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ABSTRACT
TARGETING DRONES: FRAMING, VETTING, AND POWER IN
TRANSNATIONAL ADVOCACY ISSUE NETWORKS
SEPTEMBER 2021
ALEXANDRIA JANE NYLEN
B.A., UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Charli Carpenter

Existing international relations literature shows that coherent messaging by advocacy
networks is a key component for successful transnational mobilization around human
security issues. However, traditional models of transnational advocacy do not fully explain
how activists working against armed drones have mobilized over the past two decades.
This dissertation explores the case of a transnational advocacy coalition that – despite
efforts to do so – was unable to coalesce around a central message: the anti-drone issue
network. I ask two interrelated questions: 1) Why have international anti-drone activists
not been able to overcome disagreements over framings? and more broadly, 2) How do
actors with differing levels of geopolitical power navigate a transnational human security
network? Drawing on an original text and picture dataset of 300 anti-drone advocacy
documents, 38 in-depth interviews with key informants, and multi-sited fieldwork, I argue
that distinct exertions of power by specific, geographically disparate actors affected the
overall issue network’s ability to cohere around a unifying frame. Specifically, partnering
vii

decisions at every level of the network were impacted by an original concept that I call
“inverse vetting” – a process through which less materially and geographically powerful
network actors legitimize the advocacy framings of more powerful groups by partnering
with them or not.
I demonstrate this argument through three empirical chapters that examine different
levels of the transnational advocacy network against drones. In the first empirical chapter,
I focus on the most powerful actors in the network: international non-governmental
organizations that lobby international organizations. I then analyze US-based activists who
primarily petition their own government over its drone policies. The last empirical chapter
examines a violence-affected segment of the anti-drone network in Pakistan. Each of these
chapters explore how power is operative in transnational advocacy networks through the
mechanism of inverse vetting. I argue that inverse vetting demonstrates how actors who
are traditionally considered the least enfranchised members of a network can affect the
overall coherency of an advocacy campaign by making their voices and interests heard.

viii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS………………………………………………………… v
ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………………………. vi
LIST OF TABLES………………………………………………………………….. xi
LIST OF FIGURES……………………………………………………………….. xii
CHAPTER
1. INTRODUCTION……………………………………………………………….. 1
Puzzle and Research Questions…………………………………………………….. 1
Possible Explanations……………………………………………………………… 4
Argument………………………………………..………………………………...... 6
What is a Drone?...…………………………………………………………………. 7
Significance in International Security……………………………………………….. 9
Which Laws Apply to Drone Strikes? …………………………………………….. 11
Conflating Targeted Killing with Drones………………………………………..… 13
Emergence of an International Activist Response………………………………… 15
Key Concepts: Anti-Drone Activism……………………………………………… 16
Coherent Networked Advocacy…………………………………………………... 17
Inverse Vetting……………………………………………………………………. 19
Frames and Frame Typology……………………………………………………… 20
Methods and Analysis……………………………………………………………... 25
Dissertation Layout……………………………………………………………….. 33
2. “INVERSE VETTING”……………..…………………………………………. 36

ix

Introduction……………………………………………………………………… 36
Institutional Politics of Transnational Advocacy………………………………….. 37
Power and Positionality in Transnational Networks …….………………………... 41
Transnational Advocacy Processes………………………………………………... 46
Theorizing Armed Drones………...………………………………………………. 52
Conclusion: Theorizing Power and Inverse Vetting……...………………………... 56
3. “A VERY WIDE CHURCH”……………...……………………………………. 61
Introduction………………………………………………………………………. 61
Transnational Civil Society Mobilizing Around Drones………………………….... 66
Competing Transnational Frames…………………………………………………. 68
Complicating Cooperation…...……………………………………………………. 75
The Case of EFAD………………...…………………………………………….... 77
Discussion and Conclusion…….………………………………………………...... 80
4. “AN EXAMINATION OF CONSCIENCE”…..……………………………... 83
Introduction……………………………………………………………………..... 83
The Domestic Network Actors……….…………………………………………... 87
US Civil Society Mobilizing Against Drones……………………………………..... 90
Ethical Framing of “Ban Drones”………………………………………………… 93
Secular Ethical “Ban Drones” Frame”…………………………………………...... 94
Faith-Based Ethical “Ban Drones” Frame……………………………………….. 102
Ethical Frames Facilitating and Complicating Partnerships………..……………... 107
Discussion and Conclusion……………………………………………………… 115
5. “VETTING THE BOOMERANG”.…………………………………….……. 118
Introduction……………………………………………………………………... 118
Theorizing Relationships Between Activists in the Global North and South……... 122
Case Selection Logic……………………………………………………………... 124
x

U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan …………………………………………………... 124
Pakistan’s Ambiguous Stance on U.S. Drones …………………………………... 127
Pakistani Civil Society Mobilizing Against Drones……………………………….. 128
Skepticism Towards INGOs and Transnational Civil Society……………………. 132
Drones as Only Part of a Bigger Problem………………………………………... 138
Making Connections…………………………………………………………...… 143
Discussion and Conclusion……………………………………………………… 149
6. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION……………………………………... 152
Introduction……………………………………………………………………... 152
Inverse Vetting and Power in Transnational Advocacy Networks……………....... 154
Vetting Dynamics Between the Global North & South………………………....... 154
Vetting Dynamics within the Global North………………………........................... 155
Implications of Inverse Vetting for Advocacy Networks……………………….... 157
Looking Forward………………………....………………………........................... 161
BIBLIOGRAPHY………………………………………………………………... 165

xi

LIST OF TABLES
Table

Page

1.1: Frame Typology………………………………………………….…………... 23
3.1 Overall Frame Typology with Relevant Meta-Frames Highlighted…………....... 69

xii

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure

Page

1.1: Conceptual Overview of Issue Network and Levels (Author, 2021)…….……. 30
1.2 Illustrative Diagram of Drone Advocacy Issue Network (Author, 2021)………. 31
2.1 The Inverse Boomerang (Pallas, 2017)………………………………………… 58
2.2 The Inverse Boomerang (Pallas, 2017) with Author’s Conceptual Addition…… 58
3.1 Example of “Lawful Usage” Frame in Amnesty International Report, 2014…... 70
3.2 Example of “Lawful Usage” Frame from TBIJ’s Website …………………….. 70
3.3 Example of “Ban Drones” Frame from Drone Wars UK Website, 2020……… 71
3.4 Example of “Ban Drones” Frame on War on Want’s Website ………………... 72
4.1 Example of Ethical Argument in Anti-War Frame from Knowdrones.com…… 94
4.2 Example of Ethical Argument in Anti-War Frame from CodePink....................... 95
4.3: 2017 Anti-Drone Television Ad Targeting Drone Base Communities I………. 96
4.4: 2017 Anti-Drone Television Ad Targeting Drone Operators II………………. 97
4.5: Scaled 8-Foot-Long Drone Model Created by Interviewee…………………… 98
4.6 Street Art in New York City I, NY by Essam Adam Attia……………………... 99
4.7: Street Art in New York City II, NY by Essam Adam Attia………………….. 100
4.8: Anti-Drone Art by Essam Adam Attia………………………………………. 101
4.9: The Interfaith Network on Drone Warfare’s Traveling “Peace Quilt”…….… 105
4.10: Banner from Amnesty International’s 2013 “Game of Drones” Tour……… 113
5.1: “Lawful Usage” Frame on FFR’s Drone Portal…………………………….... 145
5.2: FFR’s Anti-Drone Campaign Partner Page………………………………….. 147

xiii

CHAPTER 1
INTORDUCTION:
The Transnational Armed Drone Issue

Puzzle and Research Questions
“I am feeling a lot of frustration with the drone folk,” Max1 sighed, shaking their
head. Max works as a media communications expert at an organization focused on
helping nonprofits amplify their various mission goals in the mainstream media. They
coordinate communication between advocacy organizations working on armed drones,
like Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty International (AI), Center for Civilians in
Conflict (CIVIC), and others. While they are generally surprised at the large amount of
effort it takes to coordinate joint events with these groups on drones, they reported that
their largest frustration yet was with the silence from these activists regarding the January
2020 Baghdad strike that killed the Iranian General Qasem Soleimani.
While the US government defended the strike as a legitimate “targeted killing”
within its broader “war against terrorists,”2 the Gen. Soleimani killing represents a
dramatic evolution in US drone policy. As the head of the Revolutionary Guard’s Quds
Force, Gen. Soleimani was Iran’s most powerful intelligence and security officer.3 The
January strike was the first killing by drone of an official whose government the US is
not at war with. Given Gen. Soleimani’s prominence, the strike ratcheted up tensions to

1

Name changed as per participant request and gender-neutral pronouns to conceal
identity: “they/them/their’s”
2
Gearan and Itkowitz, 2020
3
The US and Israel both officially designated Gen. Soleimani a “terrorist”
1

a fever-pitch between the US and Iran. Experts were quick to point out the possible legal
violations of this strike.4 Notably, the strike apparently occurred without the consent of
the Iraqi government,5 and without the consent of US Congress.6 Some contend, at the
very least, that the collateral deaths of nine other individuals caused by the strike were
almost certainly illegal. But, despite the action’s dubious legality, international anti-drone
activists did not release a timely joint statement acknowledging the strike.7
The absence of a public response from the anti-drone activists is not the result of
a lack of effort on the part of specific actors within that community. For example, Max
attempted to coordinate a simple and decisive joint statement on the Soleimani killing the
moment after they heard about the strike. However, according to them, back-and-forth
quibbling between key actors over framing resulted in a failure to produce such a
statement for more than a month after the strike. This is despite the shared and
expressed goal of activist community to make coordinated public comments on dronerelated current events.
The disagreements reportedly centered around language. Some organizations
wanted to take as strong of a stance as possible and call the January 2020 strike “illegal”
and use it as a way to demonstrate the insidiousness of drone warfare. However, HRW
and AI were approaching the situation with an abundance of caution and were both
hesitant to label the strike as “illegal.” In light of this resistance from the two human
rights gatekeepers, other actors suggested that rather than producing a novel joint
statement, the anti-drone community should compile and re-release its past statements
on drones. However, HRW and AI were, at the time of writing, unwilling to accept this
compromise.

4

Carpenter, 2020
Johnson, 2020
6
Zraick, 2020
7
Yeung, 2020
5

2

The Soleimani strike seems to be just the type of lightening-rod external event
that can activate and reinvigorate transnational human security campaigns. This vignette
offers a particularly powerful and contemporary example of the transnational anti-drone
activists’ inability to come together in a key moment. This is not an isolated incident, nor
a recent trend, within this specific advocacy community. On the contrary, this story
exemplifies the centrality of internal discord over framing decisions in transnational
actors’ attempts to organize joint advocacy activities, after they have already deemed the
issue as a legitimate topic for advocacy.
Disagreements and internal squabbles are common and normal for activists
attempting to work together in nascent human security campaigns.8 However, activists
working on issues that enjoy a robust and sustained civil society interest – such as
landmines and killer robots – typically overcome these arguments through compromise
or elite consolidation around a “vanilla” umbrella frame.9 Alternatively, if no compromise
around framing can be found or if powerful advocacy organizations do not want to work
on the subject, the issue may fade away and/or die.10 In addition to these factors,
international relations literature shows that issues regarding bodily harm to vulnerable
populations are particularly salient for garnering civil society’s attention, and that
advocacy topics that easily graft onto preexisting transnational issues are more likely to
form robust campaigns through processes of conceptual interlinkage, norm cascades and
band-wagoning.11 The anti-drone advocacy issue is theoretically interesting from these
standpoints, as activists have not found an overarching frame compromise, yet they have
persisted in focusing on the issue topic of armed drones for well over a decade.

8

Bahçecik 2019; Carpenter 2007
Mekata 2000; Stroup and Wong, 2017; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Breen 2019
10
Carpenter, 2014
11
Winston 2018; Lake and Wong 2009; Haddad 2013; Florini 1996
9

3

In light of this, my project asks two interrelated questions: 1) Why have
international anti-drone activists not been able to overcome disagreements over
framings? and more broadly, 2) How do actors with differing levels of geopolitical power
navigate a transnational human security network?
Possible Explanations
There are a couple alternative explanations for the lack of an overarching
campaign message, one external and one internal. First, explanations for this lack of
cohesive transnational advocacy might point beyond the tactics and strategies of the
activists themselves and to a hostile political opportunity structure regarding the
regulation of armed drone issue. Political opportunity structures are the objective,
external institutional environment in which contentious politics takes place – they define
“the nature of resources and constraints external to the challenging group.”12 States are
generally theorized as being largely unresponsive to civil society attempts to reign in their
power on issues central to national security.13 However, the presence of challenging
political opportunity structures does not fully explain the case of fragmented drone
advocacy from both empirical and theoretical levels.
On an empirical level, there is actually a widening of state interest in addressing or
at least engaging with specific aspects regarding the regulation of drones: proliferation
and assassination. While states may have been reticent to address the use of drones when
there was only one primary state user (the United States) and a small pool of potential
targets (al-Qaeda and its affiliates), the increasingly bold and sophisticated instances of
nonstate usage – such as the 2019 attack on a Saudi oil field14 and the attempted

12

Meyer, 2009: 19; Tilly, 1978; McAdam, 1982; Tarrrow, 1998
Baldwin 1993; Waltz 2001
14
This attack was claimed by Houthi rebels, but a majority of international actors like the
US, France, Germany and Saudi Arabia blame Iran (Hubbard, Karsz and Reed, 2019)
13

4

assassination on Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro15 by drone in 2018 – firmly
situates export and proliferation control as a national security issue.16 Additionally, as the
January 2020 US drone strike on Iranian General Qasem Soleimani shows, prohibition
norms surrounding the lethal targeting of state officials may be crumbling.17 On a
theoretical level, substantial transnational mobilization against an expanded state practice
can still occur even in the presence of long odds.18 Indeed, transnational activists have
launched successful campaigns aimed at banning weapons states once considered
important to their military arsenal, such as anti-personnel landmines, cluster munitions
and nuclear weapons.19
Second, turning inward to the anti-drone activist community, another potential
explanation for a lack of cohesive messaging against armed drones is disinterest from
elite transnational civil society organizations in anti-drone campaigning.20 Theory
suggests that powerful international organizations like Human Rights watch act as
“gatekeepers” that can legitimate or ignore various human security issues.21 The effect of
a gatekeeper’s lack of interest in an issue is that the issue does not become a transnational
campaign.22 For example, when local activists who wanted to ban male circumcision were
turned down as partners by large international organizations, their proposed issue was
kept off the transnational advocacy “agenda” and they were unable to spark a global
campaign to end the practice.23 However, unlike in many of these cases where elite civil

15

It is still unclear who conducted this attack; a wide array of claims have been leveled,
from anti-government forces to the potential of a false flag operation to solidify regime
power (Franke, 2018)
16
Milan and Bassiri Tabrizi 2020; Chávez and Swed 2021; Senn and Troy, 2017: 210;
Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann, 2016
17
Thomas 2001, 2005; Carpenter, 2020; Banka and Quinn 2018
18
Bayat, 2013; Goodwin and Jasper, 1999
19
Garcia, 2015; Rosert 2019
20
Park, Murdie, and Davis 2019
21
Bob, 2009
22
Carpenter, 2014
23
Ibid
5

society actors need to be convinced that a particular issue is worth their time, gatekeeper
organizations were some of the earliest “adopters” of the armed drone issue. For
example, AI, HRW and CIVIC all launched highly publicized reports on the US use of
armed drones for targeted killing as early as 2010.24
Argument
The above factors – an opening political opportunity structure and the preexisting engagement of gatekeeper organizations – suggest that the anti-drone advocacy
issue should be ripe for a robust transnational advocacy campaign in favor of regulating
or banning armed drones.25 However, anti-drone activists have not been able to
overcome their fundamental differences in how they frame the “problem of drones.”
Indeed, the complexity of the armed drone issue lends itself to a variety of human
security frames and advocacy groups hold differing ideas of the “true” problem.
This dissertation explores the case of a transnational advocacy coalition that –
despite efforts to do so – was unable to coalesce around a central message: the antidrone issue network. I analyze internal networking processes in order to understand why
the anti-drone community did not coalesce around a specific framing, despite the drone
issue’s seeming conduciveness to transnational campaigning. Drawing on an original text
and picture dataset of 300 anti-drone advocacy documents, 38 in-depth interviews with
key informants, and multi-sited fieldwork, I argue that distinct exertions of power by
specific, geologically disparate actors affected the overall issue network’s ability to cohere
around a unifying frame. Specifically, partnering decisions at every level of the network
were impacted by an original concept that I call “inverse vetting.” Inverse vetting builds
on the theoretical concept of “elite vetting,” which shows that the most powerful actors

24

Kenneth Roth 2010; “The Civilian Impact of Drones: Unexamined Costs, Unanswered
Questions,” 2012; “Will I Be Next?: U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan,” 2013
25
Park, Murdie, and Davis 2019; Della Porta and Tarrow, 2005; Tarrow, 2005; Meyer
2003; Bob, 2009; Carpenter, 2014
6

in an advocacy network oftentimes determine which human security issues emerge as
campaigns.26 Alternatively, I argue that inverse vetting is a process through which less
materially and geographically powerful network actors legitimize the advocacy framings
of more powerful groups by partnering with them or not. As I will develop throughout
this dissertation, inverse vetting is a relational process between actors with varying levels
of geopolitical power that can influence the coherence of a human security campaign. In
this case for example, the most disenfranchised actors - anti-drone grassroots activists in
Pakistan - exercised power in global politics, as their actions inadvertently impacted how
the armed drone issue is campaigned around in transnational space. Thus, the anti-drone
issue network’s inability to cohere can at least partially be explained by the presence of
both elite and inverse vetting processes. This dissertation contributes to and expands the
theorizing on transnational advocacy processes focuses on traditionally less-powerful
actors.27
What is a Drone?
A military drone, or Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), is a remotely piloted
aircraft. This means that unlike traditional aerial bombers, there is no human inside the
cockpit. Instead, drone pilots operate the vehicles hundreds, oftentimes thousands, of
miles away.28 Drones also differ from fully autonomous weapons, since there is still a
human pilot operating the aircraft and strikes are based on human decision-making
processes.29 Military drones come in multiple models, such as General Atomics’ MQ-9
Reaper and MQ-1 Predator. They are also dual use – with models specializing in strike

26

Carpenter, 2014
Arensman, van Wessel, and Hilhorst, 2017; Bownas ,2017; Capie, 2012; de Almagro,
2018; Hauf, 2017; Hertel, 2006; Irvine, 2013; Pallas, 2017; Pallas and Nguyen, 2018;
Pallas and Urpelainen, 2013; Schramm and Sändig, 2018; Temper, 2019; Wajner, 2017
28
For a fascinating and critical take on the history of bombing and its connection to
imperialism, see Lindqvist, 2001
29
Umbrello, 2019
27

7

capabilities, surveillance capabilities, or both.30 Drones can be used in support of troops
on the ground but also in independent targeted strike operations. Another key defining
characteristic of drones are which operational chains of command they fall under— the
Pentagon and the Central Intelligence Agency are both capable of running
reconnaissance and lethal international drone operations.31
As drone technologies are rapidly proliferating in civilian life, there can be
confusion amongst non-experts on what the issue actually is.32 Drone technology is
currently being used in multiple dimensions of everyday life – from the use of small
drones for photography and videography purposes to their role in Amazon deliveries.33
There is a massive research and development drive focused entirely on evolving drones
from their original use in the military to a significant role in commerce and civil
government applications, such as in farming.34 Goldman Sachs anticipates that this
domestic civilian “market opportunity” is the “fastest growing” sector – around $30
billion; while still estimating the military R&D potential at $70 billion.35 The domestic use
of nonmilitary drones are certainly without controversies of their own – especially when
it comes to issues of policing and surveillance.36 For example, in Summer 2020, domestic
drones stoked controversy for their use by police to monitor peaceful demonstrations

30

Drones are increasingly being used for commercial and civilian purposes, such as in
agriculture, photography and package delivery (Schulzke, 2019). They are also
increasingly being used in domestic police forces for purposes such as border monitoring
(Csernatoni, 2018). This dissertation is only concerned with their military use outside of
the user state’s borders in pursuit of national security objectives.
31
However, this trend may be changing more in favor of the Pentagon as it draws back
support for the CIA operations (Barnes and Schmitt 2020)
32
Suhrke, 2019
33
“Drones: Reporting for Work,” n.d.
34
Schulzke, 2019; “Drones: Reporting for Work,” n.d.
35
Goldman Sachs, n.d.
36
Davis 2019; Heen, Lieberman, and Miethe 2018
8

associated with the Black Lives Matter movement.37 Again, however, this is beyond the
purview of this dissertation which is only concerned with military usage of drones.
Significance in International Security
Military drone technology is rapidly proliferating – both state and nonstate actors
are solidifying patterns of use that are in turn affecting how contemporary wars are
fought.38 As of 2020, 120 countries have acquired some model of military drone and 11
have used armed drones in combat.39 As the technological first-mover, since 2001 the US
has launched over 4,700 confirmed strikes in seven different countries: Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Libya.40 The Obama Administration massively
expanded the targeted killing program started by the Bush Administration,41 with an
increase in drone development, strike numbers, deaths, geographical scope, and
institutionalization.42 Bolstered by the previous Administration’s bureaucratizing of the
legal and policy framework, these upward trends continued under the Trump
Administration.43 Within its first in office, the quantity of strikes doubled in Somalia,
tripled in Yemen, while also increasing in Pakistan.44 Since 2001, these strikes have
resulted in between 7,275 - 10,586 total deaths, according to differing nongovernmental
accounts,45 with 737-1,551 of these estimated as civilian deaths.46

37

Biddle, 2021
Senn and Troy, 2017; Horowitz, Kreps, and Fuhrmann, 2016; Kreps and Zenko, 2014
39
PAX, 2020
40
Savage, 2015; The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 2018
41
McCriken 2011; The first recorded U.S. drone strike occurred on November 2001 in
Kabul, Afghanistan, killing an estimated seven people. The Bush Administration oversaw
50 total drone strikes, all concentrated towards the end of his last term, all inside
Afghanistan.
42
Jameel, 2016: 6; Within Obama’s first two terms in office, the number of drone strikes
increased six times over, and deaths quadrupled.
43
But also see Yousaf 2020
44
Purkiss, Serle and Fielding-Smith, 2017
45
Ibid. These numbers do not include the number of drone strikes in the ongoing air war
in Syria and Iraq, or Israeli drone activity in Gaza.
46
Civilian casualty counting in regard to drone strikes has been contested, with the U.S.
government citing only 116 total civilian deaths. The discrepancy between the
38

9

While the US continues to remain the primary user of armed drones in the
international sphere, the drone issue is an inherently transnational one.47 The US drone
program relies on a well-developed international security architecture for proper
functioning.48 For example, the Ramstein airbase in Germany houses the satellite relay
station that grants drone operators in the US the ability to communicate with UAVs
striking in the Middle East, North Africa and Afghanistan.49 Niger Air Base 201 in
Agadez further demonstrates the complex and deeply transnational nature of US drone
operations. While this base is owned by the Nigerien military, it was built, paid for and is
operated by the US as a launching point for armed UAV operations in the Sahel.50
In addition to functioning as enabling partners for US operations, EU states and
the UK also have their own policies on the development and use of armed drones.51 For
example, the UK has its own small fleet of Reaper drones, with plans to acquire the new
“SkyGuardian” version of the former Predator drone.52 The British military and
intelligence services have also pursued targeted killing operations independent from the
US command and control. Meanwhile, the EU is currently laying the groundwork to
develop the first multinational armed drone as part of the new European Defense Fund
(EDF) – the first model being Airbus’s “Eurodrone.” Germany, France, Italy and Spain
collaborated on its development, and the “Eurodrone” will be strike-capable when it
reaches flying stage sometime in 2020.53 On this topic, Airbus’s CEO stated that the
distribution of strike-capable models will depend on the “political sensitivities” within

government’s numbers and independent reports likely arises from a difference in
definition of combatant and civilian (Kreps and Kaag, 2014)
47
Welch, 2021
48
Cannon, 2020
49
Scahil, 2015
50
Rempfer, 2020
51
Mair, Minor, and Holder 2017
52
“An Overview of Britain’s Drones and Drone Development Projects,” 2021
53
ibid
10

each EU user nation.54 These varying levels of partner-state complicity in US operations,
along with the development of independent drone programs by different users,
complicates the work of transnational activists. The diffused nature of drone warfare
creates a problem of scale regarding decisions by activists on which governments to
target.
Understanding the parameters and idiosyncrasies of the “drone debates” in the
wider international sphere is a necessary first step before analyzing the more specific case
of contestation within drone-related transnational advocacy. This is because the
conceptual ambiguities that arise from these broader debates contribute to the frame
disputes amongst activists. These effects are most notable in discussions around the
relationship between the drone technology and the policy of targeted killing.55 Below I will
detail a few aspects of the debates - and the foreign policy shifts which gave rise to them
- that are relevant to my dissertation’s subject.
Which Laws Apply to Drone Strikes?
Since the US has been the overwhelming sole-user of armed drones for the
majority of the past two decades, its patterns of use solidified precedents and set the
terms of the drone debates. US drone operations fall in line with the US’s overall
approach to its “war against terrorists:” that the country is engaged in an ongoing and
shifting global conflict.56 This foreign policy approach began after 9/11 when the Bush
Administration took the position that the US should treat terrorism as an act of war
rather than one of crime, and that they should not restrict combat operations to a single
battleground.57 Under this “war paradigm,” the Bush Administration legalized its war in
Iraq and its use of renditions and “enhanced interrogations,” and the Obama

54

Sprenger, 2018
Cortright, Fairhurst, and Wall 2015
56
Brunstetter and Jimenez-Bacardi 2015; Fisk and Ramos 2016
57
Savage, 2015
55

11

Administration institutionalized the use of drones for targeted killing both within and
beyond active warzones.58
All post-9/11 US Administrations have taken the unwavering legal position that
counterterrorism operations abroad fall under the jurisdiction of the Laws of Armed
Conflict (LOAC) rather than International Human Rights Law (IHRL).59 This position is
contested within international society, by both state and nonstate actors, given the fact
that the LOAC are much more permissive than IHRL in terms of civilian causalities and
lethal targeting in general.60 This has been especially true in the case of US drone usage,
since lethal strikes have occurred in areas that do not meet the threshold for a state of
armed conflict, such as in Northern Pakistan.61 As long as its drone strikes adhere to the
LOAC principles of distinction, proportionality, and military necessity, the US’s legal
position is that targeted killing via drone is legal.62
This war paradigm for drone strikes did not go uncontested; many international
human rights advocates, attorneys, international law experts, nongovernmental
organizations and state governments disagree with the US’s legal position.63 For example,
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) states that both IHL and IHRL are
applicable during armed conflict, and that as the “law of peacetime,” IHRL should
manage conduct outside recognized battlefields.64 Many other international actors argue
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that IHRL demands a “policing paradigm” for counterterrorism and drone strikes.65 This
means that targeting killing would only be legal if the suspect was posing an immediate
threat to others’ lives.66
Conflating Targeted Killing with Drones
These legal debates, and the confusion that can sometimes arise from them
within the public sphere, creates conceptual murkiness. This imprecision is the most
consequential when it conflates targeted killing – a policy – with drones – a weapons
technology.
Targeted killing is a leadership decapitation and deprivation tactic that have been
a central action in post-9/11 U.S. foreign policy.67 The US military has used targeted
killing extensively in its global counterterrorism operations to deprive groups like alQaeda and Daesh of their leadership with the ultimate goal of scattering the
organizations.68 Proponents of targeted killing claim that these strikes have sent terrorist
groups into a hard-to-reverse decline.69 While armed drones have been the primary
weapon platform from which these US counterterrorism strikes have occurred, targeted
killing can be undertaken with a number of weapons.70 Indeed, the most publicized
example of a targeted killing by the US military was the SEAL Team raid that killed
Usama bin Laden.
Drones, on the other hand, are an unmanned aerial weapons platform capable of
launching air-to-ground laser- or radar-guided missiles, the most common of those being
Hellfire missiles. While there are a variety of drone models from different manufacturers,
the key factor that separates drones from traditional military aircraft is the fact that they
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are remotely piloted and can hover over targets waiting for an opportunity to strike.71
Armed drones are not autonomous weapons, since they require a human in the loop that
constantly controls the aircraft and makes the strike decisions. Fully autonomous
weapons – labeled “killer robots” by some international activists72 – are currently in the
research and development stage and completely remove human control from direct
targeting decisions.73 Importantly for the topic of this dissertation, the international
drone campaigners and the international “killer robot” campaigners are distinct advocacy
issue networks.74 According to the activists I spoke with, this is because many human
security activists are frustrated at the complexity of the armed drone issue and activists’
inability to settle on a coherent message. They report that activists can much more easily
frame “killer robots” in a black-and-white way: that they are inherently “bad,” while
drones fall into a shade of gray.
These differences are more than semantics. Focusing myopically on the
technology of the drone is precisely the legal tactic that the US government has
unwaveringly adopted since 2001.75 This is because, as stated earlier, the US military
argues that as long as the strikes are undertaken in a manner consistent with the
principles of war law – distinction, proportionality and necessity – their use of armed
drones are legal (again, because the entire globe is a “battle zone” under the war
paradigm).76 The drone is revered as one of the most precise weapons technologies in the
US’s arsenal in terms of targeting combatants and limiting civilian casualties,77 and the US
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military’s logic follows that drones are uniquely capable of compliance with war law,
especially when compared to bombers of the past.78 Some public intellectuals and
academics even echo this narrative of drones as uniquely humane weapons.79 This is in
spite of the fact that the US government has kept casualty numbers caused by drones
largely secret and opaque as a matter of policy.80
Conversely, many activists and scholars urge a widened view- one that
acknowledges the potential precision-strike capability of drones as a technology; but also
interrogates the US’s jus ad bellum reasoning – or the legal claim that anywhere al-Qaeda
and its affiliates hide is part of their wider war on terror – on their policy of preemptive
drone strikes outside active battlefields.81 Critics argue that conflating the technology
with the policy obfuscates legal questions about when and where the US can undertake
lethal targeting.82 These debates and the ensuing conceptual murkiness surrounding
drones and “what matters” about them also impacts how activists advocate on the issue
of armed drones— particularly in framing decisions and intra-network disagreements.
Emergence of an International Activist Response
While the Bush Administration used armed drones for lethal targeting missions
inside the active battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan, the international activist community
began concentrating on armed drones as a significant human security issue largely under
the Obama Administration. The years 2008-2106 saw a massive uptick in lethal targeting
operations via armed drones within Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia - these attacks outside
active battlefields drew the most early activist responses.83 In 2010, the Bureau of
Investigative Journalism (TBIJ) became one of the first organizations to dedicate
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significant resources towards elevating armed drones as an important security issue
through their ongoing casualty recording project.84 In 2012, both human rights and
humanitarian disarmament groups like CIVIC, AI and HRW issued in-depth reports on
the dubious legality of drone strikes outside Afghanistan and Iraq, drawing attention to
the civilian cost of such strikes.85 As will be further explored in the empirical chapters of
this dissertation, smaller organizations based all over the world also adopted armed
drones onto their agendas during this decade. The key hubs of anti-drone advocacy were
based in the US, the UK, the EU and Pakistan.
In addition to these individual organizations’ responses, anti-drone advocates also
began to collaborate with one another under the Obama years. For example, the USbased Interfaith Network on Armed Drones formed in 2014, while the EU-based
European Forum on Armed Drones (EFAD) formed in the same year. In the most
highly published example of partnerships between organizations based in the Global
North and South, CodePink partnered with the Pakistani organization Foundation for
Fundamental Rights in its protest march from Islamabad to Waziristan.86 At this same
time, Open Society Foundation (OSF) became the major funder of anti-drone advocacy
internationally, a massive project that only just tapered off in early 2021.87 With these
activities and funding patterns in mind, the bulk of transnational anti-drone work was
carried out between 2010-2021, with most activists describing issue interest as waning in
the past several years.
Key Concepts: Anti-Drone Activism
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This dissertation focuses only on activists who are opposed, either in part or in
whole, to current state use of armed military drones. While there are robust pro-drone
(mostly corporate) lobbying activities,88 these actors are beyond the purview of this
dissertation. It is important to make a note of my terminology and definition here, so
that it is useful in regard to the diversity of actors in this network. “Anti-drone” refers to
a group or individual’s broad opposition to how armed drones are currently being used
by state actors, not necessarily that they desire a wholesale weapons ban against the
technology. For example, Human Rights Watch is only concerned with whether or not
armed drones are being used legally or illegally in combat; they do not oppose the
weapon. This is different from a small peace-oriented organization like Drone Wars UK
that opposes the armed drone entirely, and advocates for the technology to be banned.
Coherent Networked Advocacy
Overall frame coherence is the dependent variable in this project, and this
terminology needs further elaboration. In order for a transnational advocacy network to
be effective, they must be able to strategically communicate a coherent message about
their goals on a particular issue to policymakers and stakeholders.89 This involves
overcoming the problem of a “frame soup,” in which multiple actors in the network
have competing, contradictory or just different preferences on how to define the human
security issue at hand.90 Indeed, fragmented and unfocused advocacy is not only
ineffective, but it may also deter interest from policymakers due to “attention fatigue.”91
If activists can overcome this jumble, a coherent advocacy message comes in the form of
an umbrella frame – the unifying call to action or “demand” on powerholders that can
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push disparate aspirations into a consolidated campaign. In this way, strategic
participatory communication in social movements is “at the heart of social change” in
transnational politics.92
Assuming other conditions are ripe in transnational politics, it is from this
consolidated human security campaign that activists might achieve some level of policy
“success” by altering the state behavior they label as “undesirable.”93 Here, we can think
of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) as the prototypical example of
a “successful” and coherent human security campaign, as the ICBL campaign had a
cogent driving frame and achieved its self-described goals of banning anti-personnel
landmines through a treaty.94 The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
(ICAN) is another example of a human security campaign that consolidated on a simple
umbrella frame (outlaw nuclear weapons) and ultimately achieved its specific goal of
creating a new international treaty.95 The more contemporary Campaign to Stop Killer
Robots, which seeks to outlaw autonomous weapons, is an illustrative example of a
campaign that faced significant internal arguments between activists over framing
initially, but eventually cohered into a targeted campaign and is still ongoing.96 Of course,
the attainment of these advocacy goals does not ensure efficacy – the mere existence of
international treaties does not mean compliance.97
My project is not meant to be a diagnostic of the “success” or “failure” of the
anti-drone campaign, nor is it meant to account for all of the factors necessary for
“human security campaign emergence.” Instead, as the first academic project on the anti-
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drone advocacy network, this project explores the various frames that constitute the
UAV “frame soup.” I study the relational processes between actors with drastically
varying levels of geopolitical power that went into trying to create an umbrella frame for
a transnational anti-drones campaign. I found that a key relational process – inverse
vetting – played a significant role in explaining why the anti-drones network was
ultimately unable to cohere around a unifying frame.
Inverse Vetting
I argue that vetting, which are inherently relational processes, can influence the
overall coherence of a transnational advocacy campaign’s framing. While elite vetting in
advocacy networks has been studied extensively, I show that both elite and inverse
vetting processes were at play in the anti-drone advocacy network. This new coalitionbuilding dynamic builds on traditional and contemporary literature transnational
advocacy processes. The conventional boomerang model of transnational advocacy
shows us that local groups will link up with better endowed international organizations
when they face challenges.98 This can potentially allow less well-resourced activists to
circumvent blockages, as these more powerful partners are thought of as bringing
tangible resources to bear, such as political access, financial resources and technical
expertise. In the words of Keck and Sikkink (2018): “For the less powerful Third World
actors, networks provide access, leverage and information (and often money) they could
not expect to have on their own.” Other studies inverse the traditional boomerang
model, as well as introduce other “types” of boomerangs that will be discussed in the
next chapter in more detail.99 The inverse boomerang model specifically suggest that
sometimes international organizations are the ones to first initiate contact with smaller
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groups when facing lobbying blockages.100 This is because diverse stakeholder
participation is thought of as boosting campaign legitimacy, and as we know from
existing work, legitimacy is the key currency of international NGOs.101
While the boomerang models are about directionality, agenda setting helps us
better understand which issues get adopted by transnational civil society. International
gatekeeper organizations are thought of as carefully “vetting” the advocacy topics they
undertake, legitimizing only a few human security issues by adding them to their
agenda.102 I combine the above-described inverse boomerang model with a new vetting
model, how actors with differing levels of power navigate an issue network. I argue that
less powerful groups “vet” partnerships and issue framings in much the same way as
gatekeeper organizations. Inverse vetting reverses the traditional advocacy vetting model,
meaning that the less powerful grassroots actor chooses whether to legitimize certain
advocacy framings by transnational groups, rather than only the other way around. When
this inverse vetting process leads to a rejected partnership this pathway towards a
unifying frame for a given global campaign becomes more muddled and fragmented. The
implication of the inverse vetting process is that it may show a mechanism through
which activists based in the Global South, or less resource-rich groups more broadly,
impact transnational advocacy.
Frames and Frame Typology
Groups advocating against drones vary in terms of professional focus,
geographical location, and size. This collection of actors includes human rights groups,
humanitarian disarmament groups, peace groups, religious groups, and individuals like
journalists and academics who self-identify as anti-drone activists.103 These communities
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have varying degrees of communication and project synergy with one another, and are
located within geographically dispersed networks in Washington, DC, New York, the
UK, the EU and Pakistan. While all of these groups take positions against state use of
armed drones, the groups vary significantly in their focus, as well as in their prescriptions.
From the human rights groups’ perspectives, the use of drone strikes outside
“active” battlefields is illegal and constitutes extrajudicial execution. Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch, alongside smaller human rights organizations,
tend to focus on the policy of targeted killing, and when it can legally be used by states.104
Their advocacy efforts center around writing reports on the consequences of specific
strikes. They also engage in litigation on behalf of victims of US strikes and pursue
government transparency regarding armed drone policies.105 In contrast, humanitarian
disarmament groups, having a relatively successful track record on banning certain
weapons technologies like landmines, have primarily focused their advocacy attention on
demonstrating that the drone itself may be inherently harmful. More specifically, these
activists are concerned that drones are uniquely destructive weapons technologies
because they might lower the threshold for the use of force by making it easier and
cheaper; that the precision-strike narrative around drones makes policymakers less likely
to ask about civilian casualties;106 and that the drone’s ability to hover wreaks extreme
psychological damage to those who live beneath them in targeted territories.107
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A third set of actors, direct action and peace groups like Code Pink are more
“hands on” in their approaches to political mobilization. For example, as part of their
“Ground the Drones” campaign, Code Pink activists have travelled to Pakistan in order
to join local activists in a solidarity march from Peshawar into what was then called the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA; now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, or KP), and
they also host an annual trip to Creech Air Force in Nevada to “shut down” its normal
operations through embodied protest.108 Religious groups in the US have formed a
robust domestic interfaith network, which focuses on the critiquing the ethics of drone
strikes and how they relate to human dignity. Religious groups employ direct action
tactics like weekly sit-ins at drone bases, while also focusing on community socialization
through sermons.109
A fourth group of activists in Pakistan vary in their substantive focuses, with
some adopting a human rights litigation approach, some working on data gathering, and
others opting for a more indigenous grassroots response. These groups typically work
directly with survivors of strikes as part of their advocacy, though the activists vary in
their willingness to network with European and American organizations.
In this study, I identify three overarching meta-frames that groups in this
transnational network utilize when naming the “problem with drones.” I refer to these
overarching concepts as “meta-frames” in order to differentiate them from the various
sub-frames that exist under each category within my typology.110 These meta-frames
include: the “Lawful Usage” Frame, the “Ban Drones” Frame and the “Neocolonialism”
Frame, and they all represent broad ways in which groups present the drone issue in their
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advocacy. As will be developed throughout this dissertation, there are important nuances
under each category and different types of groups tend to favor specific frames within
these categories. Figure 2 below contains useful information on each meta-frame, such as
a brief description, examples of specific issues, and the proposed solutions of activists
who fall into a given category.
Meta-Frames:

Description:

Specific Issues:

Solution:

“Ban Drones”
Frame

Innate
characteristics of the
drone technology is
problematic

- unethical, either
from a secular or
religious
standpoint
- lowers threshold
of force
- dual-use
function
- hampers
situational
awareness

Ban drones

“Lawful Usage”
Frame

The technology is
not inherently
problematic; policy
and current state
use (i.e. - for
targeted killing) are
the problems

- targeted killing
- violation of
sovereignty
- lack of
transparency
- lack of
accountability

Regulate drones
- Export control
- Legal guidelines
- Transparency
measures

“Neocolonial”
Frame

Technology, policy,
legacies of historical
dispossession and
hierarchy in
transnational civil
society are all parts
of the problem

- cultural
sovereignty
- societal harm
- imperialism

Transformational
demands regarding
power relations
Falls outside a
liberal universalist
ontology and
understanding of
world politics

Table 1.1: Frame Typology
The “Ban Drones” Frame focuses on the weapon platform itself, arguing that
there is something uniquely insidious about drones- for example, this could be its dualuse function, so its fluidity in moving from a surveillance mission to a kill mission, or
23

general discomfort over its “panopticon” effect- that someone is always watching.
Groups operating from peace traditions, such as those within the US-based Interfaith
Network on Drone Warfare or the UK-based Drone Wars, tend to be the most
comfortable with adopting this more radical stance. As will be further explored in the
chapter focusing on the transnational level, there is a schism within the humanitarian
disarmament community. This division is between groups that advocate for a coalition to
ban drones, similar to the one this community successfully led on anti-personnel
landmines, and those who think such an approach would actually backfire in terms of
civilian protection, given that drones are more precise and therefore less destructive than
traditional aerial bombers.
The “Lawful Usage” Frame focuses on how states deploy and use drones in
combat. In this framing, the drone technology itself is not viewed as a problem per se. In
fact, Human Rights Watch’s position on drones is that this technology, when used
correctly, can limit civilian casualties.111 Within this frame, the primary issues are
extralegal behavior, such as extrajudicial execution and violations of sovereignty. Groups
that adopt this meta-frame tend to latch onto specific aspects of usage, depending on
their organization’s professional orientation. For example, data advocacy groups like the
Bureau of Investigative Journalism tend to be more concerned with questions of
government transparency and accountability. These activists have focused a large amount
of attention on simply gaining access to information on civilian casualties and
government drone policies through actions like FOIA requests.112
The “Neocolonialism” Frame is more complicated than the above categories,
because it does not easily mesh with professionalized understandings of transnational
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advocacy and it only appears in the violence-affected level of the network. Here,
technology, policy, state control, colonial legacies, and even hierarchy in transnational
civil society are all imbricated problems. Activists who adopt this meta-frame are more
concerned with a broader tapestry of civilian harm in the drone-affected regions,
including civilian casualties by drones but also internally displaced peoples, cultural
discrimination, economic justice, and how both historical and modern colonial
underpinnings perpetuate these problems. The “problem with drones” for these
individuals then mostly surrounds societal harm, cultural sovereignty, and the potential
that the Pakistani state is complicit in the US operations.
These three meta-frames represent fundamental differences in goals, venues for
advocacy, and desired outcomes – they are the discordant ingredients within the armed
drone “frame soup” that activists were unable to unify. These various groups choose
these frames for different reasons, and the empirical chapters in this dissertation explore
these reasons. What is key is that the frames groups choose to utilize informs how they
vet potential partners. The first two meta-frames can be thought of as the
“professionalized advocacy frames,” favored by large, mainstream international groups
like Human Rights Watch. As the network diagram in the next section will show, the
actors that adopted the Neocolonialism meta-frame are disconnected from groups that
fall into these professionalized meta-frames.
Methods and Analysis
For this dissertation, I adopt a multi-methods approach to data collection and
analysis in order to study how activists communicate and coalition-build across a specific
transnational network.113 I take a deterritorialized approach to data collection, as such an
approach is particularly well-suited to examining “how ideas circulate” through
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transnational space, because it considers “temporary sites of action” (such as
conferences) alongside more fixed sites of power (such as the UN First Committee or
the EU Parliament).114 This dissertation is based on three years of research (2017-2020),
during which I conducted three distinct but interrelated methods of data collection: 1)
creating an original text and picture dataset of advocacy organization publications,
websites, and internal communications on drones; 2) conducting semi-structured
interviews with key informants from various hierarchal slices of the issue network; and 3)
field site visits to conferences and offices.
As an initial step, I compiled a master list of advocacy organizations working on
the armed drone issue through web-based research. This Excel spreadsheet categorizes
organizations based on 1) name, 2) self-identified advocacy community, 3) type of drone
advocacy tactics, 4) location, 5) policy stance on drones [if any], 6) public partnerships
with other drone organizations, and 7) contact information for key informants [when
available]. This basic information allowed me to start tracing connections between
organizations through salient information such staff overlaps between organizations,
jointly signed documents, jointly published projects, jointly attended conferences, and cohosted drone events.115 In terms of sampling, I identified key actors through jointly
signed agreements and through participant lists for anti-drone conferences and activities.
I then contacted these organizations and used a snowball sampling method to identify
other key actors. As will be discussed in Chapter Five, my interviews with Pakistani
activists came from a professional connection who has an extensive network amongst
affected actors.
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This initial research allowed me to begin compiling an original text and picture
dataset of drone advocacy documents. The database includes over 300 multimedia
artifacts, such as website pages, court filings, research reports from NGOs, local news
sources, videos/short documentaries, interactive web material, books published by the
organizations, and protest artwork. This data was collected during fieldwork, from email
listservs, and through website scraping. With the support of an undergraduate research
team, these artifacts are documented in an Excel spreadsheet according to 1) title 2)
publishing organization 3) type of artifact, 4) link to resource if available and 5) a brief
description.
In order to investigate the relationships between advocacy groups in different
slices of the network, I supplement the database with 30 in-depth semi-structured
interviews with key informants from the drone advocacy issue network. These interviews
were gathered through a snowball sampling technique and averaged 30-90 minutes. They
were collected between 2017-2020 in New York, NY, Hartford, CT, Washington DC,
and Islamabad, Pakistan as well as over Skype and phone. In order to achieve a
reasonable level of comparability between participant responses, I posed the same semistructured interview questions to individuals at three hierarchical levels of the issue
networks: transnational, domestic, and violence-affected.
Finally, I gathered data through fieldnotes taken during field visits to sites at the
transnational, national and violence-affected levels. My first field site visit occurred in
October 2017, at the Annual Humanitarian Disarmament Forum in New York. Along
with participating in workshops and breakout groups during the long weekend, this
forum granted me insights into the key actors in the elite level of the network.
Additionally, I attended a Side Event on drones at the UN Headquarters in New York
during the meeting of the First Committee of the General Assembly in 2017. This
allowed me to witness key transnational advocacy groups interacting with state
27

representatives on the issue of armed drones. At the more domestically-focused level, I
attended an interfaith conference on armed drones in 2018 at the Hartford Seminary,
along with virtually-held anti-drone peace conferences in 2020. On the violence-affected
level, I traveled to Islamabad, Pakistan in 2018 to speak with the less traditionally legible
drone activists. With the aid of a local informant, I visited various offices in the city,
including both legal offices and organizational headquarters (as well as public spaces such
as cafes and parks for security reasons) in the city and its surrounding areas.
I qualitatively coded my database, interview transcripts, and fieldnotes in NVivo
12. After conducting a preliminary round of coding, I identified key themes and patterns
in my transcripts and documentary data and created the first draft of a codebook. These
codes included information on networking dynamics and decision making as well as
framing. I use a ground theory approach to analysis. Grounded theory is inductive, as it
involves approaching data with a question and allowing theories, concepts and
hypotheses to emerge from it.116 Such a qualitative approach to studying a transnational
network “allows collecting details on (a) the meaning individual actors attach to their
network ties and the network as a whole, (b) data on informal … networks not available
through quantitative analysis, and (c) an insider view on the relationship between
informal and formal policy networks.”117
This analysis resulted in a preliminary list of broad descriptive codes, such as
“targeted killing,” “transparency issues,” and “morally wrong.” I then refined these broad
codes in the second draft codebook as I started to note patterns in the text, especially
regarding what types of groups favored which frames, and how various frames could be
organized into larger buckets, such as “drone technology is the problem” and “policy of
TK [targeted killing] is the problem.” The final codebook is organized into five sections:
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“Advocacy Tactics and Strategies,” “Network and Advocacy Dynamics,” “Political
Opportunity Structure,” “Problem with Drones,” and “Solutions.” Each of these
sections have both self-contained codes as well as subfolders such as “Challenges with
Advocacy” and “Partnering Dynamics.”
In order to systematically assess connections, I keep all data sources on all levels
of the transnational network in the same single NVivo project, separated by clearly
labeled files. For example, any mention of specific organizations or actors by a specific
network actor can be linked back to both that actor’s and organization’s top-level
cases—a function in the software that allows me to keep track of who is talking about
whom. This enables me to track ties between specific actors within the overall network
across both interviews and documentary sources and to run analytical queries within the
software across all data sources. Utilizing both the dataset as well as interviews allowed
me to triangulate my findings, investigate how the public and private faces of these actors
relate to one another, and to reach a level of consistency in responses that signaled to me
that I achieved an acceptable level of saturation.
In this dissertation, I organize the overall transnational anti-drone issue network
into three slices: activists working at the transnational level, activists working primarily at
the domestic level, and activists working closest to a violence affected region- specifically
in Pakistan. Groups operating at the transnational level primarily petition
international/regional bodies such as the UN and EU; domestic groups focus on
petitioning their own governments; and violence-affected groups work at the grassroots
level in an affected country. Within these three slices are different types of advocacy
organizations, such as human rights groups, humanitarian disarmament groups, data
transparency groups, and peace groups. The following chapters are organized along these
three network segments, and focus on relationships between and within these different
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hierarchal groups. Figure 1 below gives a conceptual overview of the issue network’s
levels.

Figure 1.1: Conceptual Overview of Issue Network and Levels
As can be seen in Figure 2 below, a network graphic created using the analytical
outputs of my NVivo analysis, partnerships tend to occur between those actors that
share common meta-frames.118 Additionally, the most common mixed-frame cooperation
happens between actors who ascribe to one of the two professionalized meta-frames: the
“Lawful Usage” Frame or the “Ban Drones” Frame. This has the effect of not only
leaving the Neocolonialism frame disconnected, but also the majority of the violenceaffected actors, since they are the ones that utilize this less dominant frame. Notable here
is that the most politically disenfranchised population in the transnational network
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remains the most tenuously connected to the overall network, which largely
conceptualizes itself as advocating on their behalf.

Figure 1.2: Illustrative Diagram of Transnational Drone Advocacy Issue Network
This dissertation is primarily interested in the stories about the role of power
within the transnational drone network that are difficult to tell in a network visualization.
First, as will be elucidated in Chapters 4 and 5, is the story of how groups with
discordant meta-frames overcome these differences and collaborate on joint advocacy
projects. For example, smaller groups within the Global North networks do not always
merely submit to the frames of the more powerful gatekeeper organizations. Even in the
instances where the coalition moves forward with a framing that not all member groups
agree with, oftentimes a careful process of coalition-building ensured that all groups felt
as though they were meaningfully included in the process. Interviews with these activists
reveal complex processes of stakeholder buy-in from less powerful organizations. In
these cases, we can see that the less powerful actors inversely vet their more powerful
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counterparts but come to a collaborative result because they felt as if their differences
were taken seriously.
Second, lack of connection to the network is not necessarily due to
powerlessness. In fact, as will be discussed in the violence-affected chapter focused on
Pakistan as well as the US domestics-focused chapter, purposely deciding not to
participate in business-as-usual in transnational civil society may be an important exercise
of power as well. We can see this in the examples of grassroots drone activists in
Pakistan choosing not to legitimize the transnational framing by accepting gatekeepers’
overtures at partnership. We can also see this in the radical anti-war American activists
who also refused to make ties with more moderate international activist partners. The
result of these inverse vetting processes were that more radical activists either to rebuffed
or heavily renegotiated the networking proposals from transnational actors. Such
decisions ultimately impact the overall cohesiveness of the armed drone network’s
messaging, since a noncollaborative result means that individual groups continue to work
with their own chosen framings of armed drones.
These processes reveal important lessons about how power flows through a
transnational network, and how actors with differing levels of geopolitical power navigate
these obstacles.119 Specifically, inverse vetting processes show how the agency of less
well-positioned actors also shapes the contours of transnational advocacy issue
networks.120 In instances of mixed-frame cooperation, which occurred across group-type
as well as positions in the network, activists stated that they felt like their understandings
were taken seriously and meaningfully addressed in decision-making processes. However,
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in cases where actors reported feeling high levels of dissatisfaction with feeling included
in joint advocacy projects, actors avoid making ties and pursue solo projects.
Dissertation Layout
The empirical chapters of this dissertation investigate the three slices of this
overall network described above. Each empirical chapter offers separate but interrelated
case studies that reveal distinct coalition-building processes within the transnational
drone issue network, while developing the inverse vetting concept and working within
the advocacy frame typology.
Chapter Two, “Inverse Vetting: Powerlessness and Power in Transnational Advocacy,”
outlines the theoretical basis and contribution of this dissertation. I put three different
bodies of academic literature into conversation with each other for the first time–
theorizing on transnational advocacy networks, social movements, and armed drones. I
further develop my original concept of inverse vetting and how it can act as a useful
diagnostic of power within advocacy issue networks.
Chapter Three, “A Very Wide Church:’ Drone Advocacy at the Transnational Level,”
maps the elite actors in the network. In this chapter, I show how processes of inverse
vetting led to a failure to coalesce around an overarching umbrella frame. In this way,
fights over frames at the transnational level correlates with missed opportunities for joint
activism with a focused and unifying message. These disagreements occur at multiple
levels within the network. On the one hand, there is an overall difference between the
groups ascribing the to the “Ban Drones” meta-frame and those who adopt the “Lawful
Usage” meta-frame. However, there is also a debate internal to the groups who gravitate
towards the “Ban Drones” meta-frame. This disagreement is largely within the
humanitarian disarmament community, which is split amongst those who desire an
outright ban of the technology and those who favor regulation. In situations where
actors overcame framing disagreements and worked together on a distinct project, the
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weaker actors describe a feeling of meaningful inclusion in the process, but only after
they pressed the more powerful actors through a process of inverse vetting. This
described “meaningful inclusion” by powerful network actors is an important condition
for coalition-building amongst groups with differing meta-frames across all levels of the
network.
Chapter Four, “An Examination of Conscience:’ Domestic Peacemakers and the Drone
Issue,” zooms in on the US-based activists who primarily petition their own governments
over its drone policies. Where the transnational level of the network has found difficulty
keeping interest and combatting issue-fatigue, this peace-focused domestic network has
sustained active lobbying and grassroots protest activities for over a decade. However,
this robust horizontal partnerships between domestic US activists does not scale up to
vertical connections. In this case, we can see both inverse and traditional vetting
dynamics at play. Gatekeeper organizations did not largely seek out these radical groups
due to perceptions that their messaging was too anti-war, while at the same time, a
number of these domestic groups did not even attempt to initiate contact with
transnationals out of frustration with their comparatively bland framings of drones.
Chapter Five, “Vetting the Boomerang: Advocating on the Armed Drone Issue from
Pakistan,” examines the violence-affected segment of the network. In this chapter, I
contextualize the transnational drone issue in terms of the domestic politics within a
drone-targeted state: Pakistan. The case study in this chapter discusses both the domestic
and international obstacles Pakistani actors face in seeking accountability for US strikes
in the tribal regions. I found that the activists who held fundamental differences in how
they frame the “problem of drones” either rebuffed or renegotiated networking
proposals through inverse vetting processes. The empirics in this chapter demonstrate
that the decisions of local actors matter alongside the choices of large international
organizations in global processes like transnational advocacy. This also shows us that the
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means through which groups achieve outcomes is important, even if it defies certain
understandings of “effective” – refusing to partner is also a strategy.
Chapter Six concludes the dissertation by drawing the insights gained from
studying different slices of the network together, and what they mean in terms of power.
I argue that power is operative in this network in two primary ways. The first is in terms
of the reproduction of geopolitics. This is evidenced in the fact that the most influential
groups are based in the states responsible for the bombings: the US, UK and Europe.
This is also reflected in the fact that the most dominant meta-frames, the “Lawful
Usage” and “Ban Drones” frames, are both squarely based in an ontologically liberal
understanding of transnational politics. The second way is in terms of responses to
power from the bottom up. While the Neocolonialism meta-frame and its adherents are
the least well connected to the overall network, I argue that this is a response by these
grassroot actors to power structures they disagree with, rather than solely a result of
powerlessness and lack of agency. In this way, actors at the other end of the boomerang
throw, who are traditionally considered the least enfranchised members of a network, are
capable of making their voices and interests heard. I close with a discussion of how these
responses might impact efficacy and a consideration about what opportunities taking
inverse vetting processes seriously might hold in terms of more egalitarian futures in
transnational advocacy.
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CHAPTER 2
Inverse Vetting:
Powerlessness and Power in Transnational Advocacy

Introduction
This dissertation brings together international relations literatures on the
institutional politics of advocacy, political sociology literatures on transnational social
movements, and a multi-disciplinary body of research on armed drones. While much has
been written in all three of these areas, these literatures have not been brought together
before. Specifically, the transnational advocacy literature has not engaged with the drone
literature, and the drone literature has not engaged with the transnational advocacy
literature. Bringing these bodies of literature into conversation with one another is of
interest to an interdisciplinary social science audience, as such a synthesis further
elucidates how power operates in transnational space.
I combine and extend these literatures by introducing the dynamic of inverse
vetting to our understanding of networked transnational advocacy. Specifically, the
inverse vetting concept contributes to the literatures on patterns of transnational
advocacy participation by disempowered actors by showing another process through
which these actors participate in transnational politics.121 Specifically, the inverse vetting
concept as defined in this dissertation deepens our understanding of the mechanisms
through which actors in a transnational network can affect the cohesiveness of overall
campaign messaging. It deepens our understandings of how actors who are considered
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the least powerful in a transnational network exert influence that reverberates up to the
transnational level. Importantly, it must be noted that the discreet actions that go into
creating this effect are largely unintentional and are in pursuit of situational goals unique
to these actors. The inverse vetting dynamic, an inherently relational process, also
demonstrates another instance of how social and ideational factors can influence
international relations.122
Institutional Politics of Transnational Advocacy
Much of the early scholarship on INGO-led campaigns highlights the altruistic
motivations of activists, and the horizontality of transnational networks. Keck and
Sikkink’s (1998) foundational study examines the ways in which individual political
entrepreneurs can change norms within world politics through concerted transnational
advocacy campaigns targeted at national governments. The authors posit that, when
successful, these morally motivated political entrepreneurs can affect foreign policy
through strategic processes of social construction.123 These processes entail reshaping
meanings around state action by constructing a once accepted practice as inappropriate
or shameful.124 This theorized ability to teach states how to “properly” conduct politics
has led some scholars to call human security INGOs, NGOs and their transnational
partners key “makers and shapers” of legitimacy and change in the international arena.125
The efficacy of INGOs is thus theorized as being dependent in part on their acceptance
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as a principled, legitimate authority in a given issue area,126 as well as on their ability to
communicate this identity to relevant audiences.127
Numerous scholars have since argued that the saliency of INGOs in global
governance is not an unqualified normative good.128 For example, research demonstrates
that institutional factors ranging from resource scarcity129 to internal decision-making
structures130 shape INGO behavior and stymie their influence. For example, rather than
attributing a numerical growth in organizations as evidence of global civil society’s
increasing robustness,131 Cooley and Ron (2002) contend that this growth causes
competition for funding between NGOs, undermining project collaborations.132 Given
the intersubjectivity and hierarchy of transnational political space, this asymmetrical
competition between organizations can ultimately influence which civil society voices get
heard and represented in elite policymaking arenas like the UN.133
Relatedly, recent studies consider how INGO authority – bestowed in the form
of deference from policy-relevant audiences134 – hobbles the most powerful INGOs like
Amnesty International from making “transformational” demands on states.135 Stroup and
Wong (2017) argue that concerns over maintaining status as authorities lead these groups
to adopt strategies that result in “vanilla victories,” which are tolerable to a wide range of
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elite global audiences.136 This is, of course, at odds with smaller “direct action”
organizations and political groups, which make comparatively radical demands and adopt
contentious and sometimes even anti-state strategies.137
Pursuing this organizational need for legitimacy and authority also impacts the
representativeness of campaigns involving activists from the Global North and South.
On the one hand, research shows that the perceived legitimacy of human security
campaigns does in part rest on how diverse they appear from the outside, with diversity
being measured by levels of Global South stakeholder involvement in the movement.138
In the words of Keck and Sikkink (2018): “For northern groups, they [Global South
partners] make credible the assertion that they are struggling with, and not only “for”,
their southern partners.” Inclusivity and fostering grassroots “ownership” are then
important factors for transnational advocacy campaign-building success and hence
desirable goals on the part of INGOs. 139 However, studies also show that campaign
diversity and effectiveness can sometimes be mutually exclusive goals.140 This is because
activists are constantly juggling network unity with network diversity.141 Additionally, the
need to access elite actors in transnational politics can lead INGO brokers to focus on
cultivating contacts with other professionalized bodies (such as donors or corporations)
while becoming less responsive to grassroots partners affected by the human security
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issue.142 Thus, ensuring political efficacy and access on the transnational level oftentimes
involves steamrolling the interests of their grassroots partners, an act that undermines
their “normative legitimacy”143 by making the network less horizontal and more
vertical.144 Furthermore, this “logics of effectiveness” approach favored by INGOs - in
which the large INGOs pursue their goals as efficiently as possible in the transnational
policy space - can create “divisions of labor” within the transnational advocacy network
that fosters competition between hierarchical factions.145 In this way, Global South
stakeholder inclusion in transnational advocacy can simultaneously appear to “empower”
disenfranchised global populations while also exacerbating global inequalities.146
Scholarship on the institutional politics of transnational advocacy sheds light on
the structural constraints imposed upon nonstate global civil society actors. It is well
established that while individuals and groups may be guided by (what they consider to
be) “principled” motivations, INGOs and NGOs are not insulated from mundane
bureaucratic pathologies and external pressures that impact institutional processes and
outcomes more generally.147 That being said, much of this literature takes a traditional
understanding of the political, in that actors’ interests are relatively fixed and rational, and
that politics primarily happen within formal channels of organizational structures and
through official communications. My dissertation builds on this literature’s insights, by
asking how actors with varying levels of geopolitical power within these structures
collaborate (or fail to collaborate) on creating a unified advocacy message. This approach
draws on another insight of this literature: that the institutional characteristics of
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influential organizations – such as access to policymakers and resource endowment –
heavily favor INGOs from European and American contexts.148
Power and Positionality in Transnational Networks
While the above scholarship offers a useful understanding of the institutional
politics involved in transnational advocacy, a different strand of literature addresses the
former’s tacit assumption that politics are largely limited to “formal” spheres.149 Scholars
in this tradition consider the overarching discursive framework of “global civil society” in
which INGOs and NGOs are embedded.150 They argue that the universalist movements
promoted by most INGOs – such as human rights, rule of law building, and economic
development – are themselves political projects that are deeply enmeshed with
hegemonic state and economic power.151 They contend that these projects are meant to
build and sustain a neoliberal “world order,” through encouraging an engaged global
citizenship.152
For this reason, some scholars see that relationships between activists – especially
between groups in the Global North and South – are inevitably ones of problematic
power relations.153 They posit that activists from less resource-rich states (or from
organizations that make transformational demands) are in disadvantaged positions to
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take part in a so-called global citizenry.154 For example, the traditional boomerang model
of transnational advocacy contends that activists in the Global South reach out to
partners in the Global North in order to circumvent local policy blockages.155 In this
conceptualization, local groups are thought of as kicking their grievances “up” to better
known and more resource-endowed European and/or American organizations, who
then advocate on the behalf of their Global South stakeholders.
More recent work focuses on the role that activists from the Global South play in
transnational advocacy networks and challenges a perceived “Northern bias” in
transnational advocacy theorizing. For example, Hauf (2017) argues that the early
advocacy literature “overstates the Northern dimension” of transnational movements at
the expense of considering how activists in the Global South also influence a given
network. Other scholars show that sometimes Global South advocacy networks do not
even reach out to Northern partners, but instead partner horizontally with one another in
order to lobby regional governments, as in the case with Vietnamese activists in the
HIV/AIDS issue area.156 Global South-based activists have also played important roles as
stakeholders in advocacy directed at governments with emerging economies, as with
campaigns against extractive industries in BRIC countries.157 This critical literature shows
that activism in the Global South - both in terms of who is advocating and which
governments they are targeting - is more vibrant and agentic than traditional international
relations theorizing portrays.158 Indeed, marginalized populations are able to participate in
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and impact transnational advocacy through various processes, even if they are much less
visible than transnational groups based in the Global North and are forced to act within
systems that are embedded in inequitable hierarchies.159
This Southern-focused transnational advocacy literature extends to reexamining
unidirectional processes such as the traditional boomerang model. For example, Pallas
(2017) suggests that “inverse boomerang” throws also exist. This occurs when global
campaigns initiated by Northern INGOs hit policy blockages and seek out stakeholders
in the Global South to bolster their perceived legitimacy.160 The “inverse boomerang” is
theorized as creating a paradox, in that Northern partnership with Southern NGOs may
boost campaign legitimacy, but it simultaneously undermines meaningful stakeholder
input.161 The initial goals and strategies of the Southern groups can be coopted by more
powerful groups, who retranslate their frames to sit better with policy relevant
audiences.162 Other studies show how repressive domestic environments can even make
the traditional boomerang pattern dangerous and undesirable for local activists.163
Other scholars argue that in addition to traditional and inverse boomerangs,
“double boomerangs” can exist as well. 164 Through the example of women’s groups in
the Balkans and their use of both UNSCR 1325 and local gender norms, Irvine (2012)
shows that activists can pressure to both international and national authorities
simultaneously to achieve their goals, while utilizing two different sets of norms.
Almagro (2018) points of the existence of “lost boomerangs” as well. A lost boomerang
occurs when the pattern of pitching ideas between claimants and large organizations
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rebounds back and forth off mutually exclusive norms.165 Temper (2019) steps out of the
boomerang model and points to the existence of “catapult” patterns of transnational
advocacy as well. In the “catapult” model, transnational organizations send information
and resources into local groups like “projectiles” in order to bolster their own campaigns
– what is important here is that external support is not always asked for by local
groups.166
These power differentials have led to disagreements over the emancipatory
potential of transnational activism and “global citizenship.” Many see that European- and
American-based INGOs are in privileged position within this liberal discourse,167 since
they oftentimes possess the technical knowledge and professionalized expertise that serve
as barriers to entry into global governance networks.168 Some critical scholars take this
point further, and argue that these attributes – intentionally or unintentionally – replicate
colonial patterns of “power and powerlessness” between INGOs and their local
partners.169 Others remain more positive, arguing that many smaller local groups across
several different issue areas have reclaimed these universalist projects in order to pursue
counter-hegemonic resistances to globalization and oppression.170
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In this dissertation, I present the dynamic of inverse vetting as displaying a
mixture of these conclusions regarding power and powerlessness in transnational politics.
On the one hand. I am careful to never describe inverse vetting as a celebration of
complete agency or a “reclaiming” of control by less powerful actors, especially those
based in the Global South. This is because many of these actors’ motivating reasons for
such vetting processes arise from interests and goals inherently shaped by historical and
contemporary political dispossession. On the other side however, I also acknowledge the
true influence, even if oftentimes unintentional, that these traditionally disenfranchised
actors have on a global advocacy issue network, specifically in terms of its coherence and
connection. At its heart, the anti-armed drone issue network story is one about discreet
decisions driven by situational interests, mediated through relational transactions.
Analyzing intra-network relationships’ abilities to shape and even drive
transnational advocacy processes can tell us about participation in global governance.
Social networks are “networks of meaning,”171 comprised of “patterns of communication
and exchange.”172 While early research on transnational advocacy networks emphasized
the “horizontal” and “reciprocal” nature of network ties, subsequent work shows that
network connectivity forms over an uneven and hierarchal terrain.173
Networks then become more than a means for amplification of voices and
transportation of information/resources; they become key sites of power within
advocacy communities, where certain meanings are elevated at the expense of others.174
For example, Charli Carpenter’s (2014) work contends that while things like moral
entrepreneurship are important, an advocacy organization’s position in the larger
network structure – and its connection to ‘gatekeeper’ organizations like Amnesty
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International – largely determines if a group’s chosen issue makes it onto the
transnational advocacy agenda.
Transnational Advocacy Processes
In order to understand these advocacy network processes and dynamics more
fully, I also draw on conceptual tools and definitions from political sociology and
comparative politics literatures on social movements. These theoretical discussions at
times overlap with international relations work on NGOs, and studies like Jackie Smith
et al (2021) show that this increasing synergy has the potential to contribute to our
overall shared knowledge of transnational activism in the 21st century.
It is first useful to distinguish between various types of transnational advocacy.175
Khagram, Riker and Sikkink’s (2002) distinctions include: transnational advocacy
networks, transnational coalitions/campaigns, and transnational social movements.
Transnational advocacy networks consist of the least formal connections out of the other
two, and are defined as international actors “who are bound together by shared values, a
common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services.”176 Transnational
coalitions/campaigns are more coordinated in terms of information exchange and
strategizing, involving “concerted efforts by multiple organizations lobbying for a
specific outcome around a certain issue.”177 A transnational social movement, as defined
by Tilly and Tarrow, is “a sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on
target authorities.”178 Social movement actors use a repertoire of tools, and consider
themselves “worthy, unified, numerous, and committed.”179 Mobilization against armed
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drones falls conceptually between the first and second categories. This mobilization is
fractured amongst distinct, loosely connected networks of organizations with differing
levels of influence, with some of these clusters producing more targeted coalitions and
even calls to action. However, as this dissertation will show, the anti-drones network is
missing “a common discourse,” leading to difficulty in making “collective claims.”180
In order to get a better understanding of advocacy messaging in the anti-drone
human security issue in transnational space, it is useful to consider theorizing on other
humanitarian disarmament campaigns. Humanitarian disarmament is a broad approach
to international security that seeks to end human suffering through developing laws on
the use of specific weapons;181 it is distinct from the traditional disarmament movement
due to its focus on the individual human as the referent of security rather than the
state.182 Transnational humanitarian disarmament campaigns, which are focused on
creating treaty law on a specific weapon, are a key way in which these activists attempt to
impact world politics and pursue their goals.183 The aim of these individual treaties is to
gradually expand the humanitarian obligations that states have towards individuals in
peace and war time, with the ultimate goal of reducing unnecessary suffering caused by
specific weapons of war.184 They do so by not only attempting to create international
treaties, but also by pioneering “norms of acceptable state behavior”185 – for example,
the “taboos” around the usage of nuclear weapons and chemical weapons can in part be
connected to transnational campaigning against these specific technologies.186
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All of these campaigns had concise external messaging regarding what was
“wrong” with each weapons technology. The most famous humanitarian disarmament
campaign is the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), which resulted in a
treaty-based ban on anti-personnel landmines and is widely considered to be the most
successful transnational campaign.187 Anti-personnel landmines were considered uniquely
harmful weapons due to the fact that they are victim-activated and unable to distinguish
between combatant and civilian; they are also oftentimes left behind as remnants of war
that accidentally get triggered by civilians.188 Humanitarian disarmament activists also
succeeded in banning the use of chemical weapons and cluster munitions,189 both of
which were campaigned against as being inherently indiscriminate in their effects on both
combatants and civilians.190
These campaigns have also been able to produce pre-emptive weapons
technology bans, such as in the case of blinding lasers, which were presented as causing
unnecessary lasting harm and suffering to victims.191 While it has not yet produced policy
outcomes, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots is a robust and active campaign trying to
preemptively ban fully autonomous weapons.192 The campaigners have framed these
weapons as potential science fiction nightmares ala The Terminator, due to the fact that a
human does not maintain meaningful control over the targeting procedures and it is
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unclear how they would be able to conform to the laws of war.193 Another contemporary
campaign, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), captured
headlines by winning the Nobel Prize in 2017 for its success in creating an international
treaty ban on nuclear weapons.194 Much like with landmines, cluster munitions, and
chemical weapons, the ICAN campaigners framed nuclear weapons as being inherently
indiscriminate and destructive since they are unable to target only combatants and cause
widespread environmental degradation.195
Advocacy frames are a particularly useful modality through which to study
relational meaning-making processes in humanitarian disarmament campaigns such as
the ones discussed above.196 On the broadest level, sociologist Erving Goffman (1974)
defined frames as the “principles of organization which govern events – at least social
events – and our intersubjective involvement with them.”197 More specifically, Gamson
and Modigliani (1987) define a frame as “a central organizing idea or story line that
provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a [strategic] connection among
them.”198 The social movement literature characterizes collective action frames as
“action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate [advocacy]
activities,” which are created through negotiation between activists. Frames are important
heuristic and strategic devices, because they have the ability to name key social problems
and suggest their solutions.199 Framing is thought to impact mobilization largely through
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variables like credibility, salience and resonance.200 For example, Jutta Joachim’s study
shows that transnational women’s groups gained traction at the U.N. after strategically
re-framing the violence against women issue from an “equality” frame to a
“development” frame.201
Advocacy frames matter in terms of understanding how activists publicly
communicate “problems” to wider audiences. While the strategic framing literature offers
a useful foundation, this project treats factors like culture and interpretation as
constituting features of framing processes, rather than as objective variables subsumed
within the larger concept.202 The epistemological value of studying processes like framing
from within activist networks prioritizes the meanings activists articulate and avoids
making a network seem more cohesive than it is.203 Such an approach more closely
examines the tensions that go into creating advocacy frames, both within groups and
between groups. The process of framing is laden with power relations, because a frame
necessarily focuses on one narrative over another.204 It signifies what can be considered
as properly political, and by extension who can be considered as a central issue
stakeholder.205 Indeed, determining whose advocacy frames “count” over others is
theorized as being integral to building the appearance of a unified transnational
campaign.206 Studying these processes is thus a useful diagnostic for inter- and intranetwork politics.207

200

Benford and Snow, 2000
Joachim, 2007
202
Goodwin and Jasper, 1999
203
Zibechi, 2012; Della Porta and Ruchts, 2013
204
Della Porta and Ruchts (2013) show that power is a dynamic both internal and
external to advocacy networks and social movements
205
Benford and Snow, 2000; for applied examples in IR: Carpenter, 2005; Bob, 2002;
2009
206
Pallas, 2017
207
Of course, frames are not the only things that determine the contours of transnational
mobilization. It is also important to consider concepts like political opportunity
structures and resource mobilization. Political opportunity structures are the objective,
201

50

The canon transnational advocacy literature oftentimes eschews the
understandings and framings of local actors in favor of looking at how larger
organizations mobilize on their behalf and present the issue to wider audiences.208 This
can be seen in the theoretical assumption that once an understanding or frame is adopted
into a transnational advocacy campaign, it remains static and not contested.209 In reality,
there is an ongoing process of ideational contestation within the network even after an
“umbrella frame” emerges to “consolidate” the campaigners – and even when this frame
finds influence in policy circles, it is not just automatically accepted by individuals at the
grassroots level.210 For this reason, critical scholars of transnational advocacy and
international norm diffusion recommend focusing on the “productive power and on the
co-constitution of agents and the norms for which they advocate.”211 Going back to
Almagro’s (2018) theoretical model of the “lost boomerang,” the process of campaign
building is one of social construction that can lead to the “exclusion or annulment of
certain subject positions and discourses” when the positions of actors in a network are so
different from the mainstream that they are beyond intelligible boundaries.212 This has led
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some scholars to call localization – the process through which local activists are thought
to adapt transnational norms into local contexts – a “myth.”213
This internal frame contestation matters because disagreements can impact norm
evolution, campaign coherency and ultimately policy outcomes.214 Shareen Hertel (2007)
shows that contentious frame negotiations can occur in two patterns: an “outside-in”
pattern, in which campaigns are framed in the Global North and then imposed on
activists in the Global South, and a “dual-target pattern,” in which shared interests guide
collaborations between activists to solve problems in both the Global North and
South.215 Especially in the case of an “outside-in” framing pattern, international NGOs
are viewed as being detached from the frames of the affected population for which they
advocate. This has led some scholars and practitioners to advocate for an increased role
for “Affected Peoples’ Organizations” (APO) to frame their own human security issues
and for international NGOs to merely act in a supporting, non-framing role.216 Thus,
framing in transnational advocacy campaigns is always a battle over legitimacy and
meaning that takes place at multiple levels of the network simultaneously.217
Theorizing Armed Drones
Armed drones have captured the curiosity of many academics as well as public
intellectuals, writing from a variety of disciplines both within and outside academia.218
While expansive, the armed drone literature falls roughly into three conceptual and
thematic buckets: security studies-focused, public opinion/discourse-focused, and
law/ethics-focused.219
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Studies concerned with the efficacy of drone warfare consider whether the U.S.
policy is actually reducing national security threats or if it is causing suboptimal security
results.220 Here, “policy success” is generally treated as reducing terrorist attacks against
the US and its allies. 221 One of the most active debates in this area is over the issue of
“blowback” – or whether US drone strikes foment anti-American sentiments within the
areas being bombed.222 Another dimension of this debate is the extent to which
individuals in the targeted states support drone strikes. Reputable polling institutes such
as Pew have long reported that Pakistanis generally strongly disfavor drones. However,
Aqil Shah (2018) criticizes these polls for being misleading, while Christine Fair et al
(2016) claims NGO reporting on drones is inaccurate and biased because it relies on
television reports from affected regions.223 Both authors claim that people living in the
areas affected by the strikes are actually the most supportive of the policy. According to
Shah, this is because people living in the tribal areas comprise the population who is
most besieged by terrorism, as well as by the Pakistani army’s counterterrorism tactics.
Others have made similar arguments,224 though it is useful here to remember that
measuring any kind of civilian perceptions of violent action during conflict is
methodologically challenging since these perceptions are filtered through pre-existing
ideas of perpetrators and victims.225 Some even argue that “success” of drone strikes may
not even be possible to measure reliably.226
Another subset of drone literature studies US public opinion and popular
discourse around drones. Academics disagree over how much public opinion on foreign
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policy issues can constrain policymaking,227 and whether or not American citizens even
care about foreign policy issues.228 Recent research argues that US citizens may in fact
care quite deeply about whether or not their government respects international law and
norms.229 Additionally, public opinion polls on the armed drone issue have been difficult
barometers for Americans’ “true” sentiments on this specific foreign policy issue. This is
because the framing of survey questions on armed drones and international law in US
media are often misleading or erroneous,230 which leads to priming effects – and even
socialization effects – that favor the US government’s stance.231 The perceived “apathy”
or hawkishness on the part of the American electorate may be due to the convoluted
cultural framing of the armed drone issue, rather than a “true measure” of their
feelings.232
A large chunk of the literature considers the legality of drone warfare under
existing international law,233 as well as how drone usage may impact future laws and
norms of war, such as preventative force.234 Relatedly, a wide interdisciplinary literature
that spans from political science to critical geography considers the ethical implications
of drone warfare – oftentimes focusing on themes of distance and disembodiment in
warfare, morality, neocolonialism, or on lived civilian experiences.235 Other studies put
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forth regulatory recommendations.236 Buchannan and Keohane’s (2015) “Drone
Accountability Regime” is one of the most well-known set of policy recommendations to
come out of the scholarly drone literature. The authors argue that drone proliferation is
inevitable and that powerful states like the U.S. would not sign on to any binding legal
document dictating proper usage of drones. They identify three primary risks of drone
usage: the violation of sovereignty inherent to the technology, over-use of military
solutions, and difficulty in accountability for casualty counting. They conclude that any
legal framework should be informal and nonbinding, as well as inclusive of nonstate
actors. Their recommendations include increased transparency, enabling civil society to
hold states accountable to any abuses, and the creation of a drones Ombudsperson who
would have broad investigative responsibilities. Neta Crawford (2015) penned a rejoinder
to this article, in which she dismisses Buchannan and Keohane’s assumption that terror is
an act of war. She instead suggests a novel hybrid approach to addressing terrorism that
uses both law enforcement and military tactics. Additionally, Crawford suggests that
domestic regulation around drones must first be pioneered before designing an
international regime.237
As mentioned at the opening of this section, the drone literature and the
transnational advocacy literature has not yet overlapped. However, studying international
activists’ responses to armed drones is a useful addition to this multi-disciplinary body of
work. In terms of the more security-focused literature, studying transnational advocacy
patterns around a specific weapon can garner information on whether the security
measure is acceptable to different constituencies and populations. How much popular
support a human security advocacy campaign enjoys can act as signals and almost litmus
tests for policymakers. In part, this is why the debate detailed above over “popular
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support” for drones is so contentious – implicit (and sometimes explicit) in these
arguments is whether current security policies around drones should be continued as is,
or if they are too costly. But these studies have focused on public opinion measuring, and
not directly on transnational advocacy. Here, a more grounded study in an affected
country like Pakistan can add value. As I will explore in Chapter V, local anger at drones
(at least anecdotally) is largely aimed at the Pakistani government, rather than the US
government. This has the effect of further destabilization by further fomenting distrust
in government institutions within a nuclear armed country.
In terms of the literature subsection focused on the legality and ethicality of
armed drones, paying attention to how activists mobilize these concepts into political
action offers a useful empirical grounding. Because concepts like legality and ethicality
are socially enacted and enforced, studying one of the key processes through which these
ideas can solidify into consolidated law and norms is important.238 Additionally, by
turning analytical attention to the legal and ethical interpretations of traditionally
marginalized actors in global civil society, such as the Pakistani activists in this case, we
can also get a glimpse at which narratives and understandings of “law” are typically left
out of international law and policy discussions.239
Conclusion: Theorizing Power and Inverse Vetting
Drawing on these synergistic bodies of literature, this dissertation explores the
processes through which activists within the anti-armed drone issue network attempted
to create a unified campaign. I study hierarchal relationships within this single-issue
network in depth, in order to speak to larger questions about the role of social
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connections in global governance.240 I also build on drone-specific theorizing by
introducing a new modality – transnational activism – through which to study drones. I
see that this unique epistemological point of departure is important, as it offers a new
case for studying transnational advocacy processes and also maps a specific advocacy
issue that has not yet been addressed.
The anti-armed drone case also further illuminates the operation of power within
transnational processes. Unlike Lukes’ first face of power, where an actor has direct or
sovereign control over another, a Foucauldian approach sees power as dispersed,
constantly negotiated, and in flux.241 In other words, power is not individualized, but is
instead both produced by and productive of discourses, scientific knowledge, legal
frameworks, administrative rules, moral propositions, and a host of other sociopolitical
structures.242 Foucault’s unique approach to conceptualizing power allows us to
conceptualize a transnational advocacy network as a set of co-created power relations,
rather than a network in which some actors have more influence than others based on
their objective position economically or geographically. In doing so, it makes it possible
to see how smaller, non-gatekeeping actors produce their own discourses and positions
on a human security issue – at times actively using these discourses to assess whether the
position of larger groups fits with their own advocacy goals.
As discussed above, much of the institutional politics of INGOs literature takes a
traditional understanding of “power” and “the political.” This focus centers scholarly
attention on the actions and motivations of large, traditional advocacy organizations that
are generally headquartered in the Global North. This dissertation builds on this
literature’s insights by examining how grassroots actors can influence the strategic
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options available to activists working on the same issue from different transnational
sites.243 By doing this, my inverse vetting concept builds on contemporary theorizing on
“inverse” patterns of transnational advocacy. In order to visualize how my concept fits
into and builds off of these “inverse” transnational processes, I have replicated Pallas’s
(2017) original diagram with my own addition of where the inverse vetting takes place.
First, Pallas’s (2017) inverse boomerang model is below:

Figure 2.1 The Inverse Boomerang (Pallas, 2017)

Below, I include Pallas’s model with my own addition of where inverse vetting fits:

Figure 2.2: The inverse boomerang (Pallas, 2017) with Author’s conceptual addition
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One of the key additions to the inverse boomerang model that inverse vetting
introduces is the possibility of less powerful actors to either refuse to join altogether, or
to not join the transnationals in the manner that the transnationals desire. In both
circumstances, the less powerful actors pursue their goals in ways that impact the
cohesiveness of the overall campaign.
The consequences of assuming that power is exercised only by well-resourced
and well-connected actors misses how smaller actors present and pursue their goals; how
they resist hegemonic power within the network; and most significantly, how their
actions lead to political effects that exceed their intentions.244 Inverse vetting suggests
that rather than a single actor determining how the issue should be framed based on the
power they have, a variety of geographically and culturally dispersed actors – in resisting
and exerting their own power – seek to determine what the issue is to begin with. This has
an unintended outcome, as it contributes to the overall network’s inability to define the
problem in one meta-frame. Instead, the anti-drones work almost remains three separate
campaigns, each with their own frames, working at cross-purposes.
Relationships between activists in the Global North and South are inherently
characterized by hierarchical relationships.245 For example, the boomerang model of
advocacy contends that activists in the Global South maneuver around difficult political
opportunity structures and/or lack of resources by reaching out to groups in the Global
North.246 This model can also be reversed when global campaigns seek out partners in
the Global South to bolster their legitimacy.247 The “inverse boomerang” is theorized as
creating a paradox, in that Northern partnership with Southern NGOs may boost
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campaign legitimacy, but it simultaneously undermines meaningful stakeholder input.248
The initial goals and strategies of the Southern groups can be coopted by more powerful
groups, who retranslate their frames to sit better with policy relevant audiences –
producing the type of “vanilla victories” discussed earlier.249
All of this shows that transnational advocacy issue networks are deeply impacted
by broader geopolitical power dynamics. 250 Inverse vetting focuses on one of the
processes through which actors with varying levels of power navigate a civil society
network. This novel concept builds on and extends a growing body of literature
examining patterns of activism in the Global South, as well as the fragmenting of civil
society more broadly.251 This work contributes to research that considers the work and
motivations of grassroots activists at the “other end of the boomerang,” and how less
powerful network actors more broadly might exert influence on a transnational level.252
The preceding chapters of this dissertation explore these theoretical concepts in-depth,
as they play out in three different slices of the transnational anti-drone advocacy network.
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CHAPTER 3
“A Very Wide Church:”
Drone Advocacy at the Transnational Level

Introduction
This chapter explores the framing differences and social relationships between
the activists at the transnational level of the anti-drone network. I show that there is a
significant amount of contestation between these actors and a subsequent failure to
cohere around a single guiding anti-drone campaign frame. These disagreements
primarily center around whether to adopt the “Ban Drones” Frame or the ”Lawful
Usage” Frame. As discussed in Chapter 1, these frames are distinct and carry with them
different policy implications, and frames are a useful modality through which we can
understand power differentials between groups and how power flows across this specific
issue network. This is because the smaller groups in this network cluster tend to adopt
more radical frames considered unpalatable by larger groups. I argue that framing
disagreements between transnational actors kicked off processes of inverse vetting, in
which the less resource-rich actors pushed back and negotiated with their would-be
powerful partners.
In this chapter, I draw on a unique text and picture dataset of 300 primary
advocacy documents, 15 in-depth semi-structured interviews with key informants from
the transitional level of the armed drone network, and field site visits. In order to
determine the key network brokers at the transnational level, I attended a side event on
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armed drones at the UN, and the annual Humanitarian Disarmament Forum in 2017.253
The connections I gained granted me access to internal listservs, which include
information on advocacy planning, processes, partnering amongst the transnational level
actors as well as invitations to future events. This positioning at the center of the key site
of power within the elite cluster of the drone network also allowed me to identify
important interviewees, and to narratively map the transnational network.254
Through iterative processes of qualitative coding in NVivo 12, I identified salient
themes and patterns across both documentary and interview data sources. I found that
transnational actors have fundamental disagreements with one another over identifying
“the problem of drones.” These disagreements primarily revolve around whether drones
are an issue because of how governments use them to kill people, or because the drone
technology is inherently bad. Though these are fundamental disagreements over the
problem, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 it is common for nascent human security
campaigns to face such challenges only to either 1) fade away or 2) coalesce under an
umbrella frame.255 In this chapter, I argue that relational processes between actors,
informed by their preferred frames, prevented these activists from folding their
disagreements into one guiding advocacy message on drones.
We can see this by more closely examining a segment of the transnational level
that should be a most likely case for developing a strong, unifying anti-drone campaign
frame: the European Forum on Armed Drones (EFAD. The majority of anti-drone
organizations based in the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) are
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members of EFAD. EFAD is an active section of the transnational network, as it sends
out monthly newsletters and routinely speaks with policymakers at the EU and the UN.
EFAD is also diverse in its membership; it currently has 29 official members, including
human rights, disarmament, and peace-focused organizations ranging in staff size and
policy impact. For example, members include gatekeeper organizations like AI and Open
Society Foundations (OSF), alongside smaller NGOs like Drone Wars UK, which has a
staff of three individuals.256 EFAD’s member groups meet in-person yearly in order to
share information on each organization’s activities, discuss important developments
regarding done usage and development, and decide on the network’s action points for
the coming year. They communicate frequently throughout the year both virtually and
during conferences, such as Drone War UK’s 2020 ten-year anniversary webinar on the
future of drone warfare.
Given the density of the exchanges between members, EFAD seems like a case
within the overall anti-drone network where the activists should have been able to from
an umbrella anti-drones frame. Indeed, other human security issue areas that have
demonstrated similar levels of organizational diversity and sustained communication with
one another were able to settle on an overarching frame. For example, the Campaign to
Stop Killer Robots also has a diverse membership, with organizations from the human
rights, disarmament, computer science and peace groups.257 This campaign was able to
overcome initial in-fighting over frames – with the large gatekeepers initially hesitant to
use the science fiction terminology – and coalesce around a guiding meta-frame: the
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technology of fully autonomous weapons is inherently dangerous for its lack of human
control and should be banned, or: “Ban Autonomous Weapons.”258
But, despite its level of intra-group communication, policy work and
organizational diversity, EFAD does not have a steering committee259 and does not
consider itself a campaign against drones like the ICBL did against landmines, ICAN
does against nuclear arms260 or the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots does against fully
autonomous weapons. Instead, EFAD’s members are loosely and voluntarily bound to a
broad shared set of jointly agreed upon aspirations, codified in its “Call to Action.” This
call is aims five requests on armed drones at the EU and UN levels: “Articulate clear
policies,” “Prevent complicity,” “Ensure transparency,” “Establish accountability,” and
“Control proliferation.”261 In addition to its leaders stating that EFAD is not a campaign,
this Call to Action is different from an overarching frame because it is more aspirational
than it is a targeted message about “what is wrong with drones” and “how this problem
should be fixed with policy.” Again, in the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, the problem
and solution is clearly and cogently stated: the problem is full autonomy, and the solution
is a weapons ban.262
Given these continuing efforts to work together on joint projects, what explains
EFAD’s – and the overall transnational level’s – lack of an overarching frame? As I will
explore in this chapter, this absence of an overarching frame in part grew out of diverse
groups with diverse interests bumping up against one another to advocate for the
regulation of armed drones. I argue that the case of EFAD illuminates a wider trend
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within the transnational level of the network of how processes of inverse vetting resulted
in vague Call to Actions that represent multiple perspectives on drones rather than a
unified anti-drone frame that agrees on a problem and a policy solution.
Importantly, as will be shown in this chapter, inverse vetting processes can end in
multiple ways. In the case of EFAD, less powerful groups that prefer more radical
frames on drones reported only buying in after powerful organizations had sufficiently
and meaningfully included them in the coalition-building process. The (reported)
perception of procedural inclusion of course does not equate with achieving desired
outcomes or meaningful representation in advocacy products. Tracing these processes
illuminates how power is operative between and within the “elite” level of this
transnational issue network and illuminates how network outcomes are impacted by
power dynamics internal to coalition-building. The more powerful actors in the EFAD
subnetwork were reportedly able to achieve a sense of inclusion amongst the smaller and
more radical transnational groups to gain their organizational buy-in. As will be discussed
in Chapter 5, this same signaling towards “inclusion” and “legitimation” of differing
advocacy frames by gatekeepers is notably lacking when it comes to grassroots actors in
Pakistan.263
This chapter proceeds with a brief case background of transnational anti-drone
mobilization. I then move into an analysis of this transnational mobilization, describing
the competing frames that have characterized advocacy at this level, and delving deeper
into the specific case of EFAD. I conclude by considering what this case reveals about
power and representation in transnational advocacy.
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Transnational Civil Society Mobilizing Against Drones
The transnational anti-drone issue network hubs are located in the US and
Europe. In the US, the primary hubs are located in Washington, DC and New York, with
the human rights-focused groups mostly operating out of DC, and the disarmamentfocused groups operating out of New York. Where the human rights groups primarily
petition the US government directly, as well as the human rights bodies within the UN,
the disarmament-focused groups target the disarmament bodies within the UN.
Representatives from these key gatekeeper organizations like HRW, AI and CIVIC sit
down monthly in DC to discuss their work on drones.
Since 2010, transnational civil society groups have advocated on the use of armed
drones in three primary ways: data advocacy (or using computer science methods to
tabulate civilian casualties),264 naming and shaming through writing in-depth qualitative
reports,265 and direct lobbying of policymakers and stakeholders.266 Because advocacy is
necessarily reactive to patterns of state use, and the US has been the overwhelming sole
user until very recently, the US government has been the primary target. However, as
proliferation increases, transnational activists are widening their focus.267
The first strategy is to seek more transparency from the U.S. government about
its drone policy. Given the covert nature of the US program, both the public and
activists struggled to gain even the most basic information on the strikes.268 For this
reason, some of the earliest advocacy focused on goals of data transparency surrounding
strike locations, numbers, and deaths. The UK-based Bureau of Investigative Journalism
(TBIJ) is a pioneer within the network in this regard, essentially setting the standard for
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data advocacy on drone warfare.269 This data advocacy community is diverse in terms of
professional backgrounds, including journalists, data scientists, roboticists as well as
whistleblowers from the military, contracting and intelligence communities.
Second, human rights and disarmament advocacy groups have produced
numerous reports on the use of drones since 2010. Unlike in many other transnational
human security campaigns where elite civil society actors need to be convinced that a
particular issue is worth their time, gatekeeper organizations were some of the earliest
“adopters” of the armed drone issue.270 In 2012, CIVIC collaborated with the Human
Rights Clinic at Columbia Law school to release a report on the civilian impact of armed
drones.271 In 2013, AI and HRW coordinated a simultaneous release of two separately
researched reports on drones, with the AI report covering US drone strikes in Pakistan
and the HRW report covering the Yemen strikes.272 Along with the 2012 CIVIC and
Columbia Law School brief, these reports became three of the most highly publicized
advocacy publications on drones during the Obama years.
The third strategy is directly lobbying of policymakers and stakeholders. This
tactic is unique to the transnational groups within the issue network, given their levels of
elite access. Some groups focus on addressing state actors in official forums like the UN
and the EU, while others form professional relationships directly with stakeholders and
policymakers. For example, Article36 and other disarmament groups speak during the
meeting of the First Committee every year at the UN headquarters. In addition to this,
they host side events at the UN on specialized topics such as the humanitarian impact of
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armed drones where state representatives attend to learn about an issue more in-depth. 273
Distinct from this are the advocacy groups that solely produce content for state actors.
For example, the Oxford Research Group (ORG) creates specialized in-depth research
reports for military consumption.274 While the organization’s broad mission aligns with
other humanitarian disarmament groups, its particular tactic is to demonstrate to military
and political figures why using drones is a tactical and strategic failure not in states’ best
interests.
Competing Transnational Frames
In the words of a transparency activist from the Oxford Research Center, the
drone network is a “very wide church” with a large amount of diversity amongst its
actors.275 While these transnational actors have a baseline agreement that the armed
drone issue is worthy of valuable advocacy resources and sustained attention, they
diverge when it comes to specific organizational stances and framings of the “problem.”
Figure 1 below reintroduces my frame typology chart from Chapter 1 to explain the
difference between the two meta-frames, offering an overview in terms of definitions,
examples of what activists in these categories would consider the “key issues,” as well as
the corresponding policy solutions/recommendations.
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Meta-Frames:

Description:

Specific Issues:

Solution:

“Ban Drones”
Frame

Innate
characteristics of the
drone technology is
problematic

- unethical
- lowers threshold
of force
- dual-use
function
- hampers
situational
awareness

Ban drones

“Lawful Usage”
Frame

The technology is
not inherently
problematic; policy
and current state use
are the problems

- targeted killing
- violation of
sovereignty
- lack of
transparency
- lack of
accountability

Regulate drones
- Export control
- Legal guidelines
- Transparency
measures

Neocolonial Frame

Technology, policy,
legacies of historical
dispossession and
hierarchy in
transnational civil
society are all parts
of the problem

- cultural
sovereignty
- societal harm
- imperialism

Transformational
demands regarding
power relations

Note: Present only in
Pakistani network
segment (Ch. 3)
Table 3.1: Overall Frame Typology with Relevant Meta-Frames Highlighted
As shown in Figure 2, the policy solutions for these two groups are of course
dependent upon the framing they adopt. “Lawful Usage” activists tend towards more
status quo stances such as requesting more transparency on state parameters of lethal
targeting and regulation. On the other hand, “Ban Drones” activists generally call for
more radical policies, such as a weapon ban or extreme regulations on research and
development. These divides were reflected in the conversations I had with transnational
drone activists.
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The “Lawful Usage” frame is the preferred frame of the gatekeeper organizations
within the transnational level. As stated earlier, this frame encompasses legalistic
positions, exemplified in the following statement by the Deputy Washington Director of
Human Rights Watch during our conversation:
“I don’t have a problem with the weapon itself… The problem I have is the
approach to killing people because they are on a list of people who should be
killed. That has nothing to do with armed drones per se… I mean the
problem again when talking about drones is that I don’t think that they need
anything special. I think that states and other actors should only use weapons
in accordance with the law.”276
This same position, that drones are an issue of policy and not technology, is mirrored in
an Amnesty International infographic (Figure 3) from my dataset:

Figure 3.2: Example of “Lawful Usage” Frame in Amnesty International Report, 2014
While predominate amongst the large human rights organizations, other types of
influential network actors also adopt the “Lawful Usage” frame with different
professional emphases. For example, CIVIC, an international humanitarian law group,
focuses on detention and criminal prosecution of suspected terrorists as an alternative
approach to targeted killing. Additionally, the group advocates for “ensuring drone
strikes include precautionary measures to mitigate civilian harm” rather than an all-out
ban of the technology.277 The Oxford Research Center focuses on remote warfare as a
strategy of combat more broadly, with its program head stating that “the means of
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delivery is much less important” to them than the “misguided” policy belief that targeted
strikes work.278 There are also groups such as New America Foundation and The Bureau
of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ) that focus solely on drone data reporting, with
increased governmental transparency as their key goal. Below in Figure 4 is an example
of the organizational goal of transparency, from TBIJ’s website:

Figure 3.3: Example of “Lawful Usage” Frame from TBIJ’s Website
The “Ban Drones” frame tends to be adopted by less influential – but still
important – groups within the transnationals. For example, the director of Drone Wars
UK argues that “there is something specific about the technological potentials [of
drones], which merits addressing.”279 According to this organization, these drone-specific
potentials include risk transfer, lowering the threshold for warfare, and “PlayStation
warfare” – a distancing function of the drone that supposedly makes lethal targeting
decisions easier and civilian harm more likely. These groups are more likely to adopt the
name “killer drones” within their advocacy; a framing that leads to the more radical
proposed policy solution of “grounding” the technology. This is exemplified in the
banner below from an anti-drone rally hosted by Drone Wars UK and their partners in
the UK Drone Campaign Network:
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Figure 3.4: Example of “Ban Drones” Frame from Drone Wars UK Website, 2020
Some of these groups even go as far to describe drone technologies as inherently
“indiscriminate” – meaning that it is uniquely destructive amongst other weapons to
human life. This is in exact opposition to many of the international human rights groups’
views on drones, which sees them as potentially more humane than traditional weapons.
This position is stated clearly by War on Want below in Figure 6, in which they equate
drones to the destructive potential of banned technologies like anti-personnel landmines:

Figure 3.5: Example of “Ban Drones” Frame on War on Want’s Website
Practitioners are quite aware of these differences in issue frames and were eager
to discuss how they perceived the cleavages in the movement. For example, as one
Europe-based drone activist mapped out the key “fissure:”
“I would say that there are kind of two broad groups. But again, they break down
into subsets... One is [the group] who have a fundamental problem with the
technology, who would say that it lowers the threshold and is making the world
less safe… And then there are those who say ‘well, drones are no different from
other platforms, but it’s the way they are being used, they are being used for
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targeted killing, and that’s the problem- so we don’t have a problem with the
technologies, it’s how they are being used.’”
Framing disagreements can be viewed within groups of the same type as well.
While human rights groups generally correlate to the “Lawful Usage” meta-frame and
peace groups with the “Ban Drones” meta-frame, there is an internal debate within the
humanitarian disarmament community on which framing to adopt, and how radical of a
stance they should take. The humanitarian disarmament community largely employs the
“Lawful Usage” frame, yet there are a significant minority that wish to pursue the more
radical “Ban Drones” frame, as explained by an activist from Reaching Critical Will:
“Some people within the humanitarian disarmament community find it difficult
to know where they would sink their teeth into the drones issue. Because they
can’t quite agree as a group. Not everyone is a pacifist, right? In fact, a lot
of them aren’t [pacifist] in the humanitarian disarmament community… So they
don’t see the drone itself as a problematic. Whereas humanitarian disarmament
people have largely been about banning classes of weapons that are seen as
inhumane. And that it’s really difficult to make the argument that drones are
inhumane… It’s a slippery thing to argue.”
In addition to merely being aware of these differences, there are also tensions
between the “Ban Drones” and “Lawful Usage” groups. Each express varying levels of
frustration that the other does not understand the true problem. As one activist stated:
“people kind of constantly say to us, well what’s the difference between drones and an F16… A lot of drone campaigners are being technology blind- they focus on just the
policy of how these things are being used.”280 A disarmament activist views the more
moderate “Lawful Usage” framing as capitulating too much to national governments:
“Accountability or transparency [approaches are] sort of like ‘if you are going to do this, can
you do it a little more nicely?’ And I obviously want that as a first step, but that feels to me
somewhat a bit like giving in a bit.”281 Another activist from a separate humanitarian
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disarmament organization echoed this concern, stating that the “emphasis on transfer
and proliferation” that many within the network adopt “seems like giving in too
much.”282
Others within the “Ban Drones” frame echoed this concern and actually accused
the overall “meekness” of key network actors as irreparably ceding ground to state
governments on drones, to the point of capitulation on the issue. They argue that not
only was there not enough “early action” on the issue, but that a focus on legal
discussions about usage by human rights gatekeepers staked out a very small bargaining
range with governments. They argue that it is better to “better to focus on the
technology” rather than targeted killing, because discussions about the policy merely
turns into “discussions of law,” which in their opinion are inherently conservative
advocacy positions.
For their part, multiple activists from the “Lawful Usage” framing camp
dismissed the “Ban Drones” approach as being “unrealistic” and too pie-in-the-sky to
attain actual policy outcomes. In the words of one activist from the “Lawful Usage” side
of the humanitarian disarmament community: “I don’t think it would be politically
possible to ask for a ban at the moment because the technologies have become too
normalized.”283Another individual from an activist policy thinktank stated that these
more radical groups are ‘not part of the conversation’ within policy circles, because such
a technology abolitionist framing is a “conversation stopper” for politicians and military
officials. They went on to describe how the drone itself isn’t the most pressing human
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security issue, as much as larger strategic shifts from traditional to remote warfare of
which drones are an integral part. 284
Complicating Cooperation
The above interview data indicates a divide between the more “practical”
“Lawful Usage” frame activists – who desire greater transparency, accountability, legality
and even regulation on use and/or proliferation – and the more “idealist” “Ban Drones”
frame activists – who desire a weapon ban on armed drones. As one humanitarian
disarmament drone activist put it, when you try lump these different organizations into
“one basket” in genuine attempts to work together, the result is “strained social
relations” and stalled work on drones.285 Put another way by an Open Society
Foundations (OSF) drone specialist that has a birds-eye view of the overall network, “the
main issue with it [coalition-building] is the fact that most of these groups do not work
on drones the same.”286
Such differences and disagreements seem to matter when “the rubber hits the
road” and diverse groups try to work together in coalitions or on joint projects on armed
drones. As the same individual from OSF described: “they simply don’t agree on what
the aims of a policy paper should be.”287 A humanitarian disarmament activist elaborated
more concretely on the import of these disagreements when it comes to the mundane
day-to-day work of advocating:
“There are these really small nuances which on the surface-level look like they
mean nothing, but once you get to the little sentences that have to be in policy
documents, you definitely notice ‘wow, we are spending a lot of time emailing
about these little words here.’”288
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To avoid this perceived incompatibility, like-minded advocacy groups working on
drones tend to create silos by partnering with one another on smaller projects. While this
likely has to do with unconscious homophily and ease of communication, some
gatekeepers make a policy of it. An interviewee who works with Human Rights Watch’s
counterterrorism division stated the organization’s approach plainly when asked how
they decide to link up with drone campaign partners: “if our views are aligned and we
generally take the same approach.”289 Similarly, an interviewee from an activismmotivated thinktank described why they do not link up with “Ban Drones” groups: “it’s
hard, because there are a lot of people that like work hardcore on drones, and drones
very specifically, whereas for us, they’re just a very interesting part of a more complex
puzzle.”290
Activists have made attempts to overcome this frame silo-ing. A media
communications activist described their job as to tell the transnational anti-drone
activists that: “not only should you guys work together, but it’s better and amplifies your
message when you guys work together on a regular basis.”291 This individual has worked in
a similar capacity on other human security issues, such as nuclear weapons, and states
that cooperation is uniquely difficult to attain between the anti-drone campaigners. They
attribute this to the fact that “they are all working on different sides of this issue,”
because where AI and HRW “can only talk about that civilian harm point” and generally
don’t take positions on war, the pacifist “Ban Drones” groups “sit there like: ‘no war,
ever.’”292 According to them, the result of this “nitpicking” is that only likeminded groups
such as CIVIC, HRW and AI regularly meet during a bi-monthly meeting in DC where
they discuss joint anti-drone advocacy opportunities. When expanded to include the
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more pacifist “Ban Drones” groups, according to them “it takes them so long” to get out
a joint statement that they tell them to just “release their own individual statements
immediately.” They followed this up with the aside that they “would have a lot less work
if that [nitpicking] stopped.”293
The Case of EFAD
As stated above, EFAD is diverse in terms of its member’s views on drones, and
intentionally so. In the words of its coordinator, “we have everything from grassroots
activists like Drone Wars UK to established human rights organizations like Amnesty
International.”294 This coalition-building process was not without its obstacles, though.
According to the same coordinator, “it’s also a challenge to get local organizations to
look up and sometimes, you know, act together with other organizations. It’s more
difficult than I expected it to be… sometimes they simply don’t agree.”295 These
disagreements are the same discussed above in microcosm: “there are people who are
like against drones period, because they think it’s dehumanizing. There’s also other
people who disagree and don’t think it’s much different from an F16, and are more like
‘no, it’s just the targeted killings which are the problem.’”
As can be seen from the description above, the same “Lawful Usage” versus
“Ban Drones” divide exists within EFAD. However, the actors were seemingly able to
overcome it – or at least set it aside - and work together on a consistent basis even if they
were unable to agree on an overarching advocacy message. According to what they
reported to me, perceptions of meaningful inclusion in coalition-building processes by
the more radical groups is an important variable. Specifically, the more powerful
gatekeeper organizations purportedly gained buy-in amongst more radical groups
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through fostering what these activists described to me as a sense of inclusion. They
stated that these processes assuaged them that their concerns and positions were ‘being
taken seriously.’ However, far from adopting their radical framing into the coalition’s
overall Call to Action, the pacifist positions were folded into the positions of
gatekeepers.296 In an effort to bring diverse groups on board, EFAD’s founders
purposely did not make it a “campaign” in the vein of the International Campaign to Ban
Landmines. This resulted in EFAD remaining a loose coalition with a relatively benign
Call to Action.
EFAD’s structure is built to allow its members to air grievances and
disagreements in constructive ways. These breakout sessions happen during annual
meetings, where each group can share their perceptions. One actionable way that EFAD
attempts to honor organizational differences is by allowing its members to choose which
joint statements they sign onto and which they abstain from. As EFAD’s former
coordinator describes: “sometimes organizations simply don’t subscribe to [EFAD’s
joint statements] because they don’t agree. And that’s okay; that’s allowed.”297 Another
way in which EFAD tries to keep differing organizations engaged is by structuring breakout groups during their meetings to allow like-minded groups to partner up on smaller
projects. An activist from PAX describes, after the group creates a list of goals and
activities through large-group brainstorming, they “split up the work in groups of
interested organizations who know what they want to do together.”298 Key to this
process is that groups are free to choose topics that most align with their own
organizational interests and viewpoints.
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These organizational measures do purportedly succeed in cultivating perceptions
of meaningful inclusion amongst smaller organizations, according to what these activists
reported to me. Amongst these smaller organizations are several that do not present their
advocacy work in English, and sometimes rely on other EFAD members to translate
their work for broader dissemination. It also includes Drone Wars UK, which works its
impact by working both with grassroots peace organizations as well as alongside
transnational organizations. The founder of this organization approaches his advocacy
work from a “Christian pacifist perspective” and is interested in drones as they pertain to
the “ethics around warfare.”
While they note that they differ significantly from the larger organizations in
terms of their position on drones – that they should be banned – Drone Wars UK
remains a member of EFAD. According to them, this is because coalition actors like
Amnesty International made enough effort to takes their position seriously. The founder
describes EFAD as having “good will” towards all of its members, including the more
radical ones like their’s. They stated that “those of us who have perhaps more
fundamental problems with the technology didn’t feel excluded,” and that the Ban
Drones activists have been able to “push our perspective.” They describe a sense of
control and input in EFAD’s processes and report a satisfying ability to impact the
coalition’s focus:
“EFAD, I would say, has listened to our challenging them. I think at the
beginning, there was an idea that we [EFAD] should only work on targeted
killing; targeted killing was the problem. And I think that they have listened,
and that other groups have listened to our arguments about lowering the
threshold for war… They take that onboard now as well, so there is shifting
and movement.”299
These same organizational measures aimed at fostering inclusion of diverse
perspectives on drones also resulted in satisficing when it came to guiding principles and
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demands. Perspective of inclusion aside, EFAD’s Call to Action on the side of the
“Lawful Usage” framing. Perhaps most notably, according to the founder, EFAD
purposely maintains its status as a coalition rather than a campaign so that they can
sustain this diversity.300 The founder of EFAD goes on to state the key dilemma clearly:
“The issue in the beginning was how can we find a common goal to work on
together, where we have an advocacy goal that’s acceptable by all? Because, you
know, Amnesty has very much a human rights focus on the issue, whereas Drone
Wars UK is much more outspoken… So how can still find a common ground
where we can work together?”
Similarly, EFAD’s coordinator - the individual tasked with corralling these 29 groups into
cooperating during meetings and virtually – stated that they “just try to get as many
people agree on, you know, what is the middle road.” This oftentimes led to a situation
where the more radical groups were expected to “be pragmatic and add water to the
wine’ when it comes to working together.” As can be inferred from these statements,
EFAD’s ability to hang together as a coalition in large part depends on the more radical
groups’ willingness to work at the margins of smaller projects and to ultimately fold
themselves into the more conservative demands of the umbrella organization rather than
achieving actual representation in advocacy outputs.
Discussion and Conclusion
Above, I show that despite sharing a general common interest in advocating on
drones, there are significant disagreements over how to name “the problem of drones”
that transnational activists have largely not overcome. These disagreements center
around whether armed drones are an issue of the technology, or of how armed drones
are currently being used by governments for targeted killings. These disagreements
between meta-frames generally correspond to organization type, with the human rights
and transparency-focused organizations adopting the “Lawful Usage” framing, and the
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anti-war groups using the “Ban Drones” framing. The humanitarian disarmament
community is experiencing an internal disagreement over which framing to adopt. Some
want to take the well-trodden path of squarely focusing on a specific weapon technology,
as such a strategy has resulted in past victories (the International Campaign to Ban
Landmines).301 Larger humanitarian disarmament organizations such as PAX view a
drone ban more skeptically, agreeing more with the human rights focused activists that
the drone itself could theoretically be used to reduce civilian casualties in war and is
therefore not an inherently problematic weapon of war. However, as can be seen from
the EFAD case, how these activists engage with one another can determine whether or
not they partner, regardless of their frames. EFAD is a story about relational processes
between activists, informed by their chosen frames.
Observing how these actors relate to one another and try to come together can
illuminate how power is operative within advocacy networks. First of all, the gatekeeper
organizations such as HRW and AI along with other influential network brokers all
adopt the “Lawful Usage” frame. However, smaller groups within the Global North
networks do not always merely submit to the frames of the more powerful organizations.
Oftentimes a careful process of coalition-building attempted to ensure that all groups felt
as though they were meaningfully included in the process. Interviews with these activists
reveal complex processes of stakeholder buy-in from less powerful organizations, which
ultimately affect the network’s overall message cohesion. The desire to bring smaller
groups along in the coalition led to a situation in which EFAD was unable to solidify
around an umbrella frame, precisely because doing so risked alienating these more radical
partners.
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It is important to note that collaboration and described perceptions of inclusion
do not necessarily correlate to actual representation in advocacy outputs. From the
outside, the coalition appears to buck the “Lawful Usage”-versus- “Ban Drones” conflict
through internal procedural measures meant to foster inclusion. However, these
inclusion measures themselves seem to exert a modifying influence over the radical
groups. Rather than resulting in tangible representation of diverse perspectives within the
coalition’s Call to Action, these “wins” by the radical groups remain more symbolic and
ideational than practical and observable.
Furthermore, as will be discussed in Chapter 5, not all transnational network
partners are extended reconciliatory process-building measures as they are in EFAD. The
two meta-frames discussed in this chapter can be thought of as the “professionalized
advocacy frames,” favored by groups based in the Global North. As Chapter 5 will show,
the grassroots actors in Pakistan that adopted the “Neocolonialism” meta-frame are
almost entirely isolated from these professionalized networks. In this way, geopolitical
power relations mirrored in this network, as the most powerful and well-connected
organizations in the network are based in the countries doing the bombing. The present
chapter demonstrates that even when transnational groups differ significantly with one
another on how to frame drones, their liberal universalist ontology ultimately allows
them to maintain closer connections than with actors operating outside this ontology in
Pakistan. Due to their national headquartering and traditional approaches to advocacy,
groups in the Global North are far more willing to work with “perpetrators” of the
violence – something that grassroots actors in Pakistan largely reject.
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CHAPTER 4
“An Examination of Conscience:”
US Activists and the Armed Drone Issue

Introduction
On a bright October morning in 2019, around two dozen individuals fell, in
perfect synchronism, motionless to the pavement in front of the United Nations
Headquarters. A former United States Army member kicked off a chant by shouting:
“double tap,” to which the group responded: “drone strike!” Dressed in all white, the
protestors lay on the sidewalk beneath Predator drone model. The Army veteran
remained standing, holding a highlighter-yellow sign above his head detailing the civilian
casualties of the US drone program, along with a demand to end the manufacturing of
unmanned aerial vehicles. Named “Blank Slate,” the coordinator of this demonstration,
Essam Adam Attia, refers to it as a “public art intervention.”
The timing of this protest-through-art was strategic; within the marbled-lined
halls of the UN Headquarters, diplomats, policy experts, and transnational activists were
convening for the opening day of the General Assembly’s First Committee.302 Through
allotted speaking times on the assembly floor and scheduled side events, transnational
activists belonging to organizations such as Human Rights Watch and Reaching Critical
Will lobby policymakers from all over the world on subjects dealing with humanitarian
disarmament, including the specific issue of armed drones. Despite purposely aligning
the date to coincide with the first day of the First Committee meeting, the domestic

302

Rohrlich 2019
83

activists outside of the UN building performing a drone “die-in” protest did not
communicate nor coordinate their actions with the transnational activists inside of the
building. Both drone-focused advocacy activities took place literally adjacent to one
another, but completely separately and with very different advocacy messaging.
In the previous chapter, I showed how inverse vetting patterns within the
transnational level of the network contributed to the non-emergence of a unifying antidrones campaign frame. This chapter further explores the overall lack of an anti-drones
advocacy frame by examining the social relations and framing between activists at the US
domestic level, as well as their relations to the transnational level. Observing the case of
US domestic anti-drone activists stands to teach us more about vetting in transnational
issue networks. First, when taken with Chapter 3, it sheds light on how inverse vetting
occurs within the segment of the anti-drone network located in the Global North. Due to
their geographical locations, the domestic and transnational activists share roughly the
same cultural sensibilities.303 However, these actors – the domestics and the
transnationals – do have real differences in power, influence, and resources. As I will
show in this chapter, some US domestic groups refused to work with larger transnational
groups based on the latter’s lack of perceived radicality. This is because they see drones
as a particularly insidious expression of warfare and violent conflict, something that
makes war more efficient and one-sided. The domestics defined the armed drone issue in
their own way – through an anti-war discourse – and assessed transnational groups’ more
moderate positions as deficient in achieving their pacifist advocacy goals.
The 2019 UN Headquarters vignette is analytically useful because it distills these
two hubs – the US domestic level and the transnational level – into a microcosm.
Theorists might expect these two groups of activists to coordinate their actions and unify

303

Or, at least on a broad level; one can argue that there is a gulf American and European
political sensibilities
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their messaging, especially since both subnetworks were preexisting, robust, and all
network actors knew of the others’ existence.304 Sell and Prakash (2004) show that
domestic level political actors and transnational actors share similar interests. Indeed,
partnership with a consolidated frame and policy recommendation would benefit the
smaller organizations by elevating their voices, while also benefiting the transnationals by
giving them broader reach in disseminating international norms to a domestic context
and diversifying their base;305 it would benefit both in terms of policy outcomes.306 This
engagement with a politically active national-level network is a vital part of implementing
INGO interests, because international human rights norms are theorized as influencing
foreign policy after they become encoded into a domestic context.307 Despite this, while
the US domestic subnetwork’s messaging is rather cohesive and their social relations with
one another produce consistent advocacy products (such as conferences and protests),
the social connections between the US domestic level and the transnational level are
weak and their framings remain entirely different.308
Normative frames can act to bind activists and differences between stakeholders
in an issue area – such as the US domestic and transnational anti-drone activists –
complicate cooperation.309 While the transnational activists, as discussed in Chapter 3,
adopt both the “Ban Drones” and “Lawful Usage” meta-frames, the US domestic
activists fall mostly into the “Ban Drones” meta-frame, with a unique focus on the
ethical dimensions of armed drones.
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Indeed, the US domestic activists’ “Ban Drones” framing of the drone
technology is very dissimilar from how the transnational activists frame it. The US
domestic activists lean into a heavily ethical framing of the drone technology as “evil”
than the transnational “Ban Drones” activists, who would instead focus on more
nuanced language out of the humanitarian disarmament tradition. This ethical framing is
also different to the more clinical language of international law we see the transnational
organizations using in the “Lawful Usage” frame. This focus on ethics amongst many US
anti-drone activists is in part due to the large presence of the religious community in this
section of the network, but also the presence of secular pacifists. To distinguish it from
other “Ban Drones” frames in this chapter, I call the US domestics’ focus on technology
the “peace” approach, a term that activists themselves use, as it reflects their general antimilitarism.
Additionally, the domestics’ framing is also different from the Neocolonialism
frame. Even though the domestics’ framing does share some similarities with the
Neocolonialism frame, particularly in their focus on armed drones’ role in imperialism, I
purposely keep these two distinct. This is because the US domestics’ framing of their
anti-drone advocacy falls within the same liberal universalist ontology as the other
organizations based in the Global North, whereas the Neocolonialism frame falls outside
this conceptualization of world politics. For example, even the most radical groups in the
US believe in creating change through participation in electoral politics. In doing this,
these US activists advocate within systems of power that the Neocolonial activists wish
to distance themselves from.
This chapter supports but also extends the traditional elite vetting theory. It
supports the traditional model in that the gatekeepers clearly did not want to work with
domestic partners who were deemed as too radically anti-drone, since it would possibly
hurt their perceived professionalism. But in addition to showing support for the
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traditional model, this chapter also extends it by suggesting that this process is not only
unidirectional but can go in both directions simultaneously. In this case, both gatekeepers
and domestics were hesitant to work together and subsequently vetted one another.
These vetting processes led to an absence of compromise in terms of settling on an antidrone umbrella framing. This left both the US domestic and transnational activists to
pursue their own anti-drone advocacy with their own frames; much like how the two
groups in the opening vignette operated simultaneously but separately.
In this chapter, I draw on a unique text and picture dataset of 300 primary
advocacy documents, 10 in-depth semi-structured interviews with key informants from
the US domestic level of the armed drone network, and field site visits. As part of my
initial fieldwork for this network hub, I attended a 2018 Interfaith Network on Drone
Warfare regional conference in Hartford, Connecticut held in the Hartford Seminary.
The connections I cultivated at this networking event allowed me to gain access to the
leaders of the US domestic network hub and also granted me access to internal listservs,
which include information on advocacy planning and events. This chapter proceeds with
a brief case background of how US activists have advocated against armed drones over
the past two decades. I then move into an analysis of this mobilization within the US
context. I conclude by discussing what this case can teach analysts about transformative
politics in advocacy on human security issues.
The Domestic Network Actors
I conceptualize the US domestic network hub as groups and individual issue
entrepreneurs that primarily petition their own governments without focusing on
international policy audiences. It is important to clarify that I am not sorting these groups
based on their nationality alone, because there are American activists and groups that fall
into the transnational activist category, such as Human Rights Watch. What is salient in
this particular categorization is the fact that the activists I examine in this chapter focus
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on US politics. I do not include the smaller European organizations from the previous
chapter in this classification as “domestic activists,” since (despite their size) they petition
extra-state bodies such as the EU and UN as part of their advocacy. Because the US
groups are interested in petitioning their own government and seek partnerships with
transnationals in as far as they can help them reach this goal, the US activists I spoke to
did not express much interest in connecting with pacifist groups advocating in the EU
(even if they admired their work).
Thus, what makes US domestic actors in the issue network distinct is that unlike
their transnational counterparts, their efforts focus solely on various elements of
American politics. Whereas the transnational advocacy groups – even the ones based in
New York and Washington DC – primarily engage in transnational politics and
petitioning international/regional organizations as well as nation states, the domestic US
activists I focus on in this chapter concern themselves only with political and economic
actors as well as smaller constituencies within the US. These targeted actors may include
politicians, but also direct appeals to drone pilots asking them to join in protesting as well
as corporations that manufacture armed drone-related technology.
Additionally, while the US-based transnational activists - such as Human Rights
Watch and Human Rights First - are clustered in New York and Washington DC, these
domestic-focused activists are much more geographically dispersed throughout the
country. For example, the religiously focused group Coalition for Peace Action is based
out of Princeton, New Jersey, while the women’s peace group CodePink is headquartered
in Los Angeles, California, and Veterans for Peace is located in St. Louis, Missouri. The
largest actors in this level of the network, such as Veterans for Peace, also have dozens
of local chapters.
There are three further dimensions which are characteristic of this subnetwork
and which ultimately informs its approach to framing the problem with drones. First, it
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contains the highest numbers of anti-war pacifists. As this is also on average an older
population (a large number are retirees), many US activists cut their advocacy teeth on
anti-Vietnam War protests and nuclear abolitionism. They see drones as making foreign
wars more tempting and easier for US policymakers; a problem, since they are steadfastly
anti-war.
Second, while this level of the network is comprised of perhaps the most
surprising bedfellows out of any drone network cluster – including anti-war pacifists,
religious community leaders, veterans, Silicon Valley techies, as well as ‘concerned
citizens’ – two types are unique to the US context: the veterans and the religiously
motivated actors. Notably, this is the only part of the transnational network that contains
individuals who, at one point in their lives, directly supported the US’s drone war
through their professions before becoming conscientious objectors. Specifically, this
includes two types of individuals: 1) veterans who either served as drone pilots or bore
direct witness to drone warfare, and 2) high-tech industry workers from companies like
Booz Allen Hamilton or Google who worked on the research and development side.
Both types are unique amongst other actors in the broader issue network for the
participatory, insider role they once played in the drone program. This perspective is
significant given the layers of confidentiality and opacity surrounding the US drone
program, which activists at all levels of the transnational network often cite as a key
challenge to their work.
Finally, there is a significant segment of this subnetwork that is heavily religious
in motivations and approaches.310 For example, the Interfaith Network on Drone
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While Pakistani activists at times use religious phrases and imagery in discussing
drones, these activists do not cite religion or their personal (at times, very strongly held)
beliefs in Islam as their overarching ontology for taking political action on drones.
Additionally, unlike the US religious activists that use houses of worship and seminaries
as key sites of action, the activists I connected with in Pakistan do not similarly utilize
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Warfare is an umbrella organization that focuses on grassroots education, primarily
aiming to teach congregations about the ethics of drone warfare in key constituencies.
This group of actors includes politically liberal protestant Christian denominations such
as Unitarian Universalists and Quakers, as well as Catholic and Muslim groups. While its
founder has tried to recruit Evangelical churches to join, he reported that this has been
extremely difficult due to the politically conservative ideology of that denomination in
the US.311 They also at times participate in direct action tactics, such as protesting drone
bases and contractor headquarters, sometimes even purposefully getting arrested for
publicity. The Network also has an associated but separate policy advocacy wing called
the Interfaith Working Group on Drone Warfare based in DC that focuses on lobbying.
US Civil Society Mobilizing Against Drones
These actors have taken an eclectic approach to advocating on armed drones,
with the “how” varying widely depending on the individual’s organizational affiliation.
The most prominent tactics include direct protests of air bases, lobbying both local and
national political figures, corporate lobbying, art installations and performance pieces,
grassroots education, television ads, and litigation advocacy focused on the rights of US
citizens as they pertain to drone targeting. Again, the one common thread throughout
these approaches is that they are solely focused on advocating in the US context without
a significant, sustained international component.
The Interfaith Network primarily focuses on grassroots education and targets
religious congregations located in key congressional districts.312 Taking a religiously

religious establishments. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the grassroots activists
I spoke to in Pakistan instead cite a decolonial ontology as informing their drone work.
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For a fascinating analysis of how conservative domestic interests have created
conservative NGOs that compete with liberal groups in transnational advocacy, see
McCrudden 2015
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This educational work has been funded by the Open Society Foundation as part of its
wider armed drone advocacy initiative – which also includes funding the European
Forum on Armed Drones (EFAD) – since 2016.
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informed ethical stance against armed drones, the Interfaith Network has produced
advocacy products such as short movies, pamphlets, and pre-formatted letters to
congresspeople, all of which are meant to be easily distributed by church leaders to their
parishioners. The movies include versions of the films National Bird, Drone, Unmanned:
America’s Drone Wars – all edited down (after purchasing the rights from the creators) to
30 minutes for ease of screening in a church setting. In addition to these edited movies,
the Interfaith Network also produced two of its own movies, which are meant to be
introductory films targeted toward an American religious audience: The Religious
Community and Drone Warfare and Moral and Safe?: War, Peace, Drone Warfare and the Religious
Community.
The founders of this organization – two Unitarian Universalist reverends with a
preexisting friendly relationship – host one national conference and thirteen regional
conferences per year on drone warfare. While the national conference in Princeton, New
Jersey primarily focuses on recruiting religious leaders from key congressional districts to
attend, the thirteen regional conferences invite academics, religious lay people, as well as
community leaders to attend. The conference that I observed in Hartford, Connecticut
hosted a panel of speakers, select screenings of the short films named above, and offered
opportunities for individuals to get involved with artistic advocacy work such as adding
to a drone “peace quilt.”313 Packages passed out to the attendees included instructions on
how to introduce the issue to their own religious community, a pre-written letter to their
congressperson urging them to not support drone warfare, and scheduled in-person
protests. Ultimately, the goals of these smaller conferences are to convince attendees to
return to their parishes and host screenings of the films and to write their
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The “peace quilt” travels all around the world, with people adding squares to it, and is
meant to be a show of solidarity and common humanity with victims of US drone
strikes.
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congresspeople; encouraging individuals to go out and proselytize the religious antidrone warfare advocacy message to their community members.
Directly targeting corporations for their role in supporting the US’s use of drones
is another advocacy approach that is unique to this set of activists. These confrontations
tend to be dramatic in terms of optics. For example, an individual issue entrepreneur
organized a march in Greenwich, Connecticut to picket the house of ITT Inc.’s CEO in
order to label him a ‘war profiteer.’ This is because ITT Inc. builds the bomb release
components that allow armed drones to drop Hellfire missiles. In another instance, two
separate activists became shareholders in Honeywell, only to attend share meetings and
protest to the board about the company’s role in pioneering avionics and mechanical
systems for the MQ-9 Reaper.
These types of direct action and protests are an important part of the domestic
activist’s arsenal more generally. Heavily informed by the civil disobedience culture of the
1960s and 70s, some activists who participate in these protests purposely get arrested to
make a political statement. While these types of regularly scheduled protests occur at air
bases all around the country – such as at Horsham, Pennsylvania and San Francisco,
California – the most publicized one is an annual protest at Creech Air Force Base in
Nevada. Led by CodePink and in partnership with Veterans for Peace, the annual “Shut
Down Creech” events include the main four-day protest, but also various “peacebonding” activities and an desert campout at a goddess spirituality temple. These
differently located protests draw on various types of artforms to make their point, and
also to “go viral.” For example, there is an individual activist who considers crafting
scaled models of drones as their primary advocacy. These models are shipped all over the
US – including to Hawaii – to be used in marches and educational events.314 One New
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One of these Predator drone models was at a conference I attended for fieldwork in
2018.
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York-based artist and activist specializes in Banksy-style, drone-related political street art
and graffiti. This individual was actually arrested for allegedly counterfeiting NYPD
posters as part of his anti-drone artwork.
Lastly, the most well-known and resourced US domestic organizations tend to
focus on litigation advocacy on behalf of American citizens targeted by drones abroad as
well as on Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests regarding drone policy from the
government. The most famous case of domestic advocacy comes out of the American
Civil Liberty Union’s (ACLU) work on the behalf of Anwar al-Awlaki – a US citizen who
was targeted and killed by a US drone strike in Yemen for his role as an influential alQaeda propagandist. This case was critical in terms of compiling the most
comprehensive information on the processes to date. It revealed, in part, how the US
government makes lethal targeting decisions and how it internally justifies the legality of
such strikes. For example, the ACLU’s al-Awlaki casework revealed that in 2010 the
White House Office of Legal Council (OLC) reinterpreted the US Supreme Court case
Hamden v Rumsfeld to mean that the US can legally undertake military action within
non-war zones. Until this point, even the legal reasoning of the US government on these
policies had been classified.
Ethical Framing of “Ban Drones”
While the majority of these US groups subscribe to the “Ban Drones”
metaframe, there are distinctly culturally American dynamics that flavor this variation and
differentiate it from the transnational network’s overall framing of the armed drone
technology as a humanitarian disarmament issue. Specifically, the US domestic activists
primarily frame their drone work around what I suggest are inherently ethical
frameworks. The first type of ethical framing these groups use has a distinct anti-war
dimension and the second type has intentional religious components to it. These ethical
frames do overlap, but only in one direction: religious activists sometimes adopt an
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overall faith-based anti-war stance, while secular anti-war groups like CodePink use
ethical language but never religious parlance.
Secular Ethical “Ban Drones” Frames
Domestic US peace groups adopt the clearest anti-war stances against armed
drones. This variety of activism tends to be pathos-laden in order to provoke a visceral
response from its audience. Figure 1 below offers an illustrative example of this type of
argument.

Figure 4.1: Example of Ethical Argument in Anti-War Frame from Knowdrones.com

The particular issue entrepreneur who heads up this website further explained his
position in a 2018 interview. He made the ethical argument – grounded in secular
pacifism – that Americans “need to know how it looks from the other end of our
military machine,” and lamented that US politicians were not willing to see Americans as
“world citizens.” He continues:
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“It’s all well and good to say “drones don’t have any consequences.” But if you are on the
receiving end of a drone hellfire missile, you are experiencing consequences. And for
people to feel that you can kill people without consequence is one of the most dangerous
things that you can give somebody the sense of.”
The ethical framing of drone technology can be seen particularly well in direct
protests. CodePink has the most sustained and active anti-drone campaign in the US.
While they also engage in speaking tours and book publications on the subject, their
most notable and headline-grabbing anti-drone actions have been their protests at drone
bases. The annual “Shut Down Creech!” protest event, which is put on in partnership
with Veterans for Peace, takes place in Creech, Nevada outside the air base. The stated
goal of this action, which has taken place every year since 2015, is to: “nonviolently
oppose the barbaric and deadly U.S. drone assassination program at Creech AFB that
terrorizes communities around the world.” Figure 2 illustrates protest signage at the 2020
Creech event.

Figure 4.2: Example of Ethical Argument in Anti-War Frame; CodePink’s 2020 Creech
Protest
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Secular US peace activists directly target military members and drone pilots in
particular through ethical arguments. Essentially, these activists are trying to persuade the
“tip of the spear” that they are complicit in an immoral practice and to quit their jobs.
One example of this approach is the partnered work between KnowDrones and
Veterans for Peace Chapter 87. In 2017, these groups created short anti-drone television
ads that aired on network news channels in two “drone base communities:” Creech,
Nevada and Syaracuse, New York. The ads are meant to be “speaking about conscience”
to the drone operators according to their creator, and to “bring out the underlying causes
of these drone wars and urging drone pilots to not fly.”315 Their reasoning for targeting
drone operators directly is because the US government has “been so completely
supportive of drone attacks that we must appeal directly to drone operators to bring an
end to the drone killing.”316 Figures 3 and 4 below are screen captures of the ads, which
exemplify the morality-based appeals. Figure 3 is a broad appeal to the drone base
community, while Figure 4 is directly targeted at the drone operators.

Figure 4.3: 2017 Anti-Drone Television Ad Targeting Drone Base Communities I
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Phone interview with Author, Domestic 3; 18 March 2019
“KnowDrones,” 2021
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Figure 4.4: 2017 Anti-Drone Television Ad Targeting Drone Operators II
Evocative street and protest art is another way in which the US domestic peace
activists advocate moral stances on armed drones. It also sets them apart from their
transnational counterparts, as can be inferred from the vignette that opened this chapter.
Informed by the use of puppetry and effigy during anti-Vietnam protests, anti-drone
activists will sometimes use scaled models of drones to provoke emotional responses
from onlookers. According to the creator, who works with a team of artisans in upstate
New York and western Massachusetts, using the drone models in protests draw crowds
who take photos and experience emotional reactions to seeing the imposing prop. The
models are meant to inspire a feeling of existential terror in those who see it, and in some
installations, the creator includes a recording camera on the drone with a video screen to
make people feel repulsed at the surveillance element. Figure 5 below shows one of the
drones this interviewee created.
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Figure 4.5: Scaled 8-Foot Long Drone Model Created by Interviewee
New York-based artist and political activist Essam Adam Attia’s anti-drone work
exemplifies the evocative moral framing and garnered some of the most media attention
out of all the US domestic activists. Attia is a veteran and the activist who led the 2019
protest at the UN Headquarters discussed at the start of the chapter. In 2012, Attia
created posters imitating NYPD posters and signs and posted them all over New York
City. These signs were meant to impose upon the residents of Manhattan the same
feelings of insecurity imposed upon individuals living in drone-targeted areas. As in
Figures 6 and 7, they include pithy slogans like: “drones, protection when you least
expect it,” and even “Wanted” posters for President Barack Obama, as seen in Figure 8.
This drone protest work made Attia a figure in a high-profile local case, as he was
charged with grand larceny, criminal possession of stolen property and 56 counts of
possession of forged items. Figures 6, 7, and 8 show examples of this anti-drone street
protest art.
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Figure 4.6: Street Art in New York City I, NY by Essam Adam Attia
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Figure 4.7: Street Art in New York City II, NY by Essam Adam Attia
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Figure 4.8: Anti-Drone Art by Essam Adam Attia
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At first glance, these examples may seem to fit into the same “Ban Drones”
frame utilized by transnational advocacy groups like Drone Wars UK – i.e. that the drone
itself is inherently problematic. But this would ignore that in targeting US policymakers
exclusively, this brand of provocative pacifism has a distinctly American history to it, one
that is steeped in anti-war cultural reactions going back decades. Most notable is the
connection to anti-Vietnam messaging and the notion that the US is engaging in wars of
imperialist, extractionist aggression. At times, this is a direct connection, as a large
number of US anti-drone organizers are retirement age and participated directly in antiVietnam protests. For example, on its website, one group cites Martin Luther King Jr.’s
speech “Beyond Vietnam” – which discusses the role of global economic injustice and
extractionism – as being directly relevant to the US’s contemporary drone wars. One
activist described the Global War on Terror as “definitely [of] the same character that
went on in Vietnam: the amount of killing that’s going on, the amount of secrecy, the
amount of suppression, the amount of fear.”317 For these domestic activists, drones fit
into an overall, historically grounded argument about US foreign policy: namely that the
country’s foreign wars are imperial conflicts of extraction. This is an inherently different
problem conceptualization from the transnational level.
Faith-Based Ethical “Ban Drones” Frames
The US religious community has not been nearly as involved in advocating
against the “Global War on Terrorism” (GWOT) as it was involved in the anti-Vietnam
movement. However, while it doesn’t reach this threshold of anti-Vietnam mobilization,
the armed drone issue has been a standout issue within GWOT that has animated a
significant amount of political organizing and agitation from multiple US religious
communities. Some of these organizations, such as the Quakers, adopt an ethical stance

317

Phone interview with Author, Domestic 3; 18 March 2019
102

against war all together, folding the issue into their “swords into ploughshares”
movement. Other religious organizations – such as the US Conference of Catholic
Bishops – are not wholesale pacifists but do proscribe to the “Just War” (Jus Bellum
Justum) theological doctrine, which strives to make the conduct of war morally
justifiable. Regardless of whether the group adopting the religiously informed approach is
pacifist or not, both frame their advocacy in terms of a religiously-grounded ethics. This
quote from one of my interviewees drives home the central ontological importance of
approaching their advocacy from a faith-based motivation: “There’s a place in the New
Testament where Jesus says he wants his followers to be as wise as serpents but as gentle
as doves. So [as activists] we’re pretty good at being as gentle as doves but we’ve also got
to be wily like a serpent.”318
Both types of religious activists frame drones as a particularly insidious and
morally bankrupt instantiation of modern warfare. For example, the Interfaith Network
on Drone Warfare issued a joint statement to the US Congress in 2019 exemplifying this
deeply religious moral frame:
As members of the American faith community, we believe that all people have
human rights given to us by God, and that there must be transparency and
accountability regarding the use of lethal force undertaken on our behalf.
Therefore, we are writing to ask you to end the CIA’s use of armed drones to
carry out lethal attacks.319
From a theological and philosophical standpoint, these religious activists are concerned
with the dehumanizing impact that they see drones as propagating. The focus then
becomes the drone technology’s unique ability to create what one reverend activist called
“moral disengagement” – both in the general US population through a decreased number
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It should be noted that while this particular statement only mentions the CIA, the
Interfaith Group’s members also largely opposes the use of drones by the Department of
Defense.
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of US casualties and on the part of the drone pilot who has increased distance.320 This
approach also appears in other religious groups’ advocacy products. On the Friends
Committee on National Legislation’s drone website portal, they make the statement that
“drone warfare is a moral and ethical issue as much as a legal one.” The post elaborates,
drawing on this “moral disengagement” framing: “When drones kill for us, with little
public awareness or scrutiny, we can more easily avoid thinking about the human life
affected by these conflicts and the common humanity we share with those we
are targeting.”321 The focus on the shared humanity of those killed in drone strikes, while
it appears in secular pacifist activism as well, here draws on a deep religious tradition of
human solidarity and dignity, which is uninfringeable due to the divine nature of a soul.
Advocacy projects inspired by this religious ontology of human solidarity is perhaps best
demonstrated in the Interfaith Network’s global peace quilt, made on behalf of drone
strike victims and displayed during their conferences, depicted below in Figure 9:
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article on the related concept of “moral injury” on drone pilots, and Dill 2019 for an
equally insightful discussion on the role of the moral responsibility of attackers in
individualized warfare.
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Figure 4.9: The Interfaith Network on Drone Warfare’s traveling “peace quilt”
This focus on the drone pilot herself, as an individual participating in warfare, is
also unique to the US domestic context and finds particular focus in amongst the
religious activists. As an outcome of “moral disengagement,” one Unitarian Universalist
leader cites “moral injury” as a major problem with drone warfare, both on the part of
drone operators and the US public. From a theological perspective, “moral injury”
occurs when an individual damages their conscience by partaking in an act of
transgression – with the concept of a conscience being a religious concept inextricable
from a human’s soul. In this way, drone strikes are akin to creating a collective sin of
communal complicity and silence, arising out of the individual sin of the drone operator.
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The Interfaith Network makes this “moral injury” a central frame. One way they do this
is by showing a shortened version of the film “National Bird,” which focuses on the moral
anguish of the first drone pilot to have her mental illness diagnosed by the VA as PTSD
caused by her service. Though put in secular clinical language in the film, the subsequent
speakers at the conference then translate the woman’s agony to a more faith-based
parlance.
Hosting veteran speakers with firsthand experience of drone warfare is another
way the Interfaith Network uses this “moral harm” frame. There is a specific veteran
activist, a Unitarian Universalist Minister, who associated with both the Interfaith
Network as well as Veterans for Peace. The Rev. served for five years in the US Army
Chaplain Corps and was deployed to Kandahar Airfield in Afghanistan in 2012. During a
2018 interview, they described their dilemma of conscience over drones during their
deployment as follows:
I saw drones for the first time and it was no longer on the peripheral – it was
right there in front of me. And I was really confronted with a decision...
Essentially in terms of what I was seeing and what I was learning about, and who
I am in terms of what I represent.
Faced with what he considered a moral dilemma, the Rev. addressed what they
were perceiving about drones in a sermon in front of freely gathered servicemembers and
contractors. They described this moral responsibility in a 2018 interview as follows:
I was there [Afghanistan] as an Army chaplain and it was my responsibility to
provide spiritual leadership for the institution of the military, and it was my
responsibility to be a moral compass to the institution and to the soldiers and
servicemembers in my care. And for me, that meant addressing the moral
dimensions of what we were doing.
During our conversation, the Rev. was quick to clarify that they did not see this
sermon as a “protest” action, but rather as bearing “prophetic witness.” According to
them, “prophetic witness has to do with standing up for moral commitments out of a
sense of religious obligation.” Unfortunately for their career in the US Army, their
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superiors perceived this sermon as “politically inflammatory,” and it resulted in the
issuing of a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand and a release from active duty
in Afghanistan.322
While the secular peace activists in the US may hold some messaging affinities
with the technologically-focused transnationals, it is much easier to observe the stark
differences in messaging when observing the religious groups’ ethical frames. Again,
these ethical frames are grounded in a focus on banning the drone technology, but with a
uniquely American flavor that does not translate well outside of this domestic context.
Just as defense and politics have historically been more intertwined in the American
context than in the European context, so to has religion and politics. Returning again to
the importance of the Vietnam War, we can observe the role of the US religious
community in attempting to sway foreign policy through moral messaging. Again, as
with the secular peace activists, we can see that drones fit into a more historical advocacy
concern that the US’s militarism is oftentimes not guided by “just” causes.
Ethical Frames Facilitating and Complicating Partnerships
When looking at domestic US activists, two patterns are visible in terms of how
productively they work with other stakeholders. First are the connections between
activists within this subsection of the network, which are relatively robust and sustained
overtime. Second, however, are the connections between this subnetwork and the overall
network, which are quite detached and with fleeting partnerships.
The first part of this chapter focused on detailing the two types of ethical framing
of drone advocacy amongst the US domestic activists. While it would seem intuitive that
there might be a hard wall between secular and religious activists, this is not the case in
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In 2013, Rev. Antal called a Congressional inquiry that found the military command
had no grounds for disciplinary action on the grounds that this action had been
government interference in religion.
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terms of drone activists. For both groups, there is a baseline understanding of war as
being morally repugnant, and of drone technologies being a particularly insidious
expression of violent conflict. Due to this comparatively hardline stance towards war in
general, these domestic activists are willing to adopt radical framing; namely, a “peace”
approach that is inflected with a heavy sense of anti-militarism.
Tracing the drone models offers an illustrative example of how these groups
work with one another under overlapping ethical anti-war frames as well as a baseline
appreciation for how they relate to one another in a horizontal, non-hierarchical manner.
As stated earlier, the issue entrepreneur who creates the scaled models distributes them
to various groups around the US, including Code Pink and the Interfaith Network on
Drone Warfare. The Code Pink staffer who designs the organization’s advocacy products
identified the drone model as fitting with their approach to protest and acquired one of
these models from its makers in 2013. The group still uses it in their Washington DC
protests. In addition to utilizing the model, Code Pink and this specific entrepreneur
engage in joint speaking tours on “killer drones,” in which they proselytize the need to
ban the technology. The issue entrepreneur describes admiring Code Pink’s “insight and
tenacity” as an anti-war group, saying it was a main reason that they “still do things in
cooperation with them.”323 Tracing the drone model beyond Code Pink, the organizers
of the Interfaith Network on Drone Warfare also utilize one during their regional
conferences. The importance here is the shared understandings that these groups hold
towards the use of the drone model. It is meant to inspire feelings of aversion in people
who see them by bringing the “drone wars” – and violent conflict in general – closer to
Americans, making it more visceral.
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In addition to sharing resources, such as the drone model, US domestics engage
in jointly funded protest events. This is perhaps most evident in the “flows” of
likeminded individuals between in-person protests. The “Shut Down Creech!” annual
event discussed above is the most obvious example of this, as it is an official partnership
between Code Pink and Veterans for Peace. In addition to this partnership, the event
itself draws likeminded peace activists from within the Interfaith Network on Drone
Warfare as well as individual entrepreneurs such as the creator of KnowDrones.com.
Even the veteran Rev. discussed earlier, who does take personal issue with the radical
“killer drone” anti-militarism framing of the Creech Air Base protest event, opts to
attend the related drone speaking events that occur in Las Vegas simultaneously with the
peace campout.
These groups all adopt a distinct “peace” framing of the drone advocacy issue.
There is also a significant amount of personal admiration – built upon this foundation of
“peace”-oriented political ontology and “rebels with a cause” personas – that plays into
the intimacy of these sustained relationships and reported satisfaction with the process of
coalition-building. For example, when asked how they choose to form partnerships in
their drone work, one activist stated that in addition to auditing the potential partner’s
history, they ask themselves: “how do they view the United States and the world and the
conduct around military?” They then described partners from within Creative Voices for
Non-Violence who have “gotten arrested around drones” as the type of “people I really
respect and really like to work with.”324
However, the factors that help the US domestic network cohere with each other
– the shared broad “peace framing” of the technology and reported perceptions of
mutually respectful partnering procedures – seems to repel it from the transnationals.

324

Phone interview with Author, Domestic 3; 18 March 2019
109

This repellence goes in both directions, with the transnationals opting not to partner with
the domestics, and vice versa. Where processes of internally vetting fellow peace activists
resulted in a productive partnership between US activists, vetting processes between US
domestic activists and transnationals had the opposite effect. The one example of
sustained cooperation within the DC-based working and policy group –– offers useful
analytical leverage to see the conditions under which these groups with different frames
may more readily unify and cohere.
Transnational activists cite the general anti-militarism and radicality of the
peace groups as being conversation-stoppers in the halls of power that the transnationals
try to influence. As one activist from a prominent humanitarian disarmament
organization described their perception of the domestic peace activists’ reach: “those
groups had less purchase within the political arena than the human rights community.”325
They continued, describing the “rituals” of transnational campaigning – such as
compiling a well-researched reported that you can “make it thump on the table” of
policymakers. They note that this rational approach to data collection sets aside the peace
groups from the transnationals: “I think it’s kind of crucial that politics has these rituals
and processes— that, I think, is common between human rights and humanitarian
disarmament [groups].”326
Complicating the relationship far beyond matters of professional rituals and
practice, many transnational human rights groups – such as Human Rights Watch and
Amnesty International – have a foundational position that they will not take stances on
issues of war and peace. Put plainly by a Human Rights Watch employee when asked
about their position on the armed drone technology: “we do not oppose the use of any
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particular weapon, other than the ones that are illegal.”327 The logic behind this approach
is that facilitates better access to governments in order to hold them accountable on
human rights issues, because discussions about pacifism are “conversation-stoppers”
with states and foreign policymakers.
The drone issue itself is particularly complicated when it comes to maintaining
this stance of not weighing in on matters of war and peace. This is due to the perception
amongst policymakers and military officials that advocating against drones has become
inextricably linked with pacifism in civil society circles. This official perception leaks
down to some transnational groups as well, as can be seen in this transnational
interviewee’s statement:
“A lot of the people within the military … suspect that a lot of people that are
advocating against armed drones are just broadly anti-war… They don’t really
like war and therefore they definitely don’t like drones – when they’re trying to
campaign against drones, what they really want is for the war in general to stop.”
This link to pacifism is problematic, because according to the transnational activist:
“what it has done to a certain extent is create kind of a bit of a myth, I would say,
within the military that the NGO community [as a whole] doesn’t understand
what the actual questions are in warfare—rightly or wrongly, because they [the
military] were like: “drones are no different than any other military technology
than we’ve ever used.””
This “myth” about the anti-drone-activism-equals-anti-war appears to overemphasize both the size and influence of the domestic peace groups within the overall
network. This heuristic error appears to impact some transnational groups as well as state
officials. For example, the fear of anti-drone advocacy acting as a “conversation-stopper”
amongst the key targets of transnational advocacy has actually led some transnational
groups to touch on the topic of drones more surreptitiously, in order to completely avoid
the stigma of being “anti-war.” In the words of the same activist: “we’ve found actually
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that specifically not talking about drones has been one of the reasons why we’ve been
able to make such good contacts and connections within the military... And we bring
drones into that a lot as like a facilitation method.”
This “myth” of pacifism and the desire to avoid the taint can be seen in a direct
example from a US domestic activist’s rejected attempt to partner with Amnesty
International. The veteran Rev. discussed above ultimately resigned from the Army
Chaplain Corps out of protest over drones and wanted to “capitalize” on the publicity
surrounding it. They described wanting “to see if Amnesty would kind of stand behind
that and help publicize it and generate some kind of media around it.” Even though they
met up with Amnesty International in DC, their attempt to connect was unsuccessful:
“At the end of the day they couldn’t really offer much for reasons I still don’t quite
understand…” They continue, describing their perception of why this missed connection
was the case:
“Amnesty was under some interesting kind of restrictions. Like they don’t – I
don’t want to misrepresent them – but they don’t take positions on war or a
particular conflict. So part of our messaging in the Interfaith Network on Drone
Warfare Amnesty couldn’t stand behind because it goes beyond the scope of
what they do. So it was complicated politics that seemed to obstruct that.”328
All of the above being said, it is important to note that the US Domestics are not
without connections to the transnationals. These connections have generally been
fleeting. For example, returning again to the drone model as a way to trace connections,
Amnesty International America contacted the maker in order to acquire and use one for
a prop in its educational university speaking tour on drones. This 2013 national speaking
tour was named “Game of Drones,” and was coordinated by and conducted through
Amnesty’s National Youth Program. After the speaking tour ended – which had been
timed to correspond with the release of their high-impact human rights report on a
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specific Pakistani drone strike – Amnesty International America stopped using the drone
model and no longer kept in contact with the domestic issue entrepreneur. Figure 10
shows its use in a campus visit. As can be seen in the banner, the messaging around the
“Game of Drones” tour was to address the specific legal issue of extrajudicial executions,
which is notable because the individual who created the drone model is a pacifist who
wants to see a total ban on the weapon technology.

Figure 4.10: Banner from Amnesty International 2013 “Game of Drones” Tour
But in addition to these one-off interactions, there has also been at least one
example of more sustained domestic-transnational cooperation. As described above, the
Interfaith Working Group on Drone Warfare is a related but separate wing of the
Interfaith Network on Drone Warfare – specifically, where the Network is a 501(c)(3)
educational nonprofit based in Princeton, New Jersey, the Working Group is a dedicated
policy lobbying group based in DC. This working group has maintained thin but
sustained ties to the transnational drone activists’ policy group that meets monthly. This
transnational working group is the same one described in the previous chapter and has
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members from organizations like Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and
Human Rights First..
Observing the flows between these two DC-based groups through their monthly
meetings offers some insight into the nature of US domestic-transnational connections.
First of all, the ties between these two separate groups are sustained through two key
network brokers from the faith-based US domestics’ side: an individual well-known in
the advocacy circles for their work on the National Religious Campaign Against Torture
(NRCAT), and another well-connected individual from the Friends Committee on
National Legislation (FCNL). Second of all, the flow of information is unidirectional.
This is because while the transnationals accept the ties with the nationals, the nationals
still maintain a facilitating role, in that their role is to “report back from the policy
meetings to the faith groups on how they can help” support the transnationals in their
work.329
Important to note in this example is that the most sustained contact between the
transnationals and the US domestics hinges on the professional reputations of two
individual faith-based activists. Put simply, this relationship is perceived to “work”
because of the trust that these two domestic activists earned amongst transnational
activists by participating heavily in the anti-torture campaigns of the early 2000s. Both
individuals were heavily involved in the torture advocacy issue during the Bush
Administration years, which was a campaign that both the religious organizations and the
large transnational organizations easily rallied behind. For the religious organizations,
torture was viewed as an affront to humans’ God-given dignity and was therefore an
“obvious” issue that could sustain heavy faith mobilization.330 For the transnational
organizations, torture was also an obvious issue, but instead due to its absolute
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prohibition under international law.331 Put plainly, these two activists “earned” the
reputation as “serious” issue campaigners worthy of partnering with, thus escaping the
anti-militarism orientation to activism that can oftentimes be perceived as “unserious” –
and by extension an organizational liability – by the large professionalized INGOs.
Discussion and Conclusion
The previous section detailed the distinct frames adopted by two types of US
domestic activists. Where the US domestic activists were able to bring two different types
of groups – religious and secular peace groups – under one unifying frame of “armed
drones are unethical,” these same groups did not come together with the transnational
activists to create an overarching campaign frame. This was not due to a baseline desire
from either the domestic or transnational activists not to partner with one another,
either. Again, as in Chapter 3, we can see that relational processes between activists
occupying different hierarchal points in the transnational network played a part in
determining the overall cohesiveness of the anti-drone network’s messaging.
These vetting processes went both ways. For example, the Rev.’s disappointing
meeting with AI – when they did not follow up with him – as an example of the
traditional elite vetting model, as a gatekeeper did not want to appear too radical.332
However, we can also see an inverse vetting effect in play, with the US activists who
primarily wanted to work with other activists that shared their politically radical stances
and horizontal approach to campaign organizing – such as CodePink’s “peace bonding”
approach that allows activists to create personal relationships with one another. .
The differences in frames between the US Domestics and the Transnationals
center around the radicality of language and messaging around ethics that each
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subnetwork is comfortable adopting. This is not to claim, at all, that the work the
transnational activists undertake is unethical, or not inspired by a deep understanding of
ethics. This is instead referring to the willingness of groups to wear their ethical
orientations on their sleeves, through their public advocacy messaging.333 Whether
religious or secular, the US Domestic activists place their foundational ethics front and
center, whereas the transnational activists place their rationality, credibility and
methodologies at the public forefront.
The comparison of these two subnetworks and how they relate to one another
offers analytical insights about power. In keeping with the insights from the previous
chapter, the groups that adopt a more radical framing on drones tend to be the ones that
are the most marginalized from both the rest of the network and the policymakers. What
sets the US domestic activists apart from the less-powerful activists within EFAD
however is their enthusiastic embracing of this “rebel with a cause” identity, with the
intentional arrests and lawbreaking as in the case of graffiti and trespassing. Indeed, this
“rebel with a cause” identity factored into some domestic activists’ partnering decisions,
as they preferred to work with others that they deemed as unwilling to “give in” to
power. Again, this radical “anti-war” approach to armed drone advocacy can be couched
in a historical tradition of leftist direct political action, and in the drones case, is directly
linked to the anti-Vietnam movement.
But the discussion of power would be incomplete without acknowledging the
relative power of the US domestic activists to the activists in Pakistan, who are the
subject of the next chapter. Stroup reminds us that the host state can exert significant
conditioning roles over the nature of advocacy.334 As activists based in the country whose
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military is conducting the bombing, no matter how pacifist and grassroots these US
domestic activists may be, they still enjoy a considerable amount of geopolitical power
relative to Pakistani activists. And while the “myth” of the pacifism approach to armed
drone technology may be viewed as locking the peace activists out of the halls of power
(sometimes to the domestics’ pride, sometimes to their chagrin), the activists still have
the ability to participate in the electoral politics of the belligerent country and formally
present their government with grievances and requests for information on the drone
program, by virtue and privilege of their US citizenship. Equally salient is the fact that
many activists at the US domestic level, due to their identities as veterans, have at one
point directly served as the “sharp end” of militarized US foreign policy—whether they
participated in the US’s contemporary drone wars or a past conflict like Vietnam.
Again, the US domestic activists come the closest to adopting the
Neocolonialism Frame, specifically in the discussions of the US’s foreign wars being
waged for imperialist, expansionist purposes. But, crucially, these contextual
understandings are very dissimilar. When they discuss the violence-affected population in
Pakistan, it is through a “give voices to the victims” approach that is actually a more
populist mirror of the type of carefully gathered victims testimonies that the
transnationals utilize in their reports. As will be discussed in the following chapter, the
advocacy frame adopted by some Pakistani activists is much more complicated and
nuanced due to their proximity to the violence and experiences of historical
dispossession.
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CHAPTER 5
Vetting the Boomerang:
Advocating on the Armed Drone Issue from Pakistan

Introduction
In Summer of 2018, I met with Ibrahim335 in an Islamabad cafe to talk about his
NGO’s past work on US drone strikes. Ibrahim heads up a small organization in
Pakistan, which focuses on social, political and development issues in what was formally
called the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA; now called Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
or KP).336 According to The Bureau of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ), the most reliable
source for drone-related casualty recording, drone strikes in this region reportedly killed
between 2,500-4,000 people and injured around 1,100-1,700 between 2001 and 2021.
Between 424-966 amongst those killed were civilians, and that between 170-200 of these
were children.337 These strikes by the US were accompanied by the Pakistani state’s
increasingly invasive counterinsurgency operations in the areas, which included activities
such as housing demolitions and forced disappearances. Local civil society organizations
found these conflict dynamics difficult to address in through advocacy, because at this
time the Pakistani state also passed sweeping restrictions on NGO activities. It was in
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this hostile domestic environment that a well-known international NGO based in the
Global North contacted Ibrahim and proposed that they partner together to work on a
project related to the drone strikes. Despite this menacing domestic opportunity
structure, and despite the fact that he wished to address the issue of drone strike victim
compensation, Ibrahim told this powerful INGO “no.” In the face of all these domestic
challenges towards his advocacy work, why would Ibrahim say “no” to linking up with a
powerful partner that could have amplified his impact?
Pakistan’s civil society is heavily monitored; issues related to national security are
particularly controversial and prone to government interference into advocacy activities.
This was especially true in the country’s northwestern tribal areas during the height of the
drone strikes. Despite the presence of these factors – conditions that should presumably
kick off a boomerang throw – overt instances of local groups and individuals reaching
out to the international community to circumvent stagnation on drones have been
relatively rare. Given the extreme domestic blockages Pakistani actors faced in addressing
drones during the height of the strikes, why didn’t more issue entrepreneurs attempt to
connect with powerful international gatekeeper organizations like Human Rights Watch
that were already advocating on the subject in order to form a unified campaign? What
has the drone advocacy network looked like in Pakistan? And how has it related to the
grassroots and transnational activism in the North?
Grassroots hesitancy to accept powerful transnational advocacy support is
puzzling from an international relations theory standpoint. As described in Chapter 2, the
conventional advocacy boomerang model posits that less resource-rich groups link up
with better endowed international organizations in situations where political opportunity
structures are inconducive to domestic advocacy.338 Local groups are thought of as
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kicking their grievances up to better known European and/or American organizations,
who then popularize the given issue, and advocate on the behalf of or in partnership with
their domestic stakeholders. Of course, not every would-be issue entrepreneur’s cause
gains elite attention, as international gatekeeper organizations carefully “vet” the
advocacy topics they undertake.339 As discussed in detail in Chapter 2, more recent
scholarship deepens unidirectional models of transnational advocacy processes by
demonstrating that “inverse boomerang” throws also exist, as well as “double
boomerangs,” “rebounding boomerangs,” and even “catapults.”340 The inverse
boomerang in particular occurs when the larger advocacy groups in the Global North
face international policy blockages on their issue of choice, and then seek out partners in
the Global South to bolster the legitimacy of their intended campaign.341 While useful,
none of these models fully explain the dynamics of advocacy surrounding the US’s use of
armed drones in Pakistan. In this chapter, I show how inverse vetting contributes to this
body of theorizing on how actors in the Global South enact agency and impact in
transnational advocacy networks.342
In the previous two chapters, I have considered how relational processes
between activists at the transnational level and US domestic level has affected the overall
network’s ability to cohere around a unified anti-drone campaign frame. In this chapter, I
turn to the grassroots political mobilization against armed drones in Pakistan. Drawing
on a text and picture dataset of 300 advocacy documents and 13 in-person, semistructured interviews with key informants in Islamabad, I argue that the local activists
who held fundamental differences in how they frame the “problem of drones” from the
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transnational activists either rebuffed or renegotiated networking proposals through a
process of “inverse vetting.”343 In this chapter, inverse vetting occurs when less powerful
local actors decide for themselves whether or not to accept a partnering proposal by a
transnational group based on the perceived merit of the organization and/or its project.
The effect of this refusal complicates the overall campaign’s ability to unify around an
impactful advocacy message and to demonstrate the involvement of affected populations
– a feature IR theorists point to as bolstering campaign legitimacy.344 Taken together with
the findings of the previous two empirical chapters, we can see that inverse vetting
within the Pakistani anti-drone advocacy case offers yet another possibility for why the
overall anti-drones transnational campaign did not settle on a unifying umbrella frame.
While I have shown similar patterns of less powerful groups resisting the frames
and partnerships of more powerful network actors in the previous two empirical
chapters, here inverse vetting process is especially central to understanding why certain
Pakistani activists chose not to link up to the transnational level. Again, this process is
based on these activists’ descriptions of their goals, interests and strategies, with these
descriptions being operationalized through frames. Crucially, this refusal to work openly
with international partners was not unanimous. The two Pakistani groups that did form
open partnerships with transnational organizations – the Foundational for Fundamental
Rights (FFR) and Pakistan Body Count (PBC) – share similar framings of armed drones
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with their transnational partners. Interestingly, multiple activists who fall into the
Neocolonialism frame viewed FFR with similar levels of skepticism as their transnational
partners.
The chapter proceeds with a brief case background of US drone strikes in
Pakistan, the domestic challenges facing activists, and what mobilization around drones
has looked like both transnationally and within Pakistan. I then move into an analysis of
this mobilization in Pakistan, detailing how these local activists inversely vetted potential
transnational partners. I conclude by considering what this case not only reveals about
how actors with varying levels of geopolitical power navigate a network, but also what it
reveals about grassroots resistance in the face of national and international statesponsored violence.
Theorizing Relationships Between Global North and South Activists
As discussed in previous chapters, much of the institutional politics of INGOs
literature takes a traditional understanding of “the political,” in that actors’ interests are
relatively fixed and rational and that politics primarily happen within formal channels of
organizational structures and through official communications.345 This focus centers
scholarly attention on the actions and motivations of large, traditional advocacy
organizations that are generally headquartered in the Global North.346 This present
chapter builds on this literature’s insights, by asking how the grassroots actors’ framing
of their work influence their connections and relationships with activists working on the
same issue from different transnational sites.347 Framings do not float free from context
in transnational space and network positionality is integral to campaign construction and
mobilization.348
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Relationships between activists in the Global North and South are characterized
by hierarchy.349 For example, the boomerang model of advocacy contends that activists
in the Global South maneuver around difficult political opportunity structures and/or
lack of resources by reaching out to groups in the Global North.350 This model can also
be reversed when global campaigns seek out partners in the Global South to bolster their
legitimacy.351 The “inverse boomerang” is theorized as creating a paradox, in that
Northern partnership with Southern NGOs may boost campaign legitimacy, but it
simultaneously undermines meaningful stakeholder input.352 The initial goals and
strategies of the Southern groups can be coopted by more powerful groups, who
retranslate their frames to sit better with policy relevant audiences – producing the type
of “vanilla victories” discussed earlier.353
A diverse number of actors and professional identities have mobilized around the
issue in Pakistan over the past decade. Given this complexity, I adopt a wider
conceptualization of who constitutes an “activist,” beyond an NGO-centric
professionalized understanding. This approach includes individuals from loose epistemic
communities like legal fraternities, data scientists and journalists, all of whom saw
themselves at some point during the height of the strikes as doing political work on
drones. According to some activists, popular perceptions in Pakistan of local NGOs as
being corrupt, funding-driven and/or mouthpieces of powerholders means that a lot of
political activism in Pakistan has occurred outside traditional spaces.354
Transnational advocacy issue networks are deeply impacted by broader
geopolitical power dynamics. This chapter focuses on one of the processes through
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which actors with varying levels of power navigate a civil society network – through
inversely vetting more powerful organizations. The inverse vetting concept builds on and
extends a growing body of literature examining patterns of activism in the Global South,
as well as the fragmenting of civil society more broadly.355 These studies consider the
work of grassroots activists at the “other end of the boomerang,” and how less powerful
network actors might exert influence on a transnational level.356 The inverse vetting
process may show another path through which activists based in the Global South enact
agency.
Case Selection Logic
I now turn to a case study on anti-drone mobilization in Pakistan, in which local
activists, at least in part, determined the broader transnational issue network’s ability to
unify around a clear advocacy message. Pakistan is just one of several countries affected
by U.S. drone strikes. The U.S. undertakes lethal drone strikes in six other countries, all
with varying levels of intensity, visibility and local conflict levels. Given the diversity of
these settings, closely examining any one of these contexts would almost certainly reap
different insights. I selected Pakistan as a single most-likely case for transnational
advocacy networking for this chapter. This is because while Pakistan is not considered a
fully democratic society by sources like Freedom House and the Fund for Peace, it does
still have a vibrant – albeit heavily monitored - civil society.357 Under these domestic
conditions, we would expect to see local advocacy efforts boomerang.358
U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan
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While Chapter 1 broadly covers the transnational armed drone issue, it is useful
here to specifically and more closely examine the US’s history of using armed drones for
targeted killings in Pakistan. The US-Pakistani partnership in the Global War on
Terrorism has been fraught and generally untrusting.359 On the Pakistani side, this
distrust is in part due to the U.S. censure of its nuclear program in the 1990s, and the
general perception that the US uses and abandons Pakistan for its own gain.360 U.S.
frustration stems mainly from supposedly ongoing Pakistani deep state support for
militants like the Haqqani network, despite civilian government assurances to the
contrary.361 Coupled with the US’s perceived strategic importance of Pakistan’s tribal
areas as an extension of the Afghan battlefield, this uneasy alliance heavily influenced the
US’s decision to rely on targeted killing by armed drones as its key counterterrorism
tactic in Pakistan.
On 18 June 2004, the first recorded drone strike in Pakistan reportedly killed Nek
Muhammed Wazir, an individual classified as a target by the US, and his 8- and 10-yearold children, alongside 2-5 others.362 This was one of 51 strikes undertaken during
George W. Bush’s Administration, which culminated in a final strike on 2 January 2009,
just 18 days before President Barack Obama took office. Between 2004-2009, estimates
from lowest to highest report that 410-595 people were killed in the Pakistan strikes
during the Bush years, with anywhere from 167-332 of these being civilians, and 102-129
of these numbers being children.363 An additional 175-255 people were reported injured,
and during Bush’s tenure, the U.S. drone program was never officially acknowledged.
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22 January 2009 - just five days after his inauguration – marked the first strikes
under President Obama in Pakistan.364 These strikes heralded in a new phase in US drone
warfare in general – one that was much expanded in frequency, intensity and
deadliness.365 This new chapter was especially relevant to Pakistan in particular, as
dramatically increasing the number of attacks in the tribal regions was a hallmark of the
Obama Administration’s strategy – indeed, all 54 drone strikes in 2009 alone took place
in Pakistan.366 Between January 2009 and January 2016, Pakistan’s tribal areas saw a
minimum of 375 reported strikes, 2,095-3,415 overall reported deaths, and 990-1,474
reported injuries.367
The increasing number of strikes in Pakistan was matched with a greater
institutionalization of target killing outside active battle zones into the framework of US
foreign policy.368 This legalization – the process of bringing this new practice into
preexisting legal frameworks through Office of Legal Council (OLC) memos – focused
in large part on strikes outside the active zones of hostility in Iraq and Afghanistan, in
order to encompass the Obama Administration’s pivoted focus to Pakistan, Yemen and
Somalia.369 Alongside this institutionalization, or perhaps as part of it, the Obama
Administration offered the first official U.S. acknowledgement of the drone program in
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2012. The Administration was slow to reveal its legal justifications for the extra-territorial
strikes – leading many to criticize the government’s use of “secret law.”370
Pakistan’s Ambiguous Stance on U.S. Drones
The Pakistani government found itself in a delicate situation regarding its stance
on the U.S. strikes, 371 something that deeply complicated local activists’ attempts to seek
redress. The Pakistani government has been reluctant to take ownership – or to even
discuss cooperation with the US – in the strikes occurring within its northwestern
territories. Admitting complicity would open a floodgate of questions domestically, most
controversial of which being why the government cooperated with Americans to kill
Pakistanis in Pakistan.372 Public support and endorsement would also raise questions of
the government’s responsibility to compensate victims for collateral damage caused by
the attacks and could possibly serve as fodder for anti-state groups.373
On the other hand, the government was also cautious not to disavow all
responsibility for the bombing. One of the more pressing reasons for this is likely a
desire to avoid framing the strikes as an unchecked foreign military incursion into
Pakistan’s sovereign territory – something that would portray the state as weak and
unable to govern its own territory in an area of crucial strategic interest. The
government’s political tightrope walk resulted in what was likely an intentional public
stance of ambiguity towards the drone strikes. As former President Pervez Musharraf
reportedly told a CIA employee regarding plausible deniability: “in Pakistan, things fall
out of the sky all the time.”374 Activists cite this quote as revealing the extreme challenges
they face on the issue.375
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Pakistani Civil Society Mobilizing Against Drones
Pakistani nongovernmental groups face significant challenges regardless of which
issues they work on, and government regulations at times impedes operations. The 2011
Save the Children controversy – in which a CIA agent used a vaccination program to
gather intelligence on Osama bin Laden - served as the inciting incident for a broad and
lasting crackdown on international organizations within the country.376 Subsequent
legislation regarding INGO license registrations has made it difficult for some
organization to continue operations and has resulted in the expulsion of at least 20
INGOs on the basis of suspected anti-state activity.377 Working with INGOs has also
become more difficult for domestic groups under these restrictions, as the domestic
groups bring more government scrutiny on themselves in attempting to register
international partners, or to receive international funding.
Despite this difficult operational landscape, domestic mobilization against the
drone strikes did exist in significant ways during the height of the bombings between
2010 and 2017. Islamabad has been a key hub of Pakistani anti-drone activity. It houses
the headquarters of organizations that have worked on drones, such as the Foundation
for Fundamental Rights, the Conflict Monitoring Center, the Pakistan Institute for Peace
Studies and others. It is also the location of relevant law and media offices of notable
attorneys and journalists, who have at times acted as individual issue entrepreneurs from
within loose epistemic communities. Since it is Pakistan’s political capital and is relatively
close to the drone-affected tribal regions, Islamabad also served as a base for significant
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drone protest activity, especially outside of the National Press Club. Indeed, popular
protest was one of the three primary strategies of drone strike resistance in Pakistan, with
the other two being litigation and data advocacy (or, the collection of statistics on
casualties).
Protests and public demonstrations were a key form of domestic mobilization
against drones in Pakistan. These protests occurred both in the targeted areas of the
tribal regions where they blocked NATO supplies from entering Afghanistan, as well as
large cities like Peshawar and Islamabad.378 These protests typically coincided with
specific strikes, such as the 2011 bombing that killed at least 38 people gathered for a
tribal dispute resolution meeting.379 The most notable of these demonstrations was led by
Pakistani politician Imran Khan in 2012, when he tried to lead a convoy of 100 vehicles
from Islamabad to South Waziristan to bring international attention to the strikes;
international activists from Code Pink and Reprieve UK were amongst the delegation.380
Khan served as a prominent, key voice against drones before his election as Prime
Minister in 2018, oftentimes condemning the policy in speeches and rallies.381
Litigation advocacy was also a key tactic for trying to address the damage caused
by drone strikes in Pakistan. Indeed, a large number of individuals who worked on the
armed drone issue were attorneys at various levels of the Pakistani courts. Litigation
advocacy primarily focused on individual victim compensation by the Pakistani
government, and these suits took place both on individual levels and also through
NGOs. In one case filed on behalf of the Rehman family at the Supreme Court of
Pakistan, advocates petitioned Pakistan’s interior ministry to provide compensation for
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the deaths of ten kinsmen in a single drone strike.382 The most (in)famous of these cases
– a victim compensation suit for KP resident Kareem Khan – resulted in the intentional
outing of the CIA station chief in Islamabad, as he was named as party to the suit.383 The
CIA employee was recalled from Pakistan, something that Shahzad Akbar – Khan’s
attorney – attributed to a desire not to appear in court, since he might not qualify for
diplomatic immunity.384
These compensation cases were difficult to argue and nearly impossible to win in
Pakistan for several reasons. First, as discussed earlier, the Pakistani government wanted
to avoid inadvertently admitting complicity by granting victim compensation. Second,
before 2018 the drone-affected population – all residents of the tribal regions – were
unable to petition the Supreme Court under a law called the Frontier Crimes Regulation.
Lastly, the ultimate responsibility of a foreign government for the killing complicated
attempts to litigate victims’ cases domestically.385 Due to these challenges, the cases were
elevated to the international level for publicity. In 2013, the Rehman family traveled with
Akbar (their attorney) to Washington D.C. to testify in front of the U.S. Congress.386 This
publicity event took the collaboration of Akbar’s Foundation for Fundamental Rights
and the U.K.-based organization Reprieve.387 In a separate international publicity
campaign, a Pakistani journalist brought the family’s young girl Nabila, her father, and
Khan to Japan in order to discuss the fallout of the drone program with the Japanese
government and media.388
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Lastly, data advocacy was another significant way that Pakistani issue
entrepreneurs confronted U.S. drone strikes. Since the early days of the war on terror,
transnational data activists in large part focused on casualty counting. This tactic became
popularized amongst activists specifically during the 2003 Iraq War, with groups like Iraq
Body Count (IBC) creating a public database on the number of people killed during the
conflict.389 With transparency and accountability being two primary concerns of data
advocacy, the opaqueness of the drone war in Pakistan alarmed many national and
international activists.390 Since the drone program is classified, official data on dronerelated deaths has been hard to come by, and White House reporting on the numbers has
been widely criticized as being too low.391 The group Pakistan Body Count (PBC) –
headed by data scientist Zeeshan Usmani – followed the model of IBC. PBC recorded
deaths caused by both U.S. drone strikes as well as terrorist attacks in Pakistan. Given the
controversial nature of measuring Pakistani attitudes on drone strikes, other data
advocacy groups conducted public opinion research in the tribal regions.
Negotiating the Boomerang
Individuals and groups that held significantly divergent understandings of the
“drone problem” tended to avoid overt ties with transnational civil society. A closer look
suggests that rather than just being a product of different understandings, the local actors
who chose to rebuff or renegotiate partnering overtures with transnational groups
reportedly did so because they did not assess them as worthy partners. These inverse
vetting processes sometimes resulted in a refusal to work on drones with international
partners at all, or resulted in processes of re-negotiation so that the proposed partnership
better represented their interests.
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Rather than falling into the “Ban Drones” or “Lawful Usage” frames described in
Chapter 1 and explored in Chapters 3 and 4, many of these local actors fall into the third
frame category: the “Neocolonialism” frame. The “Neocolonialism” frame is more
complex than the other categories, because it does not easily mesh with professionalized
understandings of transnational advocacy. Here, technology, policy, state control,
colonial legacies, and even hierarchy in transnational civil society are all imbricated
problems. This differing frame, explored through interview evidence below, included a
general distrust of INGOs as institutions and the problem conceptualization of drones as
being merely one of many human security issues in KP. Indeed, due to a hostile political
opportunity structure, activists described having to be extra cautious when choosing
international partners in order to make sure the groups were trustworthy and would not
betray their confidential assistance. In these ways, after making offers for partnership,
gatekeeper organizations were subjected to vetting processes by these grassroots actors
according to internal standards of ethicality and efficacy.
All of that being said, there are prominent examples of Pakistani issue
entrepreneurs and NGOs that did form robust and public ties with transnational civil
society. These organizations – Foundational for Fundamental Rights and Pakistan Body
Count – present similar problem conceptions and engage in the same advocacy
repertoires as their transnational partners – they more easily fall into the “Lawful Usage”
and “Ban Drones” frames. The analytical portion of the chapter is structured around
exploring the unique dynamics present in these two clusters: groups that either avoided
or heavily renegotiated relationships with transnationals, and groups that formed
relationships with international partners.
Skepticism towards INGOs and Transnational Society
According to several informants, the perceived untouchability of the drone issue
in Pakistan and the possibility of INGO complicity with perpetrating governments or
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methodological carelessness with confidentiality was a key reason that they cited for
vetting transnational partners. Rather serving as a key impetus for reaching out to
gatekeepers, the unique challenges of advocating on a national security-related issue from
Pakistan led these actors to either renegotiate or circumnavigate the conditions of
partnering in transnational advocacy. According to these activists, this was because the
dangerous conditions made finding reliable partners essential. For example, this
perception of danger for activists, at least in one important incident, led a local group to
insist on renegotiating a collaborative proposal made by a large international
organization.
In addition to their career as a journalist, Ibrahim headed up a human security
organization during the crescendo of US drone attacks. Ibrahim explained to me how in
his opinion, the external dangers made the need for caution in conducting anti-drone
advocacy and by extension choosing international partners very real. When I asked him
to elaborate on these consequences for not being cautious with anti-drone advocacy in
Pakistan, Ibrahim elaborated:
Author: Because the government could block funding? Or block the
project?—
Ibrahim: They can block us (Ibrahim laughs darkly).
Author: Yeah? The organization?
Ibrahim: They [Pakistan’s security forces] can do whatever they wanted, you
probably would be no more, if they don’t like you to be. To be no more …
That’s an easy job for them. So why should we be taking on things this way?”392
According to Ibrahim, the knowledge of these potential consequences factored
into the need to vet potential international partners for reliability. It was in this
security context that a large, well-known INGO that I will call Human Security
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Champions (HSC)– which is primarily focused on accountability, transparency and
human rights – first made contact with his group, according to Ibrahim. Given a
desire to keep both his staff and organization safe, he rebuffed HSC’s initial proposal.
Ibrahim described the outreach as such:
“Human Security Champions worked quite closely on this very issue [armed
drones]… and they were … asking for someone to partner with [so they] could
get the issue published. But we were again, not willing and not able to do that
under our name because it involves quite a bit of sensitivities, and here in
Pakistan you know it’s impossible to talk- to get that published. So, we couldn’t
do that … 393
Ibrahim rebuffed HSC’s initial proposal to partner, because they originally
wanted to use his organization’s name for transparency purposes. He ended up
negotiating a partnership with HSC that better suited his group’s unique position.
They describe this negotiated compromise below:
“We reached an understanding with [HSC] that we gather data from the people
[in FATA]. We gathered some data about people, pictures, some evidences,
and then we had some interviews and video evidence from the ground, um but
again we were not able to get that published [under our name].
That was the understanding, we had the data on the numbers, how much was
the number of the drone attacks, where were these drone attacks … So that
was the understanding, that we would do that [share information] but not
under our own name. I have been providing them some input on that very
issue, but when it would come to my name, uh, putting me- or for that matter
doing that under my name, I would say no.”394
This was indeed a process of negotiation between two actors with differing
interests and vastly differing levels of power. Like other powerful INGOs, HSC puts a
premium on accountability and transparency of information and sources, an operational
procedure arising from their reputational need for credibility.395 According to Ibrahim,
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HSC even suggested that they could work in an open partnership if he conducted the
work under the mantel of a different domestic institution he was also affiliated with, in
order to avoid naming his NGO. Ibrahim still “said no” to this revised proposal, and the
partnership remained anonymous. Ibrahim’s NGO facilitated the fieldwork, while HSC
used the information gathered to launch an influential report at the transnational level. In
his words, Ibrahim had only agreed to partner after HSC could reliably demonstrate that
they would take steps to protect their local partners and not merely benefit by extracting
information and labor.396
A healthy skepticism towards the motivations, efficacy and methods of
transnational society. In addition to questioning the ability of INGOs to keep local
partners safe, some respondents described to me that distance from the problem and a
supposed lack of understanding of the tribal region’s conflict dynamics made INGOs
poor potential partners. In light of these positions, the implementation of local actors’
goals and strategies resulted in a process of rigorous inverse vetting – in which external
project proposals were measured against specific internal standards of quality and
ethicality.
For example, one reason that this inverse vetting process ended in rejection,
according to what a local actor explained to me, was because they assessed a would-be
transnational partner’s project as being poorly designed. HSC was not the only
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international organization to reach out to Ibrahim’s group. An equally influential and
more widely recognizable human rights gatekeeper organization that I will call
International Human Rights Defenders (IHRD) also contacted Ibrahim as part of its
wider drone-related advocacy. However, Ibrahim was much less enthusiastic about this
INGO’s work, as they detail below:
“IHRD worked a lot on the issue, and they would reach out to me from time
to time, but that was not a properly designed study. That would be from, sort
of project to project or say, for an article, or for that matter for the research …
they would be just reaching out, asking for some questions, asking for some
input I would be providing to them, and that’s not a properly designed study”397
Ibrahim clarified that where their confidential work with HSC was a real
“partnership,” the type of collaboration IHRD proposed was a much less desirable
parachuting in method. According to him, HSC’s desire to “get the story in FATA right”
through intensive, on the ground fieldwork was a key difference between the two
international groups’ approaches:
“HSC did the project the way it should be. We filtered our people on the
ground; we sent then out to FATA, South Waziristan, and everywhere we had
these drone attacks on. They gathered the data; they collected the evidences
[sic]; they did the whole tour on the ground; and we got that collected.”398
The grievance that led Ibrahim to rebuff IHRD’s proposal – that internationals
do not want to take the time to get FATA’s story correct “from the ground” – threaded
through several interviews I conducted in Islamabad. The animating assumption of this
grievance is that transnational civil society’s geographic and symbolic distance from
Pakistan’s tribal regions breeds misperceptions over the human security problem in the
area. For example, another interviewee named “Saeed” characterized INGO work on
drones in Pakistan as primarily occurring from a “safe distance.” When asked about
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Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch’s work on the subject in the country,
Saeed – an attorney based in Punjab – interrupted:
“Where?! Drone strikes were happening in Pakistan! Alright? Maybe they were
raising voices against… They were raising voice against [drones] at UN…”
[They continued by clarifying why this distance is insulting, stating:] “…my point of view
is, that even when your own government is silent, who will speak on your
behalf? And who will speak on behalf of the people of FATA?”399

In addition to appraising the methodology of a proposed project, this inverse
vetting also extended to scrutinizing the funding agency behind INGO projects. This is
evidenced in ‘Fahad’s’ decision to reject an offer of project partnership with a third
INGO, which I will call Global Development Coalition (GDC) due to the fact that the
project was funded by USAID. Fahad is the former president of a development-focused
NGO that works in FATA, while GDC is a large international organization that focuses
primarily on development in conflict and post-conflict zones, including projects on
countering violent extremism. GDC contacted Fahad and proposed that their
organizations collaborate on a rehabilitation project focused on civilians injured by the
war on terror in what was then FATA. This project included working with victims of
explosive remnants of war more generally, but also with civilians specifically affected by
drone strikes. Fahad describes the project below, as well as the reason for rejecting it:
“…that [project] was particularly for the bomb blast, you know, victims’
families and those who were injured in the bomb blast. It was funded by
USAID, so we refused to partner. We received an offer from that
organization [GDC]… [but] the funding was from USAID, so I refused. I
said: ‘it’s just hypocrisy.’”400
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Where Ibrahim had rejected an inverse boomerang throw for methodological
reasons, Fahad rejected the gatekeeper’s overture for ethical reasons. The partnership
GDC proposed would have certainly amplified the type of work Fahad’s group was
already conducting in FATA. However, for Fahad, the proposed project’s monetary
connection to very state perpetrating the violence was a red line he would not cross.
Drones as Only Part of a Bigger Problem
Individuals that I spoke to who were from the drone-affected areas tended to
view the security situation in the tribal regions much more broadly and historically than
any single military tactic like drone strikes. For context, the legitimacy of the Durand
Line – drawn up by colonial powers in 1893 to separate Afghanistan and Pakistan– has
fomented ongoing conflict between both state and nonstate actors in the area. The
border divides the region historically inhabited by Pashtun tribes – an ethnic group
indigenous to the region that is now southern Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan.
This diaspora led to intense anti-colonial sentiments amongst the Pashtuns towards
imperial Britain, and the continued recognition of the border motivates ongoing Pashtun
nationalism that sees itself as oppositional to the Pakistani state. These pre-existing
tensions came to the fore post-9/11, when the U.S. war in Afghanistan pushed militants
deep within Pakistan, inflaming pre-existent domestic extremism issues. The post-9/11
period has proven a bloody one for residents of the tribal areas, who are squeezed
between terrorist attacks and extortion by extremists, and counterinsurgency operations
by the state.
My interactions with “Massoud” offers an example of how some local actors
view drone activism as fitting into this complex human security situation. Massoud is a
Pashtun rights activist. Their work on the drone issue began early– according to them,
they organized and led one of the first large protests against the policy in Islamabad.
Massoud was quick to note that their involvement in protest activities was specifically
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against the deaths caused by the 2011 jirga strike, that this activism was not in tandem
with international groups’ or Imran Khan’s work on the subject, and that the extrajudicial
killing of the targeted militants was not his concern:

“When I was protesting, it [the motivation] was drone attack on civilians. The
village council – the jirga… Many of the elders were just killed in that drone.
That’s why I came out. Otherwise I was very loud against these armed groups.
From the jihad and all the things. I denounce [militants] openly in my writings
and speeches. But when that happened on jirga, I said no. That’s not the
way.”401

This qualifying language about drone protests being disconnected from support
for militants gets to the heart of what Massoud thinks outsiders supposedly do not
understand about FATA’s political situation. Namely, that the tribal area’s residents are
not only killed in occasional drone strikes by the US government, but that they are also
constantly subjected to terrorist attacks by militants and large-scale military operations by
the Pakistani military. And, importantly, that many Pakistanis outside the tribal regions
supposedly do not know much about the tribal regions due to its lack of coverage in the
mainstream domestic media. Massoud continued, explaining to me his opinion that
INGOs do not grasp this unique conflict situation:
“Massoud: And by the way, the international organizations, the NGOs, are not
very much aware of the dynamics. Because they are not aware about the
relationship between the state and the tribal region. They don’t pay any
attention to see how the state – you know what are the rules of business of the
state in the region.
Author: Could you go into that more? What don’t they understand?
Massoud: Okay, uh, this region, the people of this region, they used for the
Afghan war in the 80s. It was a very groundbreaking process for militarizing
everything. Once they successfully militarized, then every action on them was
justified. In Pakistan and internationally. And even the US, the Americans,
401
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considered these peoples savages. They considered the people savage, not -you
know- human. There is no civilization, people are still living in tribal situations,
its lawless, and no-man’s land. It’s lawless, so we have to do this [intervene
militarily].”

‘Shoaib’ (another interviewee present): Ilaqa gher means the land of others. It is
the ilaqa gher of Pakistan. It is a state word used for the tribal area.”
Massoud: The people within Pakistan, the policymakers and the researchers
again they are not familiar with the dynamics in the tribal areas. How can
international NGOs be? They are just imposing things. It is counter-productive
… The international organization are not accurate while making opinion.”402

As seen from this exchange, the perception of distance and power asymmetries
between themselves and transnational civil society arises largely from this region’s
difficult human security situation. This attitude was most pronounced in interviews with
individuals from the tribal regions, like Massoud. This exchange also highlights how
some local actors closest to the conflict think that transnational actors do not understand
the conflict dynamics of the tribal regions enough to represent their interests. Of course,
these are statements of opinion by specific individuals, and merely represent a perception
and not necessarily objective reality. For example, as described earlier, the report that
Ibrahim and HSC collaborated on did focus significant attention on the totality of the
tribal area’s challenges.
That being said, this “Neocolonialism” frame’s broad framing of human security
threats is generally very different from how transnational civil society groups work, since
professionalized organizations tend to focus on rigidly delineated issues. For example,
both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch focus on concepts such as the
legality of targeted killing, as well as the proportionality of civilian casualties in drone
strikes. Activists like Massoud are more concerned with a broader tapestry of civilian
402
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harm in the tribal areas, including civilian casualties by drones, but also internally
displaced peoples, cultural discrimination, economic justice, and how both historical and
modern colonial underpinnings perpetuate these problems. Out of this unique security
situation arises the perception that the extrajudicial killing of terrorist suspects is not a
problem with drones, but in fact a potential benefit. Additionally, given the general
antagonistic attitudes towards the state within ethnic nationalist circles, concerns over
state sovereignty are also non-issues. The “problem with drones” for these individuals
then mostly surrounds lawful usage – civilian deaths, societal harm, cultural sovereignty,
and the potential that the Pakistani state is complicit in the U.S. operations.
“Afzal,” an author who has published on these conflict dynamics in the tribal
areas, explained his perception of these operational and ideational differences between the
local and transnational:
“So the international NGOs that are protesting, they are right in their own
place because drones are used against humans. And whosoever is targeted
by drones is killed extrajudicially. And this is wrong. That is against human
rights, that is against fundamental rights, it is against anything that stands
in this world. Whether it is religious or secular. So that is the major issue.
We have another understanding… In Pakistan, Taliban are the vanguard
of the Pakistani military establishment. So they [the Taliban] go there, and
the military will follow.
When they [INGOs] are speaking against the drone they … actually want
peace. And when there is drone - the use of weaponized drone - that means
there is no peace. It is disturbed. And so at their level they are right.
But when it comes to the ground realities, when it comes to the common
people, the affectees, so the people who are affected by the existence of
these militants… If there are Taliban, and the drones are targeting, they
will feel relieved. But the people at the international level, when they are
campaigning against the drones at the international level, they actually want
peace. They are against the extrajudicial killing of any individual; citizen of
any country.
So they are right at their own level. People here are right at their own…
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… We do respect those [INGO] people who are against drones [targeting
suspects]. But the people would certainly see that how drone is used …
usually a common man, is least concerned with international politics.”403
These differences in problem conception seemed to be a major reason activists like
Massoud was uninterested in initiating ties with transnational groups, even when they were
resisting drone strike casualties through protest with no response from the government.
According to them, a focus on just one tactic like drones – rather than the entire portrait
of dispossession, explained by Afzal above – is a simplistic understanding of the human
security crisis the tribal areas face. For example, it was Massoud’s interpretation that many
individuals in the tribal areas regard the militants who terrorize their villages and families
with much more hatred than the drones. Again, in this context, drones are a problem when
they hit and terrorize the wrong people – the legitimacy of extrajudicially killing a
‘combatant’ is a non-issue, since these may be the same individuals perpetrating violence
in their communities. According to Massoud as well as another interviewee named
‘Shoaib,’ this was to the extent that some locals came to call the U.S. drones ababil – a
reference to great Quranic birds that would drop tiny stones from the sky onto the
approaching enemies of Mecca to kill them instantly.404 Massoud continued, elucidating
how some individuals in FATA perceive the “biggest” threat in the wider humanitarian
crisis to be the Pakistani state:
“Those who are in favor of drone attacks were actually looking into it as an
alternative to a massive military operation. Due to this massive and large-scale
military operation, people used to force to move out of their towns, and farms.
They forced to stay away from their villages. Larger destruction than
drones.”405
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This quote suggests that many closest to the ground are view acts of violence by
both state and nonstate according to scale – and that drones are ‘the lesser evil’ in this
calculus. A resident of KP who was present during my interview, “Javed,” was quick to
agree with this assertion, but warned that “nobody is supporting drone without
comparison.”406 Indicative of this complicated political context, Massoud informed me of
another word locals used to describe drones: mangana. Mangana, they explained, captured
the sound of the drone, but also the psychological terror that the buzz instilled in people
at the height of the bombing. Massoud elaborated, comparing the drones to alternative
repertoires of violence: “They are both evils, but nobody likes it. It’s [drone strike] a lesser
evil... But it is an evil.”407 Descriptors like ababil and mangana demonstrate how activists like
Massoud, Javed and Shoaib might perceive the focused messaging by INGOs, and even
mid-level groups like Code Pink, as frustrating for their own political ends. This is because,
in their opinion, the issue-based focus of transnational groups working on drones
steamrolls the complicated local conflict dynamics within FATA. Javed’s closing statement
eloquently presented this sentiment:
“We are the victims. Whether the drones are ‘legal’ or ‘illegal,’ our people suffer,
our children suffer, our schools and institutions suffer… So we are the victim.
If someone says [under international law] it was militant who was the victim, it
is not right. We are the victims.”408
Making Connections
While all of the above suggests how differences in framing might kick off inverse
vetting processes and ultimately hamper relationships with transnational NGOs, two
outlying examples of close partnering between transnational and Pakistani NGOs merit
closer examination. These Pakistani NGOs – the Foundation for Fundamental Rights
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(FFR) and Pakistan Body Count (PBC)– collaborated with transnational activists to
differing extents.409 The anti-drone frames that both organizations chose cohered with
the hegemonic framing at the transnational level – the “Lawful Usage” frame. Since
frame choice is a key factor that goes into whether or not a group engages in inverse
vetting, these frame similarities between these two Pakistani NGOs and their
transnational partners may have made their relationships less conflictual. In their own
ways, both of these organizations’ presentations of the “drone problem” map onto their
transnational counterparts’ “Lawful Usage” framings, unlike the groups discussed above
who fall into the “Neocolonialism” frame.
Founded by barrister Shahzad Akbar, FFR is a Pakistani human rights NGO that
advocates on issues such as lethal drone strikes, state torture and capital punishment.
Attorneys affiliated with the NGO represented compensation cases for drone strike
victims in national courts with the aim of holding responsible both the Pakistani and US
governments. For example. FFR filed a case on behalf of families affected by the 2011
jirga strike in which the Peshawar High Court ruled that US drone strikes were illegal, and
that the Pakistani government must provide legal redress to the victims. Explaining the
case, FFR argues that “the strikes constitute a serious breach of the Geneva
Conventions,” and that “the U.S. Government is bound to compensate all the victims’
families and that the Pakistani Government should take steps to ensure that this
happened immediately.”410 For an example of the “Lawful Usage” Frame on FFR’s
website, see Figure 1:
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Figure 5.1: “Lawful Usage” Frame on FFR’s Drone Portal
The most (in)famous of these cases was the one filed on behalf of Kareem Khan, in an
attempt to bring a criminal case against CIA officials in Pakistan. As mentioned earlier,
Akbar purposely outed the identity of the CIA station chief in Islamabad by naming him
as a party in the lawsuit, stating that the US had no “legal authority” to conduct lethal
strikes within the country.
Data scientist Dr. Zeeshan Usmani founded PBC in 2006 in order to create a
dataset of terrorist bombings for his doctoral dissertation. Frustrated with the lack of
credible casualty numbers in what was formerly called FATA, Usmani later expanded his
initial advocacy project to include the armed drone issue to his website’s database. PBC
collected this data from media sources and hospitals and published the numbers on their
website in order to publicize the “intensity” of the human security situation in Pakistan.
As an academic and data scientist, Usmani has published research on drone deaths in
venues such as Brown University’s Cost of War project.411 While he stopped updating the
project’s online presence in 2014, PBC offers several models of data presentation, from
charts with granular details of individual strikes to interactive maps that allows visitors to
see the exact location of the strikes.
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Unlike the individuals and group discussed in the previous subsection, FFR and
PBC have partnered openly with multiple international groups, including both nationaland transnational-focused groups. PBC is a member of the transnational casualty
recorders network called Every Casualty, which also includes international NGOs like
members of the European Forum on Armed Drones (EFAD) Article 36 and The Bureau
of Investigative Journalism (TBIJ). In terms of nationally-focused NGOs, Akbar and
CodePink founder Medea Benjamin share both a close professional relationship. In 2012,
by invitation of Akbar and Imran Khan, CodePink members travelled to Islamabad in
order to participate in a planned anti-drone protest, called The Waziristan Peace March.
The CodePink delegation of 35 Americans met with Shahzad Akbar in Islamabad, where
they hosted a joint news conference for their planned march. This protest was planned as
a caravan to South Waziristan but was blocked at a checkpoint before it could enter the
tribal areas. Both groups’ stated purpose of the march was to bring visibility to the
civilian casualties caused by drones, and the illegal lethal targeting by the US
government.412
In terms of the transnational level, Akbar himself is a key network broker within
the wider drone issue area. While running FFR, he also held a long-term visiting research
fellowship at Reprieve – a UK organization and EFAD member. In this partnership,
FFR has played a largely facilitating role, brokering meetings with people impacted by US
drone strikes in Pakistan across Europe and the US. He also speaks about the human
rights implications of drone strikes in international forums well-attended by policymaking
audiences, such as a side event on armed drones at the UN in 2017, and an event in
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Islamabad where he hosted a UN Special Rapporteur.413 Figure 2 below shows a visual
example of these transnational linkages from FFR’s website:

Figure 5.2: FFR’s Anti-Drone Campaign Partner Page
FFR also maintains an organizational presence at international advocacy summits
like the Humanitarian Disarmament Forum, which is also attended by representatives
from gatekeeper organizations like HRW and AI.414 Akbar also authored the chapter
discussing drones from a human rights law perspective in the 2017 Humanitarian Impact
of Armed Drones report, a key advocacy document from the transnational humanitarian
disarmament community.415
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While several factors likely explain why FFR and PBC maintained open
partnerships with transnational civil society when other Pakistani groups did not, these
two groups’ preferred anti-drone frames may be an important part of the story as to why
an inverse vetting process did not cut off these relationships.
As a casualty counting NGO, PBC taps into a wider transnational community
that puts a premium on transparency and accountability surrounding wartime deaths.
These organizations, such as TBIJ, focus not only on counting the dead but also call for
clear targeting criteria in order to assess the policy’s guidelines for using lethal force – a
frame that falls into the “Lawful Usage” category. Usmani similarly argues that the main
“problem of drone warfare” is the opaqueness of the policy’s targeting procedures.416 He
counters the U.S. government’s official precision-strike narrative, arguing that “while
drone technology may be able to reduce a building to a debris field [and] leav[e] the one
next to it standing,” the government’s wide targeting criteria cannot reap precise
outcomes.417 This type of argumentation is in line with many member organizations in
the Casualty Recorders Network.418
As a human rights advocacy group, FFR engages in the parlance of universal
human rights law.419 FFR’s “problems with drones” are primarily legalistic, in that they
are concerned with extrajudicial execution, rule of law and sovereignty, as exemplified in
this official statement: “drone assassinations violate international and domestic law,
negate due process, and violate the principle that everyone is innocent before the law
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until proven guilty.”420 International human rights groups have consistently framed the
problem of drones as one of policy – whether the US’s use of targeted killing is legal or
not. Akbar’s contribution to the 2017 Humanitarian Impact of Drones report adopts this
same legalistic language, with terms like “targeted killing,” “collateral damage.”421 This is
echoed on the organizations’ website, which argues that contrary to the strikes killing
mostly militants, “mostly civilians have been killed with some militant “collateral
damage” resulting.”422
Discussion and Conclusion
This chapter has explored how relational processes between local grassroots
actors and international activists influence the overall formation of cohesive transnational
advocacy, and suggests the need for greater attention to coalition-building processes at
the “other end” of the boomerang throw. In the anecdotes above, we can see that a
number of local Pakistani actors engaged in inverse vetting processes to determine if
their potential international partners perceived legitimacy of INGOs. In this analysis,
according to my interviewees, INGO legitimacy rested on two specific criteria for local
anti-drone activists: project methodology and ethicality. Opinions on the true human
security issues in the drone-affected areas and a perceived misalignment of interests with
and distrust of international NGOs reportedly factored into some local actors’ decisions
on how they pursued relationships with transnational partners. This was contrary to the
instances in which outlying groups formed ongoing relationships with transnational
partners.
This chapter also offers support for the existence of broader inverse models of
transnational advocacy, like Pallas’s (2017) inverse boomerang. Indeed, in the anecdotes
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shared above, it was the large gatekeeping NGO that first reached out to the local NGO
with specific partnership proposals, rather than the other way around as existent theory
suggests. Building from Pallas’s (2017) work that characterizes INGOs as desiring
partnership with smaller groups for legitimacy, the above case study also suggests that
local groups form relationships with international activists over the perceived legitimacy
of International NGOs as well. This dissertation’s original concept of inverse vetting
constitutes an expansion of this “inverse advocacy processes” literature, by suggesting
that the decision of local actors to work with large gatekeepers may also shape
transnational advocacy processes like cohesive campaign messaging formation.
Importantly, however, this inverse vetting pattern should not be read as a
celebration of unconstrained agency on the parts of grassroots actors. Advocacy
dynamics take place over an uneven terrain of power, and the ability to vet actors does
not have the same weight at both ends of the boomerang throw. Where vetting processes
by gatekeepers have a very real impact on whose ideas get representation in global
governance, vetting processes by less powerful actors should perhaps be thought of as
more acts of resistance, with both symbolic and material power. The unwillingness to
partner with a larger organization may influence the overall network’s cohesion and
legitimacy but the gatekeeper organizations, with their hegemonic understandings and
resources, ultimately remain the governors. In the face of this asymmetry, it is then the
willingness to say “no” that becomes an important symbolic form of power; one which
allows the local actor to create a momentary disruption to make their voices and interests
heard. Here, inverse vetting process should invite scholars to think of the ways that less
powerful actors still matter within networks and to further explore the multiplicity of
ways that they influence global processes like transnational advocacy.
Finally, scholars interested in norm effects – and more specifically, their
“shadow” effects – may also find the case of drones in the Pakistani context useful.
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Many see that norms surrounding civilian protection in armed conflict strengthened over
the course of 20th century warfare, with governments increasingly facing heavier censure
for using indiscriminate military tactics and weapons.423 This censure may extend to
domestic constituencies as well as international ones— public opinion of foreign policy
has proven a potentially important variable in democratic elections.424 In part due to an
increasing sensitivity to the civilian protection norm, the ability of a weapon to deliver
precise, sanitized warfare with minimal casualties factors into American citizens’ support
for a specific weapon.425 Given these conditions, drone warfare might constitute a case of
norm shadow effects, in that it could be viewed as an evolution in military strategy that is
actually becoming more sensitive towards civilian deaths, albeit in ways many
international activists would not approve of. Interestingly, the actors closest to the
violence in the above case seem the most aware of this possible drone shadow effect, in
that they deem it preferable to the largescale destruction wrought by Army raids.

423

Thomas 2000
Tomz and Weeks 2013
425
Walsh 2015
424

151

CHAPTER SIX
Implications and Conclusion

Introduction
As part of the adjacent events for the 2017 Humanitarian Disarmament Forum,
participants had the option to attend a gala party on a cruise ship-sized vessel, called The
Peace Boat, docked in Manhattan. The Peace Boat is a Japanese NGO focused on
sustainability and human rights; it holds a special consultative status with the Economic
and Social Council of the UN. The organization uses its boat to conduct most of its
activities, including international voyages to promote the UN sustainability goals. The
gala itself was very formal; with tray-passed appetizers, bars, champagne and sake toasts.
I attended this event as part of my fieldwork to watch (and participate with) the
transnational activists I had just spoken to the previous day about their work on drones. I
discussed the intricacies of international law and politics with a champagne flute in my
hand, on the deck of the boat, with the late-night Manhattan skyline as a backdrop. I
remembered these discussions especially vividly when I was in Pakistan conducting
fieldwork for this project a year later. The sheer disconnect between the two locations
was startlingly obvious; I felt impossibly far away, in every way, from that glitzy night in
Manhattan meant to celebrate the accomplishments of the activists in attendance.426
At first glance, this stark difference between the transnational and violenceaffected levels of anti-drone activism seems to be a strong instantiation of IR theories
426

This dislocation – while disorienting - was useful for me as an analyst, since multisited fieldwork brings into focus that there is no one position that grants the researcher
privileged perspective (Pachirat, 2012)
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that point to the power of INGOs in determining transnational advocacy. For example,
Carpenter’s (2011) elite gatekeeping argument discusses power within an advocacy
network by showing how well-resourced and well-connected actors set the agenda. The
implication here is that smaller actors are unable to affect a given advocacy issue network
independently in a significant way. This gatekeeper vetting hypothesis seemed very much
mirrored in the power asymmetries I witnessed during fieldwork as reflected in the
opening vignette, because there was no mention of the less dominant anti-drone frames
amongst transnational activists attending the gala or during the weekend-long forum.
These gatekeeping effects are certainly sometimes operative in specific instances within
the anti-drone network, most apparently in Chapters 3 and 4.
The notion of elite vetting is largely based on studying organizations with varying
levels of power that are all based in the Global North. But this focus on the Global
North does not tell the full story. Scholars who study transnational advocacy
participation by actors in the Global South have shown us that it is equally important to
consider how the less powerful act in a network.427 For example, as I showed in Chapter
5, smaller and less connected groups not only have their own ways of defining the stakes
of a security issue, they also actively resist the frames of larger civil society groups and
base their partnering decisions on this calculus. As I showed in Chapters 3 and 4, this
inverse dynamic exists within the Global North as well. Taking a grounded approach,
which is better suited to studying power “up” - rather than down or horizontally - shows
that otherwise “less powerful” actors are politically significant within the network.428
As argued in the theory chapter of this dissertation and demonstrated in the
empirical chapters, assuming that power is exercised only by powerful actors risks
overlooking or undervaluing how smaller actors present their goals, how they resist
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hegemonic power within the network and how their actions can have political effects
that exceed their intentions. Specifically, as both smaller actors in the Global North and
South use their own frames for the drone issue, refusing to work with or heavily
renegotiating the terms of partnering with larger actors, the drone network becomes less
cohesive and with fragmented messaging. In short, geographically and culturally
dispersed actors resist and exert their own power by seeking to determine what the issue
is to begin with. These diffused exercises of power produces the unintended effect of
hampering the overall network from coming together in collaboration to create an
overarching anti-drone umbrella frame.
In the remainder of this conclusion, I unpack these theoretical concepts in
greater detail, specifically through the lens of the dynamic I have called inverse vetting
before discussing the implications of this concept for the efficacy and possible futures of
transnational advocacy networks.
Inverse Vetting and Power in Transnational Advocacy Networks
The concept of inverse vetting is used throughout this dissertation as a way to
explore how power is operative in transnational advocacy networks and its effects. In
doing so, inverse vetting shows us how smaller, non-gatekeeping actors produce their
own discourses and positions on a human security issue and at times actively assess
whether the position of larger groups fits with their own advocacy goals. In the
subsections below, I will detail how this dissertation has discussed these dynamics in
terms of how actors with varying levels of political power have navigated the anti-armed
drones advocacy issue network.
Vetting Dynamics Between the Global North & South
In Chapter 5 I examined how drone-affected populations –people living closest
to the violence – frame the issue as an imperialistic project. Their assessment was a
product of a perceived experience in which a distinct group (Pashtuns) inhabiting a
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particular geographic area (Northern Pakistan and Southern Afghanistan) had historically
been the subject of both colonial and post-colonial pacification projects. Crucially, these
grassroots actors saw transnational actors associated with the Global North – such as
Human Rights Watch – as themselves being part of a larger globalist project of
domination and cultural erasure. This globalist project includes both international states
as well as their own national government of Pakistan. This perspective, engrained by
these historical experiences and interpretations, gave these actors the discursive tools
with which to justify not working with powerful organizations in the drone issue network.
This is despite the fact that these larger actors were working to mitigate and or regulate
the very drone violence grassroots actors were enduring.
Vetting Dynamics within the Global North
Inverse vetting is not just an argument about a difference in culture and a
corresponding disagreement on how to advocate as a result. The Global North/Global
South divide and the historically mediated power asymmetries it entails gives grassroot
actors significant reasons to vet the transnationals – even though traditional IR theory
stipulates that they should want to work with powerful partners.429 But inverse vetting
also occurs within the Global North between activists with differing power, where
activists share the same cultural sensibilities at least on a broad level. As I demonstrated
in Chapter 4, some US domestic groups refuse to work with larger groups based on the
latter’s lack of perceived radicality. This is because they see drones as a particularly
insidious expression of warfare and violent conflict, something that makes war more
efficient and one-sided. Their opposition to drones, unlike Human Rights Watch (HRW),
is not just a concern with legality but with war in general. As I further showed, this
opposition to transnational framing was grounded in a perception of the US as a
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perpetrator of “endless wars,” including past conflicts like the Vietnam War. Again, the
anti-war discourse made it possible for these groups to define the drone issue in their
own way and assess the larger groups’ position as deficient in achieving their advocacy
goals.
However, it would be inaccurate to say that the US domestic actors – unlike the
violence-affected actors – largely rejected working with the transnational level. Indeed,
there were instances in which discerning actors did see partnering with large gatekeepers
as useful. Furthermore, we can also see the traditional gatekeeper vetting model at work
in this level, as Human Rights Watch purposely avoided partnering with groups it
perceived as taking too strong of stances on issues of war and peace. Nevertheless,
whether or not US domestic actors chose to work with larger groups on particular
occasions, they continued to use their own frames and internal discourses to vet those
opportunities. In short, in instances where partnerships seemed useful, domestic actors
came to that decision based on their own goals and frames.
When we focus on the transnational level of the network itself, we can see similar
patterns. More specifically, we can observe examples of less powerful groups not simply
kotowing to their more powerful counterparts. In Chapter 3, I used the European Forum
on Armed Drones (EFAD) as a case study within a case study in order to explore how
actors at the same level of the network, but with differing levels of power from one
another, make partnering decisions. While EFAD from the outside appears to be a
cohesive network with a comparatively consolidated guiding frame, tracing the processes
through which this “unity” was achieved reveals unique elements of inverse vetting.
Specifically, it shows us some of the conditions under which actors with fundamentally
differing frames agree to work with one another.
The EFAD case reveals that, according to what my interviewees reported, the
perception of meaningful inclusion on the part of less powerful actors is an important
156

component that can determine the result of an inverse vetting process. For example,
smaller and more radical groups initially did not want to work with the gatekeepers
within EFAD because It was their opinion that the gatekeeper’s approach to drones was
too bland. But through a variety of sustained, process-based consensus building activities,
the less powerful actors described attaining a level of satisfaction with the process high
enough to buy into the collaborative project. These lengthy deliberations and sustained
back-and-forth’s between EFAD members created a model flexible enough to promote
heterogenous membership. Again, key to reaching this collaboration was the idea that the
less powerful actors’ concerns were taken seriously by the gatekeepers, even if their frames
were not reflected in the final group advocacy project.
We can compare this transnational-to-transnational process to the transnationalto-violence-affected processes. Far from experiencing such a process-based collaborative
advocacy model, the Pakistani activists described that they perceived the transnationals as
merely “parachuting in,” an approach they said felt insulting and delegitimizing to their
lived experiences. In the EFAD case, the sustained and at times grinding commitment to
make all its members feel respected in their heterogeneous views on drones led the
smaller actors to accept ties with the gatekeepers in their inverse vetting processes.
Contrarily, this described lack of inclusion and respect on the part of transnationals led
the violence-affected activists’ inverse vetting processes to result in refusal to partner.
Implications of Inverse Vetting for Advocacy Networks
As with elite agenda vetting, the complex process of inverse vetting has potential
consequences for transnational advocacy, both in terms of how it is conducted and who
can participate in it. At the most basic level - at least as demonstrated in my findings
specifically on the drone issue - inverse vetting might impact the contours of a network;
put simply, how the overall network “looks” and the cohesiveness of its overall
messaging. On a more nuanced level, inverse vetting processes stand to complicate
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conceptualizations of political and social power within networks. Below I explore these
two implications, which I see as the primary theoretical and empirical imports of the
inverse vetting dynamic I have defined and described throughout this project.
First, inverse vetting processes may lead to more disconnection within advocacy
networks. For example, in addition to exploring the lack of an anti-drone umbrella frame,
another animating empirical puzzle of this dissertation has been why there was so little
connection between the violence-affected level and the transnational level; a dynamic
that theory may have predicted as existing in a more robust manner. Finding that the elite
agenda vetting argument was not applicable in the drone case, a ground-up approach to
explaining this gap pointed to the internal decision-making processes of the violenceaffected actors themselves as rebuffing or heavily renegotiating ties to transnationals,
even when powerful organizations sought ties. Just as elite vetting keeps certain human
security issues off the agenda, inverse vetting may have a similar impact, with the key
difference being the origin of the actors who erect barriers to partnering. Put simply,
inverse vetting expands the number of actors who can say “yes” or “no” to partnerships
and issue framings within a network.
Second, inverse vetting expands our understanding of how power is operative
within transnational advocacy networks. This expansion of agentic actors may mean that
coalition-building in human security issues is even stickier and more conflictual than
once thought, especially when considering the importance of discourse. The occurrence
of inverse vetting at different levels of the transnational network means that gatekeeper
organizations do not entirely control the contours of the network and that they do not
entirely control the discourse on a given issue. On a basic level, these findings expand big
theoretical questions in international relations regarding who can participate in global
civil society, and to what effects. More specifically, looking through the lens of inverse
vetting demonstrates the largely diffused nature of power in an advocacy network. This is
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especially evident when we consider how seemingly small actions and decisions within
the drone network – such as a comparably tiny Pakistani group’s refusal to partner with a
gatekeeper organization over distaste of their framings – have large consequences when
scaled up to the overall transnational network.
These power asymmetries I observed in the network are characterized by actors’
context-specific and historical experiences of conflict that pre-date the use of armed
drones. The most obvious and tangible connection here is between the Pakistani activists
and their constant contending with legacies of colonialism and state domination. But
grassroots actors in the US, such as the most radical anti-war demonstrators who willfully
got arrested during Vietnam protests, also bring their experiences of conflict to armed
drone advocacy. These histories are crucial, because they determine the prisms through
which each actor create their framings and conceptualizations around armed drones.
These distinct, historically informed differences – operationalized through advocacy
frames – allows these actors to claim space in the wider drone issue network that more
powerful actors must contend with. Here, we see that it is not just power asserted that
matters, but also power resisted – which itself is a result of unique histories. The drones
case invites us as scholars to perhaps rethink advocacy not by strictly delineated issues, as
the most powerful political actors do, but rather as stretching well beyond into the realms
of history, morality, and policy.
These implications raise important questions, both empirically and theoretically,
about efficacy and egalitarianism in transnational advocacy. As detailed in the
introductory chapter, the armed drone activists were not able to create a concerted
campaign under a guiding umbrella frame such as the one that coalesced around
landmines and nuclear weapons. Instead, the drone network remains loosely connected
and fractured around three different meta-frames, which themselves have disagreements
within them. Interestingly, several activists in Pakistan defined their idea of success more
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around the concept of “resistance” to globalist projects, which is mutually exclusive to
transnational civil society’s definition of success. Taken together, the empirical chapters
of this dissertation show that one large campaign unified by concise messaging did not
emerge. This is in large part because the three meta-frames actually at times act as three
distinct anti-drones campaigns—ones that are sometimes working at cross-purposes with
one another. While the influx of funding from Open Society Foundation on global antidrones work did not make these groups competitors for funding, by approaching the
issue in contradictory ways, these actors still ended up competing for policy attention
nonetheless.
This dissertation also brings up the question of egalitarianism and efficacy in
transnational advocacy networks, and where these two concepts may have an
opportunity to overlap. From a traditional view, the agency of less powerful actors who
might inversely vet their agendas may be frustrating, as this lack of cooperation is
“ineffective” and “inefficient” in terms of civil society politics. Deep differences
oftentimes exist between actors seeking to advocate on the same human security issue.
As it stands, gatekeeper groups tend to approach this difference by either trying to iron
them out to achieve an advocacy message digestible to state actors,430 or by bringing on a
group from the Global South in a “token” role to boost campaign legitimacy without
including their voices.431
But the armed drone case shows that there is potentially another route that might
expand participation in transnational advocacy in a meaningful and inclusive way. This
potential is evidenced in the fact that the majority of the less powerful actors were willing
– on their own terms – to work in coalition with other actors, but ultimately opted not to
when the gatekeepers did not demonstrate their willingness to take their partnership
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seriously. Put simply, the opportunity for connections were there and the armed drone
advocacy issue was not predestined to reap suboptimal results. Distinct decisions made at
key junctures, by a variety of actors with varying levels of power, led to the
disconnectedness of this issue network. For example, the Pakistani activist who rebuffed
and refused two gatekeeper organizations ultimately ended up renegotiating a partnering
proposal by a third and joined into a meaningful and productive relationship with that
group.
Perhaps the prospect for more egalitarian and effective advocacy lies in
embracing the messiness of this renegotiation through a more reflexive approach to
advocacy – one that entails the gatekeeper organizations recognizing their own
positionality and complicity in geopolitical power structures.432 Of course, this sort of
deep self-reflection on the part of a large and entrenched institutional actor is daunting
and will likely take scarce resources. But given the ultimately normative goals of these
institutions in the area of promoting human security, such self-reflection is a necessary
and worthwhile investment for realizing their goals.
Looking Forward
The current state of the drone advocacy issue does not bode well for its future.
This is evidenced from both an empirical standpoint, looking at how many advocacy
products are created on the topic, as well as from the perceptions of activists. Nearly
every activist I spoke to, when asked about the current state of the anti-armed drone
advocacy issue, described it as “dead,” “done,” or “dying,” even if they themselves still
worked on the issue and described it as being a “very important” topic for human
security. This is despite the fact that more countries and nonstate actors than ever before
are researching and developing their own armed drone technologies. This pessimistic
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outlook is also reflected in my own observations on the issue’s evolution over three and a
half years.
During the latter part of my time researching for this dissertation, organizations
are making key shifts away from the topic altogether. For example, where ReThink
Media has been publishing a weekly bulletin of drone-specific updates for years called the
“Drone Roundup,” at the end of 2020 the listserv title was changed to “ReThink
Roundup,” and now focuses on an array of national security issues. EFAD itself, which I
have described as one of the most active and well-connected hubs, are currently having
internal end-of-life discussions for the network, which includes decisions on how to back
away from the issue but still perhaps keep their website archived. The Interfaith Network
on Armed Drones is also ending its national conferences within the first few months of
2021. Perhaps most ominously, one of the largest funders for drone work, Open Society
Foundation, is stepping away from the issue in a significant way, according to an
employee in a management position.
There are several reasons for this move away from the anti-drone advocacy issue.
First, many smaller groups are either ending or slowing their anti-drone work because
their primary source of funding – OSF – is stepping away from the issue. Second,
activists have blamed the Trump Administration’s chaotic approach to foreign policy as
dropping the armed drones issue far down their list of priorities. In the words of a HRW
activist, the drones topic stood out as problematic under the Obama Administration, but
“when so much is broken” under the Trump Administration, she said it is hard to justify
focusing closely on one small piece of the puzzle.433 Third, at least according to the
activists I spoke with, there is issue fatigue within the community over armed drones.
This arises from a perception that the anti-drones activists “missed the boat” in terms of

433

Phone interview with Author, Transnational 3; 17 June 2019
162

getting states to regulate drones early on, and that proliferation and use has gone too far
to reel back in. Some activists even suggested that seeking a preemptive weapons ban on
autonomous technology would be easier now than achieving regulation of armed drones,
since drones have been too “normalized” now.
This dissertation has focused on advocacy on armed drones as it has existed in
transnational space for about two decades. As has been discussed previously, practices,
technologies, acquisitions, and policies on armed drones have evolved relatively
unabated, making armed drones an entrenched feature of contemporary conflict during
this timeframe. Of course, a counterfactual here – what would have happened if the
drone issue network cohered early on – is impossible to make confidently and perhaps
unfair to the activists who have worked consistently on the issue from its inception,
given the increased resources the military hegemon has poured into distanced and
remote warfare. But just as the drone issue network wasn’t a foregone conclusion,
neither was the trajectory or character of state use.
Despite these disheartening developments from within the network, after twenty
years there may finally be some movement on the part of the US government on
rethinking the 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF). Again, the AUMF has
been the guiding foreign policy doctrine that has served as the legal basis for some of the
most controversial aspects of the US drone program (such as conducting strikes outside
warzones) and counterterrorism operations more broadly. it is important to remember
that the AUMF is much bigger than drones, as it opens questions about executive war
powers. The significance of the fact that the Biden Administration is considering
changing the legal framework for the war against terrorists cannot be overstated in terms
of the effects it would have on US foreign policymaking.434 Whether this potential switch
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in foreign policy direction is a product of domestic war fatigue, an opportune juncture to
rethink big policy questions opened by the COVID-19 pandemic and the one term
presidency of Donald Trump, the result of decades-long work from activists and critics,
or hard-headed Executive Office realism to pass the buck to Congress on foreign wars435
are all empirical questions ripe for future research. It is very likely a mixture of all these
factors.
Returning to this dissertation’s implications in this changing security
environment, the drone advocacy issue network case stands to teach transnational
activists important lessons that they can take forward to future human security
campaigns. Regardless of external policy developments on the advocacy issues, inverse
vetting exists and should be taken seriously. Because as we can see from the drone case, a
failure to create an inclusive advocacy platform resulted in fragmented advocacy.
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